In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of $n$ trials so as to maximize the total payoff of the chosen …
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of $n$ trials so as to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the performance of bandit algorithms with a small finite strategy set is quite well understood, bandit problems with large strategy sets are still a topic of very active investigation, motivated by practical applications such as online auctions and web advertisement. The goal of such research is to identify broad and natural classes of strategy sets and payoff functions which enable the design of efficient solutions.
It is not uncommon for certain social networks to divide into two opposing camps in response to stress. This happens, for example, in networks of political parties during winner-takes-all elections, …
It is not uncommon for certain social networks to divide into two opposing camps in response to stress. This happens, for example, in networks of political parties during winner-takes-all elections, in networks of companies competing to establish technical standards, and in networks of nations faced with mounting threats of war. A simple model for these two-sided separations is the dynamical system dX / dt = X 2 , where X is a matrix of the friendliness or unfriendliness between pairs of nodes in the network. Previous simulations suggested that only two types of behavior were possible for this system: Either all relationships become friendly or two hostile factions emerge. Here we prove that for generic initial conditions, these are indeed the only possible outcomes. Our analysis yields a closed-form expression for faction membership as a function of the initial conditions and implies that the initial amount of friendliness in large social networks (started from random initial conditions) determines whether they will end up in intractable conflict or global harmony.
Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g.,in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. …
Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g.,in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami etal. (SODA, 2005) proposed this problem and gave logarithmic approximations (in the number of consumers) for the unit-demand and single-parameter cases where there is a specific set of consumers and their valuations for bundles are known precisely. Subsequently several versions of the problem have been shown to have poly-logarithmic in approximability. This problem has direct ties to the important open question of better understanding the Bayesian optimal mechanism in multi-parameter agent settings; however, for this purpose approximation factors logarithmic in the number of agents are inadequate. It is therefore of vital interest to consider special cases where constant approximations are possible. We consider the unit-demand variant of this pricing problem. Here a consumer has a valuation for each different item and their value for aset of items is simply the maximum value they have for any item in the set. Instead of considering a set of consumers with precisely known preferences, like the prior algorithmic pricing literature, we assume that the preferences of the consumers are drawn from a distribution. This is the standard assumption in economics; furthermore, the setting of a specific set of customers with specific preferences, which is employed in all of the prior work in algorithmic pricing, is a special case of this general Bayesian pricing problem, where there is a discrete Bayesian distribution for preferences specified by picking one consumer uniformly from the given set of consumers. Notice that the distribution over the valuations for the individual items that this generates is obviously correlated. Our work complements these existing works by considering the case where the consumer's valuations for the different items are independent random variables. Our main result is a constant approximation algorithm for this problem that makes use of an interesting connection between this problem and the concept of virtual valuations from the single-parameter Bayesian optimal mechanism design literature.
Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent …
Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent observation. The famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the distribution of each random variable can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a "prophet" who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. We generalize this result to the setting in which the gambler and the prophet are allowed to make more than one selection, subject to a matroid constraint. We show that the gambler can still achieve at least half as much reward as the prophet; this result is the best possible, since it is known that the ratio cannot be improved even in the original prophet inequality, which corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids. Generalizing the result still further, we show that under an intersection of $p$ matroid constraints, the prophet's reward exceeds the gambler's by a factor of at most $O(p)$, and this factor is also tight.
Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. …
Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.
We further develop the group-theoretic approach to fast matrix multiplication introduced by Cohn and Umans, and for the first time use it to derive algorithms asymptotically faster than the standard …
We further develop the group-theoretic approach to fast matrix multiplication introduced by Cohn and Umans, and for the first time use it to derive algorithms asymptotically faster than the standard algorithm. We describe several families of wreath product groups that achieve matrix multiplication exponent less than 3, the asymptotically fastest of which achieves exponent 2.41. We present two conjectures regarding specific improvements, one combinatorial and the other algebraic. Either one would imply that the exponent of matrix multiplication is 2.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions …
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions than GD for modern neural networks. In order to understand this phenomenon, we take an alternative view that SGD is working on the convolved (thus smoothed) version of the loss function. We show that, even if the function $f$ has many bad local minima or saddle points, as long as for every point $x$, the weighted average of the gradients of its neighborhoods is one point convex with respect to the desired solution $x^*$, SGD will get close to, and then stay around $x^*$ with constant probability. More specifically, SGD will not get stuck at "sharp" local minima with small diameters, as long as the neighborhoods of these regions contain enough gradient information. The neighborhood size is controlled by step size and gradient noise. Our result identifies a set of functions that SGD provably works, which is much larger than the set of convex functions. Empirically, we observe that the loss surface of neural networks enjoys nice one point convexity properties locally, therefore our theorem helps explain why SGD works so well for neural networks.
We consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential …
We consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers ("agents") that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agent's value for an item is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown) distribution with support [0,1]. The seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each arriving agent (possibly different for different agents), and aims to maximize his expected revenue.
The spread of a cascading failure through a network is an issue that comes up in many domains - in the contagious failures that spread among financial institutions during a …
The spread of a cascading failure through a network is an issue that comes up in many domains - in the contagious failures that spread among financial institutions during a financial crisis, through nodes of a power grid or communication network during a widespread outage, or through a human population during the outbreak of an epidemic disease. Here we study a natural model of threshold contagion: each node v is assigned a numerical threshold ℓ(v) drawn independently from an underlying distribution μ, and v will fail as soon as ℓ(v) of its neighbors fail. Despite the simplicity of the formulation, it has been very challenging to analyze the failure processes that arise from arbitrary threshold distributions; even qualitative questions concerning which graphs are the most resilient to cascading failures in these models have been difficult to resolve. Here we develop a set of new techniques for analyzing the failure probabilities of nodes in arbitrary graphs under this model, and we compare different graphs G according to their μ-risk, defined as the maximum failure probability of any node in G when thresholds are drawn from μ. We find that the space of threshold distributions has a surprisingly rich structure when we consider the risk that these thresholds induce on different graphs: small shifts in the distribution of the thresholds can favor graphs with a maximally clustered structure (i.e., cliques), those with a maximally branching structure (trees), or even intermediate hybrids.
We introduce a technique for establishing and amplifying gaps between parameters of network coding and index coding problems. The technique uses linear programs to establish separations between combinatorial and coding-theoretic …
We introduce a technique for establishing and amplifying gaps between parameters of network coding and index coding problems. The technique uses linear programs to establish separations between combinatorial and coding-theoretic parameters and applies hyper graph lexicographic products to amplify these separations. This entails combining the dual solutions of the lexicographic multiplicands and proving that this is a valid dual solution of the product. Our result is general enough to apply to a large family of linear programs. This blend of linear programs and lexicographic products gives a recipe for constructing hard instances in which the gap between combinatorial or coding-theoretic parameters is polynomially large. We find polynomial gaps in cases in which the largest previously known gaps were only small constant factors or entirely unknown. Most notably, we show a polynomial separation between linear and non-linear network coding rates. This involves exploiting a connection between matroids and index coding to establish a previously unknown separation between linear and non-linear index coding rates. We also construct index coding problems with a polynomial gap between the broadcast rate and the trivial lower bound for which no gap was previously known.
Index Coding has received considerable attention recently motivated in part by real-world applications and in part by its connection to Network Coding. The basic setting of Index Coding encodes the …
Index Coding has received considerable attention recently motivated in part by real-world applications and in part by its connection to Network Coding. The basic setting of Index Coding encodes the problem input as an undirected graph and the fundamental parameter is the broadcast rate $\beta$, the average communication cost per bit for sufficiently long messages (i.e. the non-linear vector capacity). Recent nontrivial bounds on $\beta$ were derived from the study of other Index Coding capacities (e.g. the scalar capacity $\beta_1$) by Bar-Yossef et al (2006), Lubetzky and Stav (2007) and Alon et al (2008). However, these indirect bounds shed little light on the behavior of $\beta$: there was no known polynomial-time algorithm for approximating $\beta$ in a general network to within a nontrivial (i.e. $o(n)$) factor, and the exact value of $\beta$ remained unknown for any graph where Index Coding is nontrivial.
Our main contribution is a direct information-theoretic analysis of the broadcast rate $\beta$ using linear programs, in contrast to previous approaches that compared $\beta$ with graph-theoretic parameters. This allows us to resolve the aforementioned two open questions. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm with a nontrivial approximation ratio for computing $\beta$ in a general network along with a polynomial-time decision procedure for recognizing instances with $\beta=2$. In addition, we pinpoint $\beta$ precisely for various classes of graphs (e.g. for various Cayley graphs of cyclic groups) thereby simultaneously improving the previously known upper and lower bounds for these graphs. Via this approach we construct graphs where the difference between $\beta$ and its trivial lower bound is linear in the number of vertices and ones where $\beta$ is uniformly bounded while its upper bound derived from the naive encoding scheme is polynomially worse.
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists …
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size of the support. We leverage this result to show that in the oracle model introduced by Ronen and Saberi [FOCS'02], there exists a polynomial time truthful in expectation mechanism that provides a (1.5+ε)-approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal truthful-in-expectation mechanism, and a polynomial time deterministic truthful mechanism that guarantees 5/3 approximation to the revenue achievable by an optimal deterministic truthful mechanism.
The network inference problem consists of reconstructing the edge set of a network given traces representing the chronology of infection times as epidemics spread through the network. This problem is …
The network inference problem consists of reconstructing the edge set of a network given traces representing the chronology of infection times as epidemics spread through the network. This problem is a paradigmatic representative of prediction tasks in machine learning that require deducing a latent structure from observed patterns of activity in a network, which often require an unrealistically large number of resources (e.g., amount of available data, or computational time). A fundamental question is to understand which properties we can predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy with the available resources, and which we cannot. We define the trace complexity as the number of distinct traces required to achieve high fidelity in reconstructing the topology of the unobserved network or, more generally, some of its properties. We give algorithms that are competitive with, while being simpler and more efficient than, existing network inference approaches. Moreover, we prove that our algorithms are nearly optimal, by proving an information-theoretic lower bound on the number of traces that an optimal inference algorithm requires for performing this task in the general case. Given these strong lower bounds, we turn our attention to special cases, such as trees and bounded-degree graphs, and to property recovery tasks, such as reconstructing the degree distribution without inferring the network. We show that these problems require a much smaller (and more realistic) number of traces, making them potentially solvable in practice.
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for single-parameter domains: …
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for single-parameter domains: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a single call to a monotone allocation function. Our main result is a general procedure to take a monotone allocation rule and transform it (via a black-box reduction) into a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation and individually rational for every realization. Moreover, the mechanism implements the same outcome as the original allocation rule with probability arbitrarily close to 1, and requires evaluating that allocation rule only once.
The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing …
The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow them to match ads to viewers more effectively. In this paper we study the design of optimal mechanisms for a monopolistic data provider to sell information to a buyer, in a model where both parties have (possibly correlated) private signals about a state of the world, and the buyer uses information learned from the seller, along with his own signal, to choose an action (e.g., displaying an ad) whose payoff depends on the state of the world.
Index Coding has received considerable attention recently motivated in part by real-world applications and in part by its connection to Network Coding. The basic setting of Index Coding encodes the …
Index Coding has received considerable attention recently motivated in part by real-world applications and in part by its connection to Network Coding. The basic setting of Index Coding encodes the problem input as an undirected graph and the fundamental parameter is the broadcast rate $\beta$, the average communication cost per bit for sufficiently long messages (i.e. the non-linear vector capacity). Recent nontrivial bounds on $\beta$ were derived from the study of other Index Coding capacities (e.g. the scalar capacity $\beta_1$) by Bar-Yossef et al (2006), Lubetzky and Stav (2007) and Alon et al (2008). However, these indirect bounds shed little light on the behavior of $\beta$: there was no known polynomial-time algorithm for approximating $\beta$ in a general network to within a nontrivial (i.e. $o(n)$) factor, and the exact value of $\beta$ remained unknown for any graph where Index Coding is nontrivial. Our main contribution is a direct information-theoretic analysis of the broadcast rate $\beta$ using linear programs, in contrast to previous approaches that compared $\beta$ with graph-theoretic parameters. This allows us to resolve the aforementioned two open questions. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm with a nontrivial approximation ratio for computing $\beta$ in a general network along with a polynomial-time decision procedure for recognizing instances with $\beta=2$. In addition, we pinpoint $\beta$ precisely for various classes of graphs (e.g. for various Cayley graphs of cyclic groups) thereby simultaneously improving the previously known upper and lower bounds for these graphs. Via this approach we construct graphs where the difference between $\beta$ and its trivial lower bound is linear in the number of vertices and ones where $\beta$ is uniformly bounded while its upper bound derived from the naive encoding scheme is polynomially worse.
