Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Shaddin Dughmi, Jan Vondrák

Type: Preprint

Publication Date: 2011-09-06

Citations: 12

Locations

arXiv (Cornell University) - View

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+	An approximately truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial auctions using value queries	2011	Shaddin Dughmi Tim Roughgarden Jan Vondrák Qiqi Yan
+	From Convex Optimization to Randomized Mechanisms: Toward Optimal Combinatorial Auctions	2011	Shaddin Dughmi Tim Roughgarden Qiqi Yan