We consider the problem of designing revenue-maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers …
We consider the problem of designing revenue-maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers (“agents”) that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agent’s value for an item is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown) distribution with support [0,1]. The seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each arriving agent (possibly different for different agents), and aims to maximize his expected revenue. We focus on mechanisms that do not use any information about the distribution; such mechanisms are called detail-free (or prior-independent ). They are desirable because knowing the distribution is unrealistic in many practical scenarios. We study how the revenue of such mechanisms compares to the revenue of the optimal offline mechanism that knows the distribution (“offline benchmark”). We present a detail-free online posted-price mechanism whose revenue is at most O(( k log n )2/3) less than the offline benchmark, for every distribution that is regular. In fact, this guarantee holds without any assumptions if the benchmark is relaxed to fixed-price mechanisms. Further, we prove a matching lower bound. The performance guarantee for the same mechanism can be improved to O (√ k log n ), with a distribution-dependent constant, if the ratio k / n is sufficiently small. We show that, in the worst case over all demand distributions, this is essentially the best rate that can be obtained with a distribution-specific constant. On a technical level, we exploit the connection to multiarmed bandits (MAB). While dynamic pricing with unlimited supply can easily be seen as an MAB problem, the intuition behind MAB approaches breaks when applied to the setting with limited supply. Our high-level conceptual contribution is that even the limited supply setting can be fruitfully treated as a bandit problem.
We present a deterministic (1+√5/2)-approximation algorithm for the s - t path TSP for an arbitrary metric. Given a symmetric metric cost on n vertices including two prespecified endpoints, the …
We present a deterministic (1+√5/2)-approximation algorithm for the s - t path TSP for an arbitrary metric. Given a symmetric metric cost on n vertices including two prespecified endpoints, the problem is to find a shortest Hamiltonian path between the two endpoints; Hoogeveen showed that the natural variant of Christofides' algorithm is a 5/3-approximation algorithm for this problem, and this asymptotically tight bound in fact has been the best approximation ratio known until now. We modify this algorithm so that it chooses the initial spanning tree based on an optimal solution to the Held-Karp relaxation rather than a minimum spanning tree; we prove this simple but crucial modification leads to an improved approximation ratio, surpassing the 20-year-old ratio set by the natural Christofides' algorithm variant. Our algorithm also proves an upper bound of 1+√5/2 on the integrality gap of the path-variant Held-Karp relaxation. The techniques devised in this article can be applied to other optimization problems as well: these applications include improved approximation algorithms and improved LP integrality gap upper bounds for the prize-collecting s - t path problem and the unit-weight graphical metric s - t path TSP.
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of trials to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the …
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of trials to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the performance of bandit algorithms with a small finite strategy set is well understood, bandit problems with large strategy sets are still a topic of active investigation, motivated by practical applications, such as online auctions and web advertisement. The goal of such research is to identify broad and natural classes of strategy sets and payoff functions that enable the design of efficient solutions. In this work, we study a general setting for the multi-armed bandit problem, in which the strategies form a metric space, and the payoff function satisfies a Lipschitz condition with respect to the metric. We refer to this problem as the Lipschitz MAB problem . We present a solution for the multi-armed bandit problem in this setting. That is, for every metric space, we define an isometry invariant that bounds from below the performance of Lipschitz MAB algorithms for this metric space, and we present an algorithm that comes arbitrarily close to meeting this bound. Furthermore, our technique gives even better results for benign payoff functions. We also address the full-feedback (“best expert”) version of the problem, where after every round the payoffs from all arms are revealed.
Hill and Kertz studied the prophet inequality on iid distributions [The Annals of Probability 1982]. They proved a theoretical bound of 1 - 1/e on the approximation factor of their …
Hill and Kertz studied the prophet inequality on iid distributions [The Annals of Probability 1982]. They proved a theoretical bound of 1 - 1/e on the approximation factor of their algorithm. They conjectured that the best approximation factor for arbitrarily large n is 1/1+1/e ≃ 0.731. This conjecture remained open prior to this paper for over 30 years. In this paper we present a threshold-based algorithm for the prophet inequality with n iid distributions. Using a nontrivial and novel approach we show that our algorithm is a 0.738-approximation algorithm. By beating the bound of 1/1+1/e, this refutes the conjecture of Hill and Kertz. Moreover, we generalize our results to non-uniform distributions and discuss its applications in mechanism design.
We analyze the Schelling model of segregation in which a society of n individuals live in a ring. Each individual is one of two races and is only satisfied with …
We analyze the Schelling model of segregation in which a society of n individuals live in a ring. Each individual is one of two races and is only satisfied with his location so long as at least half his 2w nearest neighbors are of the same race as him. In the dynamics, randomly-chosen unhappy individuals successively swap locations. We consider the average size of monochromatic neighborhoods in the final stable state. Our analysis is the first rigorous analysis of the Schelling dynamics. We note that, in contrast to prior approximate analyses, the final state is nearly integrated: the average size of monochromatic neighborhoods is independent of n and polynomial in w.
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of trials so as to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. …
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of trials so as to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the performance of bandit algorithms with a small finite strategy set is quite well understood, bandit problems with large strategy sets are still a topic of very active investigation, motivated by practical applications such as online auctions and web advertisement. The goal of such research is to identify broad and natural classes of strategy sets and payoff functions which enable the design of efficient solutions. In this work we study a very general setting for the multi-armed bandit problem in which the strategies form a metric space, and the payoff function satisfies a Lipschitz condition with respect to the metric. We refer to this problem as the "Lipschitz MAB problem". We present a complete solution for the multi-armed problem in this setting. That is, for every metric space (L,X) we define an isometry invariant which bounds from below the performance of Lipschitz MAB algorithms for X, and we present an algorithm which comes arbitrarily close to meeting this bound. Furthermore, our technique gives even better results for benign payoff functions.
Hat problems have become a popular topic in recreational mathematics. In a typical hat problem, each of n players tries to guess the color of the hat he or she …
Hat problems have become a popular topic in recreational mathematics. In a typical hat problem, each of n players tries to guess the color of the hat he or she is wearing by looking at the colors of the hats worn by some of the other players. In this paper we consider several variants of the problem, united by the common theme that the guessing strategies are required to be deterministic and the objective is to maximize the number of correct answers in the worst case. We also summarize what is currently known about the worst-case analysis of deterministic hat guessing problems with a finite number of players.
The growth rate of tri-colored sum-free sets, Discrete Analysis 2018:12, 10 pp. This paper contributes to the remarkable collection of results that followed in the wake of the 2016 breakthrough …
The growth rate of tri-colored sum-free sets, Discrete Analysis 2018:12, 10 pp. This paper contributes to the remarkable collection of results that followed in the wake of the 2016 breakthrough by Ellenberg and Gijswijt on the cap set problem, which asks for the maximal size of a 3-term progression-free subset of $\mathbb{F}_3^n$. The polynomial method of Ellenberg and Gijswijt, who followed the lead of Croot, Lev, and Pach after whom the method is now named, showed for the first time that the size of such a set is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the ambient space. More specifically, they showed that a cap set in $\mathbb{F}_3^n$ can be of size at most $(2.756)^n$. This paper considers a variant of the cap set problem, namely the question of how large a tri-coloured sum-free subset of $\mathbb{F}_3^n$ can be. By a tri-coloured sum-free subset we mean a collection of triples $(a_i,b_i,c_i)$ in $(\mathbb{F}_3^n)^3$ such that $a_i+b_j+c_k=0$ if and only if $i=j=k$. Note that a cap set $A\subseteq \mathbb{F}_3^n$ gives rise to a tri-coloured sum-free set, namely the collection of triples $\{(a,a,a): a\in A\}$. It is therefore not entirely surprising that the Croot-Lev-Pach polynomial method can be used to show that if $q$ is a prime power, then a tri-coloured sum-free set in $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ can have size at most $3\theta^n$, where $\theta$ is the solution to an explicit optimisation problem. This is one of the results appearing in the paper ["On cap sets and the group-theoretic approach to matrix multiplication"](http://discreteanalysisjournal.com/article/1245), by Blasiak, Church, Cohn, Grochow, Naslund, Sawin, and Umans, which Discrete Analysis published earlier this year. In the present paper the authors show this bound to be tight to within a subexponential factor. The lower bound is based on a construction of an $S_3$-symmetric probability distribution on $\{(a,b,c)\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^3:a+b+c=n\}$ such that its marginal achieves the maximum entropy among all probability distributions on $\{0,1,…,n\}$ with mean $n/3$. In answer to a conjecture which was posed in the original preprint version of this article, the existence of such a distribution was established by Pebody, whose [article](http://discreteanalysisjournal.com/article/3733-proof-of-a-conjecture-of-kleinberg-sawin-speyer) is being published in Discrete Analysis alongside the present paper. The question of whether the Croot-Lev-Pach polynomial method also yields a tight bound for the cap set problem remains open.
The issue of disagreements amongst human experts is a ubiquitous one in both machine learning and medicine. In medicine, this often corresponds to doctor disagreements on a patient diagnosis. In …
The issue of disagreements amongst human experts is a ubiquitous one in both machine learning and medicine. In medicine, this often corresponds to doctor disagreements on a patient diagnosis. In this work, we show that machine learning models can be trained to give uncertainty scores to data instances that might result in high expert disagreements. In particular, they can identify patient cases that would benefit most from a medical second opinion. Our central methodological finding is that Direct Uncertainty Prediction (DUP), training a model to predict an uncertainty score directly from the raw patient features, works better than Uncertainty Via Classification, the two-step process of training a classifier and postprocessing the output distribution to give an uncertainty score. We show this both with a theoretical result, and on extensive evaluations on a large scale medical imaging application.
We present a deterministic (1+√5/2)-approximation algorithm for the s-t path TSP for an arbitrary metric. Given a symmetric metric cost on $n$ vertices including two prespecified endpoints, the problem is …
We present a deterministic (1+√5/2)-approximation algorithm for the s-t path TSP for an arbitrary metric. Given a symmetric metric cost on $n$ vertices including two prespecified endpoints, the problem is to find a shortest Hamiltonian path between the two endpoints; Hoogeveen showed that the natural variant of Christofides' algorithm is a 5/3-approximation algorithm for this problem, and this asymptotically tight bound in fact had been the best approximation ratio known until now. We modify this algorithm so that it chooses the initial spanning tree based on an optimal solution to the Held-Karp relaxation rather than a minimum spanning tree; we prove this simple but crucial modification leads to an improved approximation ratio, surpassing the 20-year-old barrier set by the natural Christofides' algorithm variant. Our algorithm also proves an upper bound of 1+√5/2 on the integrality gap of the path-variant Held-Karp relaxation. The techniques devised in this paper can be applied to other optimization problems as well: these applications include improved approximation algorithms and improved LP integrality gap upper bounds for the prize-collecting s-t path problem and the unit-weight graphical metric s-t path TSP.
Previous chapter Next chapter Full AccessProceedings Proceedings of the 2014 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)Prophet Inequalities with Limited InformationPablo D. Azar, Robert Kleinberg, and S. Matthew WeinbergPablo D. …
Previous chapter Next chapter Full AccessProceedings Proceedings of the 2014 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)Prophet Inequalities with Limited InformationPablo D. Azar, Robert Kleinberg, and S. Matthew WeinbergPablo D. Azar, Robert Kleinberg, and S. Matthew Weinbergpp.1358 - 1377Chapter DOI:https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973402.100PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAboutAbstract In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler observes a sequence of stochastic rewards V1, …, Vn and must decide, for each reward Vi, whether to keep it and stop the game or to forfeit the reward forever and reveal the next value Vi. The gambler's goal is to obtain a constant fraction of the expected reward that the optimal offline algorithm would get. Recently, prophet inequalities have been generalized to settings where the gambler can choose k items, and, more generally, where he can choose any independent set in a matroid. However, all the existing algorithms require the gambler to know the distribution from which the rewards V1, …, Vn are drawn. The assumption that the gambler knows the distribution from which V1, …, Vn are drawn is very strong. Instead, we work with the much simpler assumption that the gambler only knows a few samples from this distribution. We construct the first single-sample prophet inequalities for many settings of interest, whose guarantees all match the best possible asymptotically, even with full knowledge of the distribution. Specifically, we provide a novel single-sample algorithm when the gambler can choose any k elements whose analysis is based on random walks with limited correlation. In addition, we provide a black-box method for converting specific types of solutions to the related secretary problem to single-sample prophet inequalities, and apply it to several existing algorithms. Finally, we provide a constant-sample prophet inequality for constant-degree bipartite matchings. In addition, we apply these results to design the first posted-price and multi-dimensional auction mechanisms with limited information in settings with asymmetric bidders. Connections between prophet inequalities and posted-price mechanisms are already known, but applying the existing framework requires knowledge of the underlying distributions, as well as the so-called "virtual values" even when the underlying prophet inequalities do not. We therefore provide an extension of this framework that bypasses virtual values altogether, allowing our mechanisms to take full advantage of the limited information required by our new prophet inequalities. Previous chapter Next chapter RelatedDetails Published:2014ISBN:978-1-61197-338-9eISBN:978-1-61197-340-2 https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973402Book Series Name:ProceedingsBook Code:PRDA14Book Pages:viii + 1885
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized …
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a single call to a monotone allocation rule. Our main result is a general procedure to take a monotone allocation rule for a single-parameter domain and transform it (via a black-box reduction) into a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation and individually rational for every realization. The mechanism implements the same outcome as the original allocation rule with probability arbitrarily close to 1, and requires evaluating that allocation rule only once. We also provide an extension of this result to multiparameter domains and cycle-monotone allocation rules, under mild star-convexity and nonnegativity hypotheses on the type space and allocation rule, respectively. Because our reduction is simple, versatile, and general, it has many applications to mechanism design problems in which re-evaluating the allocation rule is either burdensome or informationally impossible. Applying our result to the multiarmed bandit problem, we obtain truthful randomized mechanisms whose regret matches the information-theoretic lower bound up to logarithmic factors, even though prior work showed this is impossible for truthful deterministic mechanisms. We also present applications to offline mechanism design, showing that randomization can circumvent a communication complexity lower bound for deterministic payments computation, and that it can also be used to create truthful shortest path auctions that approximate the welfare of the VCG allocation arbitrarily well, while having the same running time complexity as Dijkstra's algorithm.
We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with …
We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces.
Investigating potential purchases, such as a start-up company to acquire, is often a substantial investment under uncertainty. Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or ascending price auctions, compound this with …
Investigating potential purchases, such as a start-up company to acquire, is often a substantial investment under uncertainty. Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or ascending price auctions, compound this with additional uncertainty about the eventual price a bidder will have to pay in order to win. As a result they tend to confuse the process of search by leading to both wasteful information acquisition on goods that have already found a good purchaser and discouraging needed investigations of objects, potentially eliminating all gains from trade. Fully efficient procedures that avoid these problems, such as dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves processes, are extremely complex and fragile. By contrast, we show that the Dutch auction preserves all of its properties from a standard setting without information costs because it guarantees, at the time of information acquisition, a price at which the good can be purchased.
We introduce a family of one-dimensional geometric growth models, constructed iteratively by locally optimizing the trade-offs between two competing metrics, and show that this family is equivalent to a family …
We introduce a family of one-dimensional geometric growth models, constructed iteratively by locally optimizing the trade-offs between two competing metrics, and show that this family is equivalent to a family of preferential attachment random graph models with upper cut-offs. This is the first explanation of how preferential attachment can arise from a more basic underlying mechanism of local competition. We rigorously determine the degree distribution for the family of random graph models, showing that it obeys a power law up to a finite threshold and decays exponentially above this threshold.We also rigorously analyse a generalized version of our graph process, with two natural parameters, one corresponding to the cut-off and the other a 'fertility' parameter. We prove that the general model has a power-law degree distribution up to a cut-off, and establish monotonicity of the power as a function of the two parameters. Limiting cases of the general model include the standard preferential attachment model without cut-off and the uniform attachment model.
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes …
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the workflow within organizations, as well as many of the activities undertaken by regulatory bodies, who often obtain relevant information from the parties being regulated through a process of delegation. A fundamental tension underlying delegation is the fact that the agent's interests will typically differ -- potentially significantly -- from the interests of the principal, and as a result the agent may propose solutions based on their own incentives that are inefficient for the principal. A basic problem, therefore, is to design mechanisms by which the principal can constrain the set of proposals they are willing to accept from the agent, to ensure a certain level of quality for the principal from the proposed solution. In this work, we investigate how much the principal loses -- quantitatively, in terms of the objective they are trying to optimize -- when they delegate to an agent. We develop a methodology for bounding this loss of efficiency, and show that in a very general model of delegation, there is a family of mechanisms achieving a universal bound on the ratio between the quality of the solution obtained through delegation and the quality the principal could obtain in an idealized benchmark where they searched for a solution themself. Moreover, it is possible to achieve such bounds through mechanisms with a natural threshold structure, which are thus structurally simpler than the optimal mechanisms typically considered in the literature on delegation. At the heart of our framework is an unexpected connection between delegation and the analysis of prophet inequalities, which we leverage to provide bounds on the behavior of our delegation mechanisms.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions …
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions than GD for modern neural networks.
In order to understand this phenomenon, we take an alternative view that SGD is working on the convolved (thus smoothed) version of the loss function. We show that, even if the function $f$ has many bad local minima or saddle points, as long as for every point $x$, the weighted average of the gradients of its neighborhoods is one point convex with respect to the desired solution $x^*$, SGD will get close to, and then stay around $x^*$ with constant probability. More specifically, SGD will not get stuck at sharp local minima with small diameters, as long as the neighborhoods of these regions contain enough gradient information. The neighborhood size is controlled by step size and gradient noise.
Our result identifies a set of functions that SGD provably works, which is much larger than the set of convex functions. Empirically, we observe that the loss surface of neural networks enjoys nice one point convexity properties locally, therefore our theorem helps explain why SGD works so well for neural networks.
The study of random graphs has traditionally been dominated by the closely-related models G(n, m), in which a graph is sampled from the uniform distribution on graphs with n vertices …
The study of random graphs has traditionally been dominated by the closely-related models G(n, m), in which a graph is sampled from the uniform distribution on graphs with n vertices and m edges, and G(n, p), in which each of the (n/2) edges is sampled independently with probability p. Recently, however, there has been considerable interest in alternate random graph models designed to more closely approximate the properties of complex real-world networks such as the Web graph, the Internet, and large social networks. Two of the most well-studied of these are the closely related and copying models, in which vertices arrive one-by-one in sequence and attach at random in rich-get-richer fashion to d earlier vertices.Here we study the infinite limits of the preferential attachment process --- namely, the asymptotic behavior of finite graphs produced by preferential attachment (brie y, PA graphs), as well as the infinite graphs obtained by continuing the process indefinitely. We are guided in part by a striking result of Erdo;s and Renyi on countable graphs produced by the infinite analogue of the G(n, p) model, showing that any two graphs produced by this model are isomorphic with probability 1; it is natural to ask whether a comparable result holds for the preferential attachment process.We find, somewhat surprisingly, that the answer depends critically on the out-degree d of the model. For d = 1 and d = 2, there exist infinite graphs R∞d such that a random graph generated according to the infinite preferential attachment process is isomorphic to R∞d with probability 1. For d ≥ 3, on the other hand, two different samples generated from the infinite preferential attachment process are non-isomorphic with positive probability. The main technical ingredients underlying this result have fundamental implications for the structure of finite PA graphs; in particular, we give a characterization of the graphs H for which the expected number of subgraph embeddings of H in an n-node PA graph remains bounded as n goes to infinity.
We study the complexity of the maximum coverage problem, restricted to set systems of bounded VC-dimension. Our main result is a fixed-parameter tractable approximation scheme: an algorithm that outputs a …
We study the complexity of the maximum coverage problem, restricted to set systems of bounded VC-dimension. Our main result is a fixed-parameter tractable approximation scheme: an algorithm that outputs a (1-ε)-approximation to the maximum-cardinality union of k sets, in running time $O(f(ε,k,d)⋅ poly(n)) where n is the problem size, d is the VC-dimension of the set system, and f(ε,k,d) is exponential in (kd/ε)c for some constant c. We complement this positive result by showing that the function f(ε,k,d) in the running-time bound cannot be replaced by a function depending only on (ε,d) or on (k,d), under standard complexity assumptions. We also present an improved upper bound on the approximation ratio of the greedy algorithm in special cases of the problem, including when the sets have bounded cardinality and when they are two-dimensional halfspaces. Complementing these positive results, we show that when the sets are four-dimensional halfspaces neither the greedy algorithm nor local search is capable of improving the worst-case approximation ratio of 1-1/e that the greedy algorithm achieves on arbitrary instances of maximum coverage.
Martin Weitzman's "Pandora's problem" furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher …
Martin Weitzman's "Pandora's problem" furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher is not obligated to pay the cost of inspecting an alternative's value before selecting it. Unlike the original Pandora's problem, the version with nonobligatory inspection cannot be solved optimally by any simple ranking-based policy, and it is unknown whether there exists any polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy. This motivates the study of approximately optimal policies that are simple and computationally efficient. In this work we provide the first non-trivial approximation guarantees for this problem. We introduce a family of "committing policies" such that it is computationally easy to find and implement the optimal committing policy. We prove that the optimal committing policy is guaranteed to approximate the fully optimal policy within a 1-1/e = 0.63... factor, and for the special case of two boxes we improve this factor to 4/5 and show that this approximation is tight for the class of committing policies.
For a number of problems in the theory of online algorithms, it is known that the assumption that elements arrive in uniformly random order enables the design of algorithms with …
For a number of problems in the theory of online algorithms, it is known that the assumption that elements arrive in uniformly random order enables the design of algorithms with much better performance guarantees than under worst-case assumptions. The quintessential example of this phenomenon is the secretary problem, in which an algorithm attempts to stop a sequence at the moment it observes the maximum value in the sequence. As is well known, if the sequence is presented in uniformly random order there is an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1/e, whereas no non-trivial performance guarantee is possible if the elements arrive in worst-case order.
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the …
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general reduction that takes any allocation rule which satisfies "cyclic monotonicity" (a known necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness) and converts it to a truthful mechanism using a single call to the allocation rule, with arbitrarily small loss to the expected social welfare.
The network inference problem consists of reconstructing the edge set of a network given traces representing the chronology of infection times as epidemics spread through the network. This problem is …
The network inference problem consists of reconstructing the edge set of a network given traces representing the chronology of infection times as epidemics spread through the network. This problem is a paradigmatic representative of prediction tasks in machine learning that require deducing a latent structure from observed patterns of activity in a network, which often require an unrealistically large number of resources (e.g., amount of available data, or computational time). A fundamental question is to understand which properties we can predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy with the available resources, and which we cannot. We define the trace complexity as the number of distinct traces required to achieve high fidelity in reconstructing the topology of the unobserved network or, more generally, some of its properties. We give algorithms that are competitive with, while being simpler and more efficient than, existing network inference approaches. Moreover, we prove that our algorithms are nearly optimal, by proving an information-theoretic lower bound on the number of traces that an optimal inference algorithm requires for performing this task in the general case. Given these strong lower bounds, we turn our attention to special cases, such as trees and bounded-degree graphs, and to property recovery tasks, such as reconstructing the degree distribution without inferring the network. We show that these problems require a much smaller (and more realistic) number of traces, making them potentially solvable in practice.
This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation $O(\frac {\log m} {\log \log m})$-approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomial communication.
This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation $O(\frac {\log m} {\log \log m})$-approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomial communication.
The correlations and network structure amongst individuals in datasets today---whether explicitly articulated, or deduced from biological or behavioral connections---pose new issues around privacy guarantees, because of inferences that can be …
The correlations and network structure amongst individuals in datasets today---whether explicitly articulated, or deduced from biological or behavioral connections---pose new issues around privacy guarantees, because of inferences that can be made about one individual from another's data. This motivates quantifying privacy in networked contexts in terms of privacy---which measures the change in beliefs about an individual's data from the result of a computation---as originally proposed by Dalenius in the 1970's. Inferential privacy is implied by differential privacy when data are independent, but can be much worse when data are correlated; indeed, simple examples, as well as a general impossibility theorem of Dwork and Naor, preclude the possibility of achieving non-trivial inferential privacy when the adversary can have arbitrary auxiliary information. In this paper, we ask how differential privacy guarantees translate to guarantees on inferential privacy in networked contexts: specifically, under what limitations on the adversary's information about correlations, modeled as a prior distribution over datasets, can we deduce an inferential guarantee from a differential one?
We prove two main results. The first result pertains to distributions that satisfy a natural positive-affiliation condition, and gives an upper bound on the inferential privacy guarantee for any differentially private mechanism. This upper bound is matched by a simple mechanism that adds Laplace noise to the sum of the data. The second result pertains to distributions that have weak correlations, defined in terms of a suitable influence The result provides an upper bound for inferential privacy in terms of the differential privacy parameter and the spectral norm of this matrix.
The correlations and network structure amongst individuals in datasets today---whether explicitly articulated, or deduced from biological or behavioral connections---pose new issues around privacy guarantees, because of inferences that can be …
The correlations and network structure amongst individuals in datasets today---whether explicitly articulated, or deduced from biological or behavioral connections---pose new issues around privacy guarantees, because of inferences that can be made about one individual from another's data. This motivates quantifying privacy in networked contexts in terms of "inferential privacy"---which measures the change in beliefs about an individual's data from the result of a computation---as originally proposed by Dalenius in the 1970's. Inferential privacy is implied by differential privacy when data are independent, but can be much worse when data are correlated; indeed, simple examples, as well as a general impossibility theorem of Dwork and Naor, preclude the possibility of achieving non-trivial inferential privacy when the adversary can have arbitrary auxiliary information. In this paper, we ask how differential privacy guarantees translate to guarantees on inferential privacy in networked contexts: specifically, under what limitations on the adversary's information about correlations, modeled as a prior distribution over datasets, can we deduce an inferential guarantee from a differential one? We prove two main results. The first result pertains to distributions that satisfy a natural positive-affiliation condition, and gives an upper bound on the inferential privacy guarantee for any differentially private mechanism. This upper bound is matched by a simple mechanism that adds Laplace noise to the sum of the data. The second result pertains to distributions that have weak correlations, defined in terms of a suitable "influence matrix". The result provides an upper bound for inferential privacy in terms of the differential privacy parameter and the spectral norm of this matrix.
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a …
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the optimal one. We show that when the valuations of the bidders are submodular, in many interesting settings (e.g., constant number of bidders, budget additive bidders) computing an equilibrium with good welfare is essentially as easy as computing, completely ignoring incentives issues, an allocation with good welfare. On the other hand, for subadditive valuations, we show that computing an equilibrium requires exponential communication. Finally, for XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations, we show that if there exists an efficient algorithm that finds an equilibrium, it must use techniques that are very different from the ones currently known.
Crémer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full social surplus. We …
Crémer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full social surplus. We study whether this phenomenon persists when the auctioneer has only incomplete knowledge of the distribution, represented by a finite family of candidate distributions, and has sample access to the real distribution. We show that the naive approach which uses samples to distinguish candidate distributions may fail, whereas an extended version of the Crémer-McLean auction simultaneously extracts full social surplus under each candidate distribution. With an algebraic argument, we give a tight bound on the number of samples needed by this auction, which is the difference between the number of candidate distributions and the dimension of the linear space they span.
This paper presents Merlin, a new framework for managing resources in software-defined networks. With Merlin, administrators express high-level policies using programs in a declarative language. The language includes logical predicates …
This paper presents Merlin, a new framework for managing resources in software-defined networks. With Merlin, administrators express high-level policies using programs in a declarative language. The language includes logical predicates to identify sets of packets, regular expressions to encode forwarding paths, and arithmetic formulas to specify bandwidth constraints. The Merlin compiler uses a combination of advanced techniques to translate these policies into code that can be executed on network elements including a constraint solver that allocates bandwidth using parameterizable heuristics. To facilitate dynamic adaptation, Merlin provides mechanisms for delegating control of sub-policies and for verifying that modifications made to sub-policies do not violate global constraints. Experiments demonstrate the expressiveness and scalability of Merlin on real-world topologies and applications. Overall, Merlin simplifies network administration by providing high-level abstractions for specifying network policies and scalable infrastructure for enforcing them.
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved many recent successes, but our understanding of its strengths and limitations is hampered by the lack of rich environments in which we can fully characterize …
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved many recent successes, but our understanding of its strengths and limitations is hampered by the lack of rich environments in which we can fully characterize optimal behavior, and correspondingly diagnose individual actions against such a characterization. Here we consider a family of combinatorial games, arising from work of Erdos, Selfridge, and Spencer, and we propose their use as environments for evaluating and comparing different approaches to reinforcement learning. These games have a number of appealing features: they are challenging for current learning approaches, but they form (i) a low-dimensional, simply parametrized environment where (ii) there is a linear closed form solution for optimal behavior from any state, and (iii) the difficulty of the game can be tuned by changing environment parameters in an interpretable way. We use these Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer games not only to compare different algorithms, but test for generalization, make comparisons to supervised learning, analyse multiagent play, and even develop a self play algorithm. Code can be found at: https://github.com/rubai5/ESS_Game
We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into …
We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into $d$-dimensional space and payoffs are given by bilinear functions of these embeddings. We provide an efficient learning algorithm for this setting that incurs at most $\tilde{O}(T^{(d+1)/(d+3)})$ swap regret after $T$ rounds. To achieve this, we introduce a new online learning problem we call \emph{full swap regret minimization}. In this problem, a learner repeatedly takes a (randomized) action in a bounded convex $d$-dimensional action set $\mathcal{K}$ and then receives a loss from the adversary, with the goal of minimizing their regret with respect to the \emph{worst-case} swap function mapping $\mathcal{K}$ to $\mathcal{K}$. For varied assumptions about the convexity and smoothness of the loss functions, we design algorithms with full swap regret bounds ranging from $O(T^{d/(d+2)})$ to $O(T^{(d+1)/(d+2)})$. Finally, we apply these tools to the problem of online forecasting to minimize calibration error, showing that several notions of calibration can be viewed as specific instances of full swap regret. In particular, we design efficient algorithms for online forecasting that guarantee at most $O(T^{1/3})$ $\ell_2$-calibration error and $O(\max(\sqrt{\epsilon T}, T^{1/3}))$ \emph{discretized-calibration} error (when the forecaster is restricted to predicting multiples of $\epsilon$).
Omnipredictors are simple prediction functions that encode loss-minimizing predictions with respect to a hypothesis class $\H$, simultaneously for every loss function within a class of losses $\L$. In this work, …
Omnipredictors are simple prediction functions that encode loss-minimizing predictions with respect to a hypothesis class $\H$, simultaneously for every loss function within a class of losses $\L$. In this work, we give near-optimal learning algorithms for omniprediction, in both the online and offline settings. To begin, we give an oracle-efficient online learning algorithm that acheives $(\L,\H)$-omniprediction with $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T \log |\H|})$ regret for any class of Lipschitz loss functions $\L \subseteq \L_\mathrm{Lip}$. Quite surprisingly, this regret bound matches the optimal regret for \emph{minimization of a single loss function} (up to a $\sqrt{\log(T)}$ factor). Given this online algorithm, we develop an online-to-offline conversion that achieves near-optimal complexity across a number of measures. In particular, for all bounded loss functions within the class of Bounded Variation losses $\L_\mathrm{BV}$ (which include all convex, all Lipschitz, and all proper losses) and any (possibly-infinite) $\H$, we obtain an offline learning algorithm that, leveraging an (offline) ERM oracle and $m$ samples from $\D$, returns an efficient $(\L_{\mathrm{BV}},\H,\eps(m))$-omnipredictor for $\eps(m)$ scaling near-linearly in the Rademacher complexity of $\mathrm{Th} \circ \H$.
We study distributed load balancing in bipartite queueing systems. Specifically, a set of frontends route jobs to a set of heterogeneous backends with workload-dependent service rates, with an arbitrary bipartite …
We study distributed load balancing in bipartite queueing systems. Specifically, a set of frontends route jobs to a set of heterogeneous backends with workload-dependent service rates, with an arbitrary bipartite graph representing the connectivity between the frontends and backends. Each frontend operates independently without any communication with the other frontends, and the goal is to minimize the expectation of the sum of the latencies of all jobs. Routing based on expected latency can lead to arbitrarily poor performance compared to the centrally coordinated optimal routing. To address this, we propose a natural alternative approach that routes jobs based on marginal service rates, which does not need to know the arrival rates. Despite the distributed nature of this algorithm, it achieves effective coordination among the frontends. In a model with independent Poisson arrivals of discrete jobs at each frontend, we show that the behavior of our routing policy converges (almost surely) to the behavior of a fluid model, in the limit as job sizes tend to zero and Poisson arrival rates are scaled at each frontend so that the expected total volume of jobs arriving per unit time remains fixed. Then, in the fluid model, where job arrivals are represented by infinitely divisible continuous flows and service times are deterministic, we demonstrate that the system converges globally and strongly asymptotically to the centrally coordinated optimal routing. Moreover, we prove the following guarantee on the convergence rate: if initial workloads are $\delta$-suboptimal, it takes ${O}( \delta + \log{1/\epsilon})$ time to obtain an $\epsilon$-suboptimal solution.
We introduce the notion of an online matroid embedding, which is an algorithm for mapping an unknown matroid that is revealed in an online fashion to a larger-but-known matroid. The …
We introduce the notion of an online matroid embedding, which is an algorithm for mapping an unknown matroid that is revealed in an online fashion to a larger-but-known matroid. The existence of such embedding enables a reduction from the version of the matroid secretary problem where the matroid is unknown to the version where the matroid is known in advance. We show that online matroid embeddings exist for binary (and hence graphic) and laminar matroids. We also show a negative result showing that no online matroid embedding exists for the class of all matroids. Finally, we define the notion of an approximate matroid embedding, generalizing the notion of {\alpha}-partition property, and provide an upper bound on the approximability of binary matroids by a partition matroid, matching the lower bound of Dughmi et al.
A set of probabilistic forecasts is calibrated if each prediction of the forecaster closely approximates the empirical distribution of outcomes on the subset of timesteps where that prediction was made. …
A set of probabilistic forecasts is calibrated if each prediction of the forecaster closely approximates the empirical distribution of outcomes on the subset of timesteps where that prediction was made. We study the fundamental problem of online calibrated forecasting of binary sequences, which was initially studied by Foster & Vohra (1998). They derived an algorithm with $O(T^{2/3})$ calibration error after $T$ time steps, and showed a lower bound of $\Omega(T^{1/2})$. These bounds remained stagnant for two decades, until Qiao & Valiant (2021) improved the lower bound to $\Omega(T^{0.528})$ by introducing a combinatorial game called sign preservation and showing that lower bounds for this game imply lower bounds for calibration. We introduce a strengthening of Qiao & Valiant's game that we call sign preservation with reuse (SPR). We prove that the relationship between SPR and calibrated forecasting is bidirectional: not only do lower bounds for SPR translate into lower bounds for calibration, but algorithms for SPR also translate into new algorithms for calibrated forecasting. In particular, any strategy that improves the trivial upper bound for the value of the SPR game would imply a forecasting algorithm with calibration error exponent less than 2/3, improving Foster & Vohra's upper bound for the first time. Using similar ideas, we then prove a slightly stronger lower bound than that of Qiao & Valiant, namely $\Omega(T^{0.54389})$. Our lower bound is obtained by an oblivious adversary, marking the first $\omega(T^{1/2})$ calibration lower bound for oblivious adversaries.
In a landmark 1981 paper, Valiant and Brebner gave birth to the study of oblivious routing and, simultaneously, introduced its most powerful and ubiquitous method: Valiant load balancing (VLB). By …
In a landmark 1981 paper, Valiant and Brebner gave birth to the study of oblivious routing and, simultaneously, introduced its most powerful and ubiquitous method: Valiant load balancing (VLB). By routing messages through a randomly sampled intermediate node, VLB lengthens routing paths by a factor of two but gains the crucial property of obliviousness: it balances load in a completely decentralized manner, with no global knowledge of the communication pattern. Forty years later, with datacenters handling workloads whose communication pattern varies too rapidly to allow centralized coordination, oblivious routing is as relevant as ever, and VLB continues to take center stage as a widely used — and in some settings, provably optimal — way to balance load in the network obliviously to the traffic demands. However, the ability of the network to rapidly reconfigure its interconnection topology gives rise to new possibilities.
Estimating the empirical distribution of a scalar-valued data set is a basic and fundamental task. In this paper, we tackle the problem of estimating an empirical distribution in a setting …
Estimating the empirical distribution of a scalar-valued data set is a basic and fundamental task. In this paper, we tackle the problem of estimating an empirical distribution in a setting with two challenging features. First, the algorithm does not directly observe the data; instead, it only asks a limited number of threshold queries about each sample. Second, the data are not assumed to be independent and identically distributed; instead, we allow for an arbitrary process generating the samples, including an adaptive adversary. These considerations are relevant, for example, when modeling a seller experimenting with posted prices to estimate the distribution of consumers' willingness to pay for a product: offering a price and observing a consumer's purchase decision is equivalent to asking a single threshold query about their value, and the distribution of consumers' values may be non-stationary over time, as early adopters may differ markedly from late adopters.Our main result quantifies, to within a constant factor, the sample complexity of estimating the empirical CDF of a sequence of elements of [n], up to ε additive error, using one threshold query per sample. The complexity depends only logarithmically on n, and our result can be interpreted as extending the existing logarithmic-complexity results for noisy binary search to the more challenging setting where noise is non-stochastic. Along the way to designing our algorithm, we consider a more general model in which the algorithm is allowed to make a limited number of simultaneous threshold queries on each sample. We solve this problem using Blackwell's Approachability Theorem and the exponential weights method. As a side result of independent interest, we characterize the minimum number of simultaneous threshold queries required by deterministic CDF estimation algorithms.
Estimating the empirical distribution of a scalar-valued data set is a basic and fundamental task. In this paper, we tackle the problem of estimating an empirical distribution in a setting …
Estimating the empirical distribution of a scalar-valued data set is a basic and fundamental task. In this paper, we tackle the problem of estimating an empirical distribution in a setting with two challenging features. First, the algorithm does not directly observe the data; instead, it only asks a limited number of threshold queries about each sample. Second, the data are not assumed to be independent and identically distributed; instead, we allow for an arbitrary process generating the samples, including an adaptive adversary. These considerations are relevant, for example, when modeling a seller experimenting with posted prices to estimate the distribution of consumers' willingness to pay for a product: offering a price and observing a consumer's purchase decision is equivalent to asking a single threshold query about their value, and the distribution of consumers' values may be non-stationary over time, as early adopters may differ markedly from late adopters. Our main result quantifies, to within a constant factor, the sample complexity of estimating the empirical CDF of a sequence of elements of $[n]$, up to $\varepsilon$ additive error, using one threshold query per sample. The complexity depends only logarithmically on $n$, and our result can be interpreted as extending the existing logarithmic-complexity results for noisy binary search to the more challenging setting where noise is non-stochastic. Along the way to designing our algorithm, we consider a more general model in which the algorithm is allowed to make a limited number of simultaneous threshold queries on each sample. We solve this problem using Blackwell's Approachability Theorem and the exponential weights method. As a side result of independent interest, we characterize the minimum number of simultaneous threshold queries required by deterministic CDF estimation algorithms.
We consider the problem of evaluating forecasts of binary events whose predictions are consumed by rational agents who take an action in response to a prediction, but whose utility is …
We consider the problem of evaluating forecasts of binary events whose predictions are consumed by rational agents who take an action in response to a prediction, but whose utility is unknown to the forecaster. We show that optimizing forecasts for a single scoring rule (e.g., the Brier score) cannot guarantee low regret for all possible agents. In contrast, forecasts that are well-calibrated guarantee that all agents incur sublinear regret. However, calibration is not a necessary criterion here (it is possible for miscalibrated forecasts to provide good regret guarantees for all possible agents), and calibrated forecasting procedures have provably worse convergence rates than forecasting procedures targeting a single scoring rule. Motivated by this, we present a new metric for evaluating forecasts that we call U-calibration, equal to the maximal regret of the sequence of forecasts when evaluated under any bounded scoring rule. We show that sublinear U-calibration error is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to achieve sublinear regret guarantees. We additionally demonstrate how to compute the U-calibration error efficiently and provide an online algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt{T})$ U-calibration error (on par with optimal rates for optimizing for a single scoring rule, and bypassing lower bounds for the traditionally calibrated learning procedures). Finally, we discuss generalizations to the multiclass prediction setting.
In a landmark 1981 paper, Valiant and Brebner gave birth to the study of oblivious routing and, simultaneously, introduced its most powerful and ubiquitous method: Valiant load balancing (VLB). By …
In a landmark 1981 paper, Valiant and Brebner gave birth to the study of oblivious routing and, simultaneously, introduced its most powerful and ubiquitous method: Valiant load balancing (VLB). By routing messages through a randomly sampled intermediate node, VLB lengthens routing paths by a factor of two but gains the crucial property of obliviousness. Forty years later, with datacenters handling workloads whose communication pattern varies too rapidly to allow centralized coordination, VLB continues to take center stage as a widely used - and in some cases provably optimal - way to balance load in the network obliviously to the traffic demands. However, the ability of the network to rapidly reconfigure its interconnection topology gives rise to new possibilities. In this work we revisit the question of whether VLB remains optimal in the novel setting of reconfigurable networks. Prior work showed that VLB achieves the optimal tradeoff between latency and guaranteed throughput. In this work we show that a strictly superior latency-throughput tradeoff is achievable when the throughput bound is relaxed to hold with high probability. The same improved tradeoff is also achievable with guaranteed throughput under time-stationary demands, provided the latency bound is relaxed to hold with high probability and that the network is allowed to be semi-oblivious, using an oblivious (randomized) connection schedule but demand-aware routing. We prove that the latter result is not achievable by any fully-oblivious reconfigurable network design, marking a rare case in which semi-oblivious routing has a provable asymptotic advantage over oblivious routing. To analyze our routing scheme we prove an exponential tail bound which may be of independent interest, concerning the distribution of values of a bilinear form on an orbit of a permutation group action.
Predictive models in ML need to be trustworthy and reliable, which often at the very least means outputting calibrated probabilities. This can be particularly difficult to guarantee in the online …
Predictive models in ML need to be trustworthy and reliable, which often at the very least means outputting calibrated probabilities. This can be particularly difficult to guarantee in the online prediction setting when the outcome sequence can be generated adversarially. In this paper we introduce a technique using Blackwell's approachability theorem for taking an online predictive model which might not be calibrated and transforming its predictions to calibrated predictions without much increase to the loss of the original model. Our proposed algorithm achieves calibration and accuracy at a faster rate than existing techniques arXiv:1607.03594 and is the first algorithm to offer a flexible tradeoff between calibration error and accuracy in the online setting. We demonstrate this by characterizing the space of jointly achievable calibration and regret using our technique.
We present Prequal (Probing to Reduce Queuing and Latency), a load balancer for distributed multi-tenant systems. Prequal aims to minimize real-time request latency in the presence of heterogeneous server capacities …
We present Prequal (Probing to Reduce Queuing and Latency), a load balancer for distributed multi-tenant systems. Prequal aims to minimize real-time request latency in the presence of heterogeneous server capacities and non-uniform, time-varying antagonist load. It actively probes server load to leverage the power-of-d-choices paradigm, extending it with asynchronous and reusable probes. Cutting against received wisdom, Prequal does not balance CPU load, but instead selects servers according to estimated latency and active requests-in-flight (RIF). We explore its major design features on a testbed system and evaluate it on YouTube, where it has been deployed for more than two years. Prequal has dramatically decreased tail latency, error rates, and resource use, enabling YouTube and other production systems at Google to run at much higher utilization.
Prophet inequalities are performance guarantees for online algorithms (a.k.a. stopping rules) solving the following ''hiring problem'': a decision maker sequentially inspects candidates whose values are independent random numbers and is …
Prophet inequalities are performance guarantees for online algorithms (a.k.a. stopping rules) solving the following ''hiring problem'': a decision maker sequentially inspects candidates whose values are independent random numbers and is asked to hire at most one candidate by selecting it before inspecting the values of future candidates in the sequence. A classic result in optimal stopping theory asserts that there exist stopping rules guaranteeing that the decision maker will hire a candidate whose expected value is at least half as good as the expected value of the candidate hired by a ''prophet,'' i.e.one who has simultaneous access to the realizations of all candidates' values.
Oblivious routing has a long history in both the theory and practice of networking. In this work we initiate the formal study of oblivious routing in the context of reconfigurable …
Oblivious routing has a long history in both the theory and practice of networking. In this work we initiate the formal study of oblivious routing in the context of reconfigurable networks, a new architecture that has recently come to the fore in datacenter networking. These networks allow a rapidly changing bounded-degree pattern of interconnections between nodes, but the network topology and the selection of routing paths must both be oblivious to the traffic demand matrix. Our focus is on the trade-off between maximizing throughput and minimizing latency in these networks. For every constant throughput rate, we characterize (up to a constant factor) the minimum latency achievable by an oblivious reconfigurable network design that satisfies the given throughput guarantee. The trade-off between these two objectives turns out to be surprisingly subtle: the curve depicting it has an unexpected scalloped shape reflecting the fact that load-balancing becomes more difficult when the average length of routing paths is not an integer because equalizing all the path lengths is not possible. The proof of our lower bound uses LP duality to verify that Valiant load balancing is the most efficient oblivious routing scheme when used in combination with an optimally-designed reconfigurable network topology. The proof of our upper bound uses an algebraic construction in which the network nodes are identified with vectors over a finite field, the network topology is described by either the elementary basis or a sequence of Vandermonde matrices, and routing paths are constructed by selecting columns of these matrices to yield the appropriate mixture of path lengths within the shortest possible time interval.
Prophet inequalities are performance guarantees for online algorithms (a.k.a. stopping rules) solving the following "hiring problem": a decision maker sequentially inspects candidates whose values are independent random numbers and is …
Prophet inequalities are performance guarantees for online algorithms (a.k.a. stopping rules) solving the following "hiring problem": a decision maker sequentially inspects candidates whose values are independent random numbers and is asked to hire at most one candidate by selecting it before inspecting the values of future candidates in the sequence. A classic result in optimal stopping theory asserts that there exist stopping rules guaranteeing that the decision maker will hire a candidate whose expected value is at least half as good as the expected value of the candidate hired by a "prophet", i.e. one who has simultaneous access to the realizations of all candidates' values. Such stopping rules have provably good performance but might treat individual candidates unfairly in a number of different ways. In this work we identify two types of individual fairness that might be desirable in optimal stopping problems. We call them identity-independent fairness (IIF) and time-independent fairness (TIF) and give precise definitions in the context of the hiring problem. We give polynomial-time algorithms for finding the optimal IIF/TIF stopping rules for a given instance with discrete support and we manage to recover a prophet inequality with factor $1/2$ when the decision maker's stopping rule is required to satisfy both fairness properties while the prophet is unconstrained. We also explore worst-case ratios between optimal selection rules in the presence vs. absence of individual fairness constraints, in both the online and offline settings. Finally, we consider a framework in which the decision maker doesn't know the distributions of candidates' values but has access to independent samples from each distribution. We provide constant-competitive IIF/TIF algorithms using one sample per distribution in the offline setting and two samples per distribution in the online setting.
Bandits with knapsacks (BwK) is an influential model of sequential decision-making under uncertainty that incorporates resource consumption constraints. In each round, the decision-maker observes an outcome consisting of a reward …
Bandits with knapsacks (BwK) is an influential model of sequential decision-making under uncertainty that incorporates resource consumption constraints. In each round, the decision-maker observes an outcome consisting of a reward and a vector of nonnegative resource consumptions, and the budget of each resource is decremented by its consumption. In this paper we introduce a natural generalization of the stochastic BwK problem that allows non-monotonic resource utilization. In each round, the decision-maker observes an outcome consisting of a reward and a vector of resource drifts that can be positive, negative or zero, and the budget of each resource is incremented by its drift. Our main result is a Markov decision process (MDP) policy that has constant regret against a linear programming (LP) relaxation when the decision-maker knows the true outcome distributions. We build upon this to develop a learning algorithm that has logarithmic regret against the same LP relaxation when the decision-maker does not know the true outcome distributions. We also present a reduction from BwK to our model that shows our regret bound matches existing results.
Online convex optimization (OCO) is a widely used framework in online learning. In each round, the learner chooses a decision in a convex set and an adversary chooses a convex …
Online convex optimization (OCO) is a widely used framework in online learning. In each round, the learner chooses a decision in a convex set and an adversary chooses a convex loss function, and then the learner suffers the loss associated with their current decision. However, in many applications the learner's loss depends not only on the current decision but on the entire history of decisions until that point. The OCO framework and its existing generalizations do not capture this, and they can only be applied to many settings of interest after a long series of approximation arguments. They also leave open the question of whether the dependence on memory is tight because there are no non-trivial lower bounds. In this work we introduce a generalization of the OCO framework, "Online Convex Optimization with Unbounded Memory", that captures long-term dependence on past decisions. We introduce the notion of $p$-effective memory capacity, $H_p$, that quantifies the maximum influence of past decisions on present losses. We prove an $O(\sqrt{H_p T})$ upper bound on the policy regret and a matching (worst-case) lower bound. As a special case, we prove the first non-trivial lower bound for OCO with finite memory \citep{anavaHM2015online}, which could be of independent interest, and also improve existing upper bounds. We demonstrate the broad applicability of our framework by using it to derive regret bounds, and to improve and simplify existing regret bound derivations, for a variety of online learning problems including online linear control and an online variant of performative prediction.
We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have qualities drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims …
We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have qualities drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims to choose the better product, but the quality of a product can only be estimated via a coarse-grained threshold test: for chosen $\theta$, the principal learns whether a product's quality exceeds $\theta$ or not.
We study this problem under two types of interactions. In the first, the principal does the testing herself, and can choose tests from a class of allowable tests. We show that the optimum strategy for the principal is to administer different tests to the two products: one which is passed with probability $\frac{1}{3}$ and the other with probability $\frac{2}{3}$. If, however, the principal is required to choose the tests in a symmetric manner (i.e., via an i.i.d.~distribution), then the optimal strategy is to choose tests whose probability of passing is drawn uniformly from $[\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4}]$.
In our second model, test difficulties are selected endogenously by the firms. This corresponds to a setting in which the firms must commit to their testing procedures before knowing the quality of their products. This interaction naturally gives rise to a signaling game; we characterize the unique Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of this game, which happens to be symmetric. We then calculate its Price of Anarchy in terms of the principal's probability of choosing the worse product. Finally, we show that by restricting both firms' set of available thresholds to choose from, the principal can lower the Price of Anarchy of the resulting equilibrium; however, there is a limit, in that for every (common) restricted set of tests, the equilibrium failure probability is strictly larger than under the optimal i.i.d. distribution.
We present the first nontrivial approximation algorithm for the bottleneck asymmetric traveling salesman problem . Given an asymmetric metric cost between n vertices, the problem is to find a Hamiltonian …
We present the first nontrivial approximation algorithm for the bottleneck asymmetric traveling salesman problem . Given an asymmetric metric cost between n vertices, the problem is to find a Hamiltonian cycle that minimizes its bottleneck (or maximum-length edge) cost. We achieve an O (log n / log log n ) approximation performance guarantee by giving a novel algorithmic technique to shortcut Eulerian circuits while bounding the lengths of the shortcuts needed. This allows us to build on a related result of Asadpour, Goemans, Mądry, Oveis Gharan, and Saberi to obtain this guarantee. Furthermore, we show how our technique yields stronger approximation bounds in some cases, such as the bounded orientable genus case studied by Oveis Gharan and Saberi. We also explore the possibility of further improvement upon our main result through a comparison to the symmetric counterpart of the problem.
One of the central human biases studied in behavioral economics is reference dependence - people's tendency to evaluate an outcome not in absolute terms but instead relative to a reference …
One of the central human biases studied in behavioral economics is reference dependence - people's tendency to evaluate an outcome not in absolute terms but instead relative to a reference point that reflects some notion of the status quo [4]. Reference dependence interacts closely with a related behavioral bias, loss aversion, in which people weigh losses more strongly than gains of comparable absolute values. Taken together, these two effects produce a fundamental behavioral regularity in human choices: once a reference point has been established, people tend to avoid outcomes in which they experience a loss relative to the reference point. A well-known instance of the effect is the empirical evidence that individual investors will tend to avoid selling a stock unless it has exceeded the price at which they purchased it.
We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for …
We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces. The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior black-box reductions is that repairing violations of incentive constraints requires understanding the distribution of the mechanism’s output, which is typically #P-hard to compute. Reductions that instead estimate the output distribution by sampling inevitably suffer from sampling error, which typically precludes exact incentive compatibility. We overcome this barrier by employing and generalizing the computational model in the literature on Bernoulli Factories . In a Bernoulli factory problem, one is given a function mapping the bias of an “input coin” to that of an “output coin,” and the challenge is to efficiently simulate the output coin given only sample access to the input coin. This is the key ingredient in designing an incentive compatible mechanism for bipartite matching, which can be used to make the approximately incentive compatible reduction of Hartline et al. [18] exactly incentive compatible.
Free order prophet inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting one value from a set of independent random variables: a "prophet" who knows …
Free order prophet inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting one value from a set of independent random variables: a "prophet" who knows the value of each variable and may select the maximum one, and a "gambler" who is free to choose the order in which to observe the values but must select one of them immediately after observing it, without knowing what values will be sampled for the unobserved variables. It is known that the gambler can always ensure an expected payoff at least 0.669 … times as great as that of the prophet. In fact, even if the gambler uses a threshold stopping rule, meaning there is a fixed threshold value such that the gambler rejects every sample below the threshold and accepts every sample above it, the threshold can always be chosen so that the gambler-to-prophet ratio is at least . … In contrast, if the gambler must observe the values in a predetermined order, the tight bound for the gambler-to-prophet ratio is 1/2.In this work we investigate a model that interpolates between these two extremes. We assume there is a predefined set of permutations of the set indexing the random variables, and the gambler is free to choose the order of observation to be any one of these predefined permutations. Surprisingly, we show that even when only two orderings are allowed — namely, the forward and reverse orderings — the gambler-to-prophet ratio improves to …, the inverse of the golden ratio. As the number of allowed permutations grows beyond 2, a striking "double plateau" phenomenon emerges: after increasing from 0.5 to φ–1 when two permutations are allowed, the gambler-to-prophet ratio achievable by threshold stopping rules does not exceed φ–1 + o(1) until the number of allowed permutations grows to O(log n). The ratio reaches for a suitably chosen set of O(poly(∊–1) · log n) permutations and does not exceed even when the full set of n! permutations is allowed.
Oblivious routing has a long history in both the theory and practice of networking. In this work we initiate the formal study of oblivious routing in the context of reconfigurable …
Oblivious routing has a long history in both the theory and practice of networking. In this work we initiate the formal study of oblivious routing in the context of reconfigurable networks, a new architecture that has recently come to the fore in datacenter networking. These networks allow a rapidly changing bounded-degree pattern of interconnections between nodes, but the network topology and the selection of routing paths must both be oblivious to the traffic demand matrix. Our focus is on the trade-off between maximizing throughput and minimizing latency in these networks. For every constant throughput rate, we characterize (up to a constant factor) the minimum latency achievable by an oblivious reconfigurable network design that satisfies the given throughput guarantee. The trade-off between these two objectives turns out to be surprisingly subtle: the curve depicting it has an unexpected scalloped shape reflecting the fact that load-balancing becomes more difficult when the average length of routing paths is not an integer because equalizing all the path lengths is not possible. The proof of our lower bound uses LP duality to verify that Valiant load balancing is the most efficient oblivious routing scheme when used in combination with an optimally-designed reconfigurable network topology. The proof of our upper bound uses an algebraic construction in which the network nodes are identified with vectors over a finite field, the network topology is described by either the elementary basis or a sequence of Vandermonde matrices, and routing paths are constructed by selecting columns of these matrices to yield the appropriate mixture of path lengths within the shortest possible time interval.
We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have qualities drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims …
We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have qualities drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims to choose the better product, but the quality of a product can only be estimated via a coarse-grained threshold test: for chosen $\theta$, the principal learns whether a product's quality exceeds $\theta$ or not. We study this problem under two types of interactions. In the first, the principal does the testing herself, and can choose tests from a class of allowable tests. We show that the optimum strategy for the principal is to administer different tests to the two products: one which is passed with probability $\frac{1}{3}$ and the other with probability $\frac{2}{3}$. If, however, the principal is required to choose the tests in a symmetric manner (i.e., via an i.i.d.~distribution), then the optimal strategy is to choose tests whose probability of passing is drawn uniformly from $[\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4}]$. In our second model, test difficulties are selected endogenously by the firms. This corresponds to a setting in which the firms must commit to their testing procedures before knowing the quality of their products. This interaction naturally gives rise to a signaling game; we characterize the unique Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of this game, which happens to be symmetric. We then calculate its Price of Anarchy in terms of the principal's probability of choosing the worse product. Finally, we show that by restricting both firms' set of available thresholds to choose from, the principal can lower the Price of Anarchy of the resulting equilibrium; however, there is a limit, in that for every (common) restricted set of tests, the equilibrium failure probability is strictly larger than under the optimal i.i.d. distribution.
People are often reluctant to sell a house, or shares of stock, below the price at which they originally bought it. While this is generally not consistent with rational utility …
People are often reluctant to sell a house, or shares of stock, below the price at which they originally bought it. While this is generally not consistent with rational utility maximization, it does reflect two strong empirical regularities that are central to the behavioral science of human decision-making: a tendency to evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point determined by context (in this case the original purchase price), and the phenomenon of loss aversion in which people are particularly prone to avoid outcomes below the reference point. Here we explore the implications of reference points and loss aversion in optimal stopping problems, where people evaluate a sequence of options in one pass, either accepting the option and stopping the search or giving up on the option forever. The best option seen so far sets a reference point that shifts as the search progresses, and a biased decision-maker's utility incurs an additional penalty when they accept a later option that is below this reference point. We formulate and study a behaviorally well-motivated version of the optimal stopping problem that incorporates these notions of reference dependence and loss aversion. We obtain tight bounds on the performance of a biased agent in this model relative to the best option obtainable in retrospect (a type of prophet inequality for biased agents), as well as tight bounds on the ratio between the performance of a biased agent and the performance of a rational one. We further establish basic monotonicity results, and show an exponential gap between the performance of a biased agent in a stopping problem with respect to a worst-case versus a random order. As part of this, we establish fundamental differences between optimal stopping problems for rational versus biased agents, and these differences inform our analysis.
Free order inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting a value from a set of independent random variables: a prophet who knows the …
Free order inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting a value from a set of independent random variables: a prophet who knows the value of each variable and may select the maximum one, and a who is free to choose the order in which to observe the values but must select one of them immediately after observing it, without knowing what values will be sampled for the unobserved variables. It is known that the gambler can always ensure an expected payoff at least $0.669\dots$ times as great as that of the prophet. In fact, there exists a threshold stopping rule which guarantees a gambler-to-prophet ratio of at least $1-\frac1e=0.632\dots$. In contrast, if the gambler must observe the values in a predetermined order, the tight bound for the gambler-to-prophet ratio is $1/2$.
In this work we investigate a model that interpolates between these two extremes. We assume there is a predefined set of permutations, and the gambler is free to choose the order of observation to be any one of these predefined permutations. Surprisingly, we show that even when only two orderings are allowed---namely, the forward and reverse orderings---the gambler-to-prophet ratio improves to $\varphi^{-1}=0.618\dots$, the inverse of the golden ratio. As the number of allowed permutations grows beyond 2, a striking double plateau phenomenon emerges: after increasing from $0.5$ to $\varphi^{-1}$, the gambler-to-prophet ratio achievable by threshold stopping rules does not exceed $\varphi^{-1}+o(1)$ until the number of allowed permutations grows to $O(\log n)$. The ratio reaches $1-\frac1e-\varepsilon$ for a suitably chosen set of $O(\text{poly}(\varepsilon^{-1})\cdot\log n)$ permutations and does not exceed $1-\frac1e$ even when the full set of $n!$ permutations is allowed.
We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders …
We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders whose distribution is correctly specified (henceforth, the bidders) is unknown to the auctioneer. The question we address is whether the auctioneer can run a mechanism that is guaranteed to obtain at least as much revenue, in expectation, as would be obtained by running an optimal mechanism on the green bidders only. For single-parameter feasibility environments, we find that the answer depends on the feasibility constraint. For matroid environments, running the optimal mechanism using all the specified distributions (including the incorrect ones) guarantees at least as much revenue in expectation as running the optimal mechanism on the green bidders. For any feasibility constraint that is not a matroid, there exists a way of setting the specified distributions and the true distributions such that the opposite conclusion holds.
We present the first nontrivial approximation algorithm for the bottleneck asymmetric traveling salesman problem. Given an asymmetric metric cost between n vertices, the problem is to find a Hamiltonian cycle …
We present the first nontrivial approximation algorithm for the bottleneck asymmetric traveling salesman problem. Given an asymmetric metric cost between n vertices, the problem is to find a Hamiltonian cycle that minimizes its bottleneck (or maximum-length edge) cost. We achieve an O(log n / log log n) approximation performance guarantee by giving a novel algorithmic technique to shortcut Eulerian circuits while bounding the lengths of the shortcuts needed. This allows us to build on a related result of Asadpour, Goemans, M\k{a}dry, Oveis Gharan, and Saberi to obtain this guarantee. Furthermore, we show how our technique yields stronger approximation bounds in some cases, such as the bounded orientable genus case studied by Oveis Gharan and Saberi. We also explore the possibility of further improvement upon our main result through a comparison to the symmetric counterpart of the problem.
Free order prophet inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting a value from a set of independent random variables: a "prophet" who knows …
Free order prophet inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting a value from a set of independent random variables: a "prophet" who knows the value of each variable and may select the maximum one, and a "gambler" who is free to choose the order in which to observe the values but must select one of them immediately after observing it, without knowing what values will be sampled for the unobserved variables. It is known that the gambler can always ensure an expected payoff at least $0.669\dots$ times as great as that of the prophet. In fact, there exists a threshold stopping rule which guarantees a gambler-to-prophet ratio of at least $1-\frac1e=0.632\dots$. In contrast, if the gambler must observe the values in a predetermined order, the tight bound for the gambler-to-prophet ratio is $1/2$. In this work we investigate a model that interpolates between these two extremes. We assume there is a predefined set of permutations, and the gambler is free to choose the order of observation to be any one of these predefined permutations. Surprisingly, we show that even when only two orderings are allowed---namely, the forward and reverse orderings---the gambler-to-prophet ratio improves to $\varphi^{-1}=0.618\dots$, the inverse of the golden ratio. As the number of allowed permutations grows beyond 2, a striking "double plateau" phenomenon emerges: after increasing from $0.5$ to $\varphi^{-1}$, the gambler-to-prophet ratio achievable by threshold stopping rules does not exceed $\varphi^{-1}+o(1)$ until the number of allowed permutations grows to $O(\log n)$. The ratio reaches $1-\frac1e-\varepsilon$ for a suitably chosen set of $O(\text{poly}(\varepsilon^{-1})\cdot\log n)$ permutations and does not exceed $1-\frac1e$ even when the full set of $n!$ permutations is allowed.
We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders …
We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders whose distribution is correctly specified (henceforth, the "green bidders") is unknown to the auctioneer. The question we address is whether the auctioneer can run a mechanism that is guaranteed to obtain at least as much revenue, in expectation, as would be obtained by running an optimal mechanism on the green bidders only. For single-parameter feasibility environments, we find that the answer depends on the feasibility constraint. For matroid environments, running the optimal mechanism using all the specified distributions (including the incorrect ones) guarantees at least as much revenue in expectation as running the optimal mechanism on the green bidders. For any feasibility constraint that is not a matroid, there exists a way of setting the specified distributions and the true distributions such that the opposite conclusion holds.
Martin Weitzman's "Pandora's problem" furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher …
Martin Weitzman's "Pandora's problem" furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher is not obligated to pay the cost of inspecting an alternative's value before selecting it. Unlike the original Pandora's problem, the version with nonobligatory inspection cannot be solved optimally by any simple ranking-based policy, and it is unknown whether there exists any polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy. This motivates the study of approximately optimal policies that are simple and computationally efficient. In this work we provide the first non-trivial approximation guarantees for this problem. We introduce a family of "committing policies" such that it is computationally easy to find and implement the optimal committing policy. We prove that the optimal committing policy is guaranteed to approximate the fully optimal policy within a 1-1/e = 0.63... factor, and for the special case of two boxes we improve this factor to 4/5 and show that this approximation is tight for the class of committing policies.
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of trials to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the …
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of trials to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the performance of bandit algorithms with a small finite strategy set is well understood, bandit problems with large strategy sets are still a topic of active investigation, motivated by practical applications, such as online auctions and web advertisement. The goal of such research is to identify broad and natural classes of strategy sets and payoff functions that enable the design of efficient solutions. In this work, we study a general setting for the multi-armed bandit problem, in which the strategies form a metric space, and the payoff function satisfies a Lipschitz condition with respect to the metric. We refer to this problem as the Lipschitz MAB problem . We present a solution for the multi-armed bandit problem in this setting. That is, for every metric space, we define an isometry invariant that bounds from below the performance of Lipschitz MAB algorithms for this metric space, and we present an algorithm that comes arbitrarily close to meeting this bound. Furthermore, our technique gives even better results for benign payoff functions. We also address the full-feedback (“best expert”) version of the problem, where after every round the payoffs from all arms are revealed.
Martin Weitzman's furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher is not …
Martin Weitzman's furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher is not obligated to pay the cost of inspecting an alternative's value before selecting it. Unlike the original Pandora's problem, the version with nonobligatory inspection cannot be solved optimally by any simple ranking-based policy, and it is unknown whether there exists any polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy. This motivates the study of approximately optimal that are simple and computationally efficient. In this work we provide the first non-trivial approximation guarantees for this problem. We introduce a family of policies such that it is computationally easy to find and implement the optimal committing policy. We prove that the optimal committing policy is guaranteed to approximate the fully optimal policy within a $1-\frac1e = 0.63\ldots$ factor, and for the special case of two boxes we improve this factor to 4/5 and show that this approximation is tight for the class of committing policies.
Algorithm configuration methods optimize the performance of a parameterized heuristic algorithm on a given distribution of problem instances. Recent work introduced an algorithm configuration procedure (Structured Procrastination) that provably achieves …
Algorithm configuration methods optimize the performance of a parameterized heuristic algorithm on a given distribution of problem instances. Recent work introduced an algorithm configuration procedure (Structured Procrastination) that provably achieves near optimal performance with high probability and with nearly minimal runtime in the worst case. It also offers an $\textit{anytime}$ property: it keeps tightening its optimality guarantees the longer it is run. Unfortunately, Procrastination is not $\textit{adaptive}$ to characteristics of the parameterized algorithm: it treats every input like the worst case. Follow-up work (LeapsAndBounds) achieves adaptivity but trades away the anytime property. This paper introduces a new algorithm, Structured Procrastination with Confidence, that preserves the near-optimality and anytime properties of Procrastination while adding adaptivity. In particular, the new algorithm will perform dramatically faster in settings where many algorithm configurations perform poorly. We show empirically both that such settings arise frequently in practice and that the anytime property is useful for finding good configurations quickly.
Algorithm configuration methods optimize the performance of a parameterized heuristic algorithm on a given distribution of problem instances. Recent work introduced an algorithm configuration procedure (``Structured Procrastination'') that provably achieves …
Algorithm configuration methods optimize the performance of a parameterized heuristic algorithm on a given distribution of problem instances. Recent work introduced an algorithm configuration procedure (``Structured Procrastination'') that provably achieves near optimal performance with high probability and with nearly minimal runtime in the worst case. It also offers an anytime property: it keeps tightening its optimality guarantees the longer it is run. Unfortunately, Structured Procrastination is not adaptive to characteristics of the parameterized algorithm: it treats every input like the worst case. Follow-up work (``LeapsAndBounds'') achieves adaptivity but trades away the anytime property. This paper introduces a new algorithm, ``Structured Procrastination with Confidence'', that preserves the near-optimality and anytime properties of Structured Procrastination while adding adaptivity. In particular, the new algorithm will perform dramatically faster in settings where many algorithm configurations perform poorly. We show empirically both that such settings arise frequently in practice and that the anytime property is useful for finding good configurations quickly.
We derive upper and lower bounds on the degree $d$ for which the Lovász $\vartheta$ function, or equivalently sum-of-squares proofs with degree two, can refute the existence of a $k$-coloring …
We derive upper and lower bounds on the degree $d$ for which the Lovász $\vartheta$ function, or equivalently sum-of-squares proofs with degree two, can refute the existence of a $k$-coloring in random regular graphs $G_{n,d}$. We show that this type of refutation fails well above the $k$-colorability transition, and in particular everywhere below the Kesten--Stigum threshold. This is consistent with the conjecture that refuting $k$-colorability, or distinguishing $G_{n,d}$ from the planted coloring model, is hard in this region. Our results also apply to the disassortative case of the stochastic block model, adding evidence to the conjecture that there is a regime where community detection is computationally hard even though it is information-theoretically possible. Using orthogonal polynomials, we also provide explicit upper bounds on $\vartheta(\overline{G})$ for regular graphs of a given girth, which may be of independent interest.
Martin Weitzman's "Pandora's problem" furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher …
Martin Weitzman's "Pandora's problem" furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher is not obligated to pay the cost of inspecting an alternative's value before selecting it. Unlike the original Pandora's problem, the version with nonobligatory inspection cannot be solved optimally by any simple ranking-based policy, and it is unknown whether there exists any polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy. This motivates the study of approximately optimal policies that are simple and computationally efficient. In this work we provide the first non-trivial approximation guarantees for this problem. We introduce a family of "committing policies" such that it is computationally easy to find and implement the optimal committing policy. We prove that the optimal committing policy is guaranteed to approximate the fully optimal policy within a $1-\frac1e = 0.63\ldots$ factor, and for the special case of two boxes we improve this factor to 4/5 and show that this approximation is tight for the class of committing policies.
Algorithm configuration methods optimize the performance of a parameterized heuristic algorithm on a given distribution of problem instances. Recent work introduced an algorithm configuration procedure ("Structured Procrastination") that provably achieves …
Algorithm configuration methods optimize the performance of a parameterized heuristic algorithm on a given distribution of problem instances. Recent work introduced an algorithm configuration procedure ("Structured Procrastination") that provably achieves near optimal performance with high probability and with nearly minimal runtime in the worst case. It also offers an $\textit{anytime}$ property: it keeps tightening its optimality guarantees the longer it is run. Unfortunately, Structured Procrastination is not $\textit{adaptive}$ to characteristics of the parameterized algorithm: it treats every input like the worst case. Follow-up work ("LeapsAndBounds") achieves adaptivity but trades away the anytime property. This paper introduces a new algorithm, "Structured Procrastination with Confidence", that preserves the near-optimality and anytime properties of Structured Procrastination while adding adaptivity. In particular, the new algorithm will perform dramatically faster in settings where many algorithm configurations perform poorly. We show empirically both that such settings arise frequently in practice and that the anytime property is useful for finding good configurations quickly.
The growth rate of tri-colored sum-free sets, Discrete Analysis 2018:12, 10 pp. This paper contributes to the remarkable collection of results that followed in the wake of the 2016 breakthrough …
The growth rate of tri-colored sum-free sets, Discrete Analysis 2018:12, 10 pp. This paper contributes to the remarkable collection of results that followed in the wake of the 2016 breakthrough by Ellenberg and Gijswijt on the cap set problem, which asks for the maximal size of a 3-term progression-free subset of $\mathbb{F}_3^n$. The polynomial method of Ellenberg and Gijswijt, who followed the lead of Croot, Lev, and Pach after whom the method is now named, showed for the first time that the size of such a set is bounded by a polynomial in the size of the ambient space. More specifically, they showed that a cap set in $\mathbb{F}_3^n$ can be of size at most $(2.756)^n$. This paper considers a variant of the cap set problem, namely the question of how large a tri-coloured sum-free subset of $\mathbb{F}_3^n$ can be. By a tri-coloured sum-free subset we mean a collection of triples $(a_i,b_i,c_i)$ in $(\mathbb{F}_3^n)^3$ such that $a_i+b_j+c_k=0$ if and only if $i=j=k$. Note that a cap set $A\subseteq \mathbb{F}_3^n$ gives rise to a tri-coloured sum-free set, namely the collection of triples $\{(a,a,a): a\in A\}$. It is therefore not entirely surprising that the Croot-Lev-Pach polynomial method can be used to show that if $q$ is a prime power, then a tri-coloured sum-free set in $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ can have size at most $3\theta^n$, where $\theta$ is the solution to an explicit optimisation problem. This is one of the results appearing in the paper ["On cap sets and the group-theoretic approach to matrix multiplication"](http://discreteanalysisjournal.com/article/1245), by Blasiak, Church, Cohn, Grochow, Naslund, Sawin, and Umans, which Discrete Analysis published earlier this year. In the present paper the authors show this bound to be tight to within a subexponential factor. The lower bound is based on a construction of an $S_3$-symmetric probability distribution on $\{(a,b,c)\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^3:a+b+c=n\}$ such that its marginal achieves the maximum entropy among all probability distributions on $\{0,1,…,n\}$ with mean $n/3$. In answer to a conjecture which was posed in the original preprint version of this article, the existence of such a distribution was established by Pebody, whose [article](http://discreteanalysisjournal.com/article/3733-proof-of-a-conjecture-of-kleinberg-sawin-speyer) is being published in Discrete Analysis alongside the present paper. The question of whether the Croot-Lev-Pach polynomial method also yields a tight bound for the cap set problem remains open.
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes …
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the workflow within organizations, as well as many of the activities undertaken by regulatory bodies, who often obtain relevant information from the parties being regulated through a process of delegation. A fundamental tension underlying delegation is the fact that the agent's interests will typically differ -- potentially significantly -- from the interests of the principal, and as a result the agent may propose solutions based on their own incentives that are inefficient for the principal. A basic problem, therefore, is to design mechanisms by which the principal can constrain the set of proposals they are willing to accept from the agent, to ensure a certain level of quality for the principal from the proposed solution.
In this work, we investigate how much the principal loses -- quantitatively, in terms of the objective they are trying to optimize -- when they delegate to an agent. We develop a methodology for bounding this loss of efficiency, and show that in a very general model of delegation, there is a family of mechanisms achieving a universal bound on the ratio between the quality of the solution obtained through delegation and the quality the principal could obtain in an idealized benchmark where they searched for a solution themself. Moreover, it is possible to achieve such bounds through mechanisms with a natural threshold structure, which are thus structurally simpler than the optimal mechanisms typically considered in the literature on delegation. At the heart of our framework is an unexpected connection between delegation and the analysis of prophet inequalities, which we leverage to provide bounds on the behavior of our delegation mechanisms.
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes …
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the workflow within organizations, as well as many of the activities undertaken by regulatory bodies, who often obtain relevant information from the parties being regulated through a process of delegation. A fundamental tension underlying delegation is the fact that the agent's interests will typically differ -- potentially significantly -- from the interests of the principal, and as a result the agent may propose solutions based on their own incentives that are inefficient for the principal. A basic problem, therefore, is to design mechanisms by which the principal can constrain the set of proposals they are willing to accept from the agent, to ensure a certain level of quality for the principal from the proposed solution. In this work, we investigate how much the principal loses -- quantitatively, in terms of the objective they are trying to optimize -- when they delegate to an agent. We develop a methodology for bounding this loss of efficiency, and show that in a very general model of delegation, there is a family of mechanisms achieving a universal bound on the ratio between the quality of the solution obtained through delegation and the quality the principal could obtain in an idealized benchmark where they searched for a solution themself. Moreover, it is possible to achieve such bounds through mechanisms with a natural threshold structure, which are thus structurally simpler than the optimal mechanisms typically considered in the literature on delegation. At the heart of our framework is an unexpected connection between delegation and the analysis of prophet inequalities, which we leverage to provide bounds on the behavior of our delegation mechanisms.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions …
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions than GD for modern neural networks.
In order to understand this phenomenon, we take an alternative view that SGD is working on the convolved (thus smoothed) version of the loss function. We show that, even if the function $f$ has many bad local minima or saddle points, as long as for every point $x$, the weighted average of the gradients of its neighborhoods is one point convex with respect to the desired solution $x^*$, SGD will get close to, and then stay around $x^*$ with constant probability. More specifically, SGD will not get stuck at sharp local minima with small diameters, as long as the neighborhoods of these regions contain enough gradient information. The neighborhood size is controlled by step size and gradient noise.
Our result identifies a set of functions that SGD provably works, which is much larger than the set of convex functions. Empirically, we observe that the loss surface of neural networks enjoys nice one point convexity properties locally, therefore our theorem helps explain why SGD works so well for neural networks.
The issue of disagreements amongst human experts is a ubiquitous one in both machine learning and medicine. In medicine, this often corresponds to doctor disagreements on a patient diagnosis. In …
The issue of disagreements amongst human experts is a ubiquitous one in both machine learning and medicine. In medicine, this often corresponds to doctor disagreements on a patient diagnosis. In this work, we show that machine learning models can be trained to give uncertainty scores to data instances that might result in high expert disagreements. In particular, they can identify patient cases that would benefit most from a medical second opinion. Our central methodological finding is that Direct Uncertainty Prediction (DUP), training a model to predict an uncertainty score directly from the raw patient features, works better than Uncertainty Via Classification, the two-step process of training a classifier and postprocessing the output distribution to give an uncertainty score. We show this both with a theoretical result, and on extensive evaluations on a large scale medical imaging application.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions …
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely used in machine learning. Although being commonly viewed as a fast but not accurate version of gradient descent (GD), it always finds better solutions than GD for modern neural networks. In order to understand this phenomenon, we take an alternative view that SGD is working on the convolved (thus smoothed) version of the loss function. We show that, even if the function $f$ has many bad local minima or saddle points, as long as for every point $x$, the weighted average of the gradients of its neighborhoods is one point convex with respect to the desired solution $x^*$, SGD will get close to, and then stay around $x^*$ with constant probability. More specifically, SGD will not get stuck at "sharp" local minima with small diameters, as long as the neighborhoods of these regions contain enough gradient information. The neighborhood size is controlled by step size and gradient noise. Our result identifies a set of functions that SGD provably works, which is much larger than the set of convex functions. Empirically, we observe that the loss surface of neural networks enjoys nice one point convexity properties locally, therefore our theorem helps explain why SGD works so well for neural networks.
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes …
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the workflow within organizations, as well as many of the activities undertaken by regulatory bodies, who often obtain relevant information from the parties being regulated through a process of delegation. A fundamental tension underlying delegation is the fact that the agent's interests will typically differ -- potentially significantly -- from the interests of the principal, and as a result the agent may propose solutions based on their own incentives that are inefficient for the principal. A basic problem, therefore, is to design mechanisms by which the principal can constrain the set of proposals they are willing to accept from the agent, to ensure a certain level of quality for the principal from the proposed solution. In this work, we investigate how much the principal loses -- quantitatively, in terms of the objective they are trying to optimize -- when they delegate to an agent. We develop a methodology for bounding this loss of efficiency, and show that in a very general model of delegation, there is a family of mechanisms achieving a universal bound on the ratio between the quality of the solution obtained through delegation and the quality the principal could obtain in an idealized benchmark where they searched for a solution themself. Moreover, it is possible to achieve such bounds through mechanisms with a natural threshold structure, which are thus structurally simpler than the optimal mechanisms typically considered in the literature on delegation. At the heart of our framework is an unexpected connection between delegation and the analysis of prophet inequalities, which we leverage to provide bounds on the behavior of our delegation mechanisms.
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved many recent successes, but our understanding of its strengths and limitations is hampered by the lack of rich environments in which we can fully characterize …
Deep reinforcement learning has achieved many recent successes, but our understanding of its strengths and limitations is hampered by the lack of rich environments in which we can fully characterize optimal behavior, and correspondingly diagnose individual actions against such a characterization. Here we consider a family of combinatorial games, arising from work of Erdos, Selfridge, and Spencer, and we propose their use as environments for evaluating and comparing different approaches to reinforcement learning. These games have a number of appealing features: they are challenging for current learning approaches, but they form (i) a low-dimensional, simply parametrized environment where (ii) there is a linear closed form solution for optimal behavior from any state, and (iii) the difficulty of the game can be tuned by changing environment parameters in an interpretable way. We use these Erdos-Selfridge-Spencer games not only to compare different algorithms, but test for generalization, make comparisons to supervised learning, analyse multiagent play, and even develop a self play algorithm. Code can be found at: this https URL
Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. …
Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of $n$ trials so as to maximize the total payoff of the chosen …
In a multi-armed bandit problem, an online algorithm chooses from a set of strategies in a sequence of $n$ trials so as to maximize the total payoff of the chosen strategies. While the performance of bandit algorithms with a small finite strategy set is quite well understood, bandit problems with large strategy sets are still a topic of very active investigation, motivated by practical applications such as online auctions and web advertisement. The goal of such research is to identify broad and natural classes of strategy sets and payoff functions which enable the design of efficient solutions.
In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still …
In this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving differential privacy. Our instantiation of the exponential mechanism can be interpreted as a generalization of the VCG mechanism in the sense that the VCG mechanism is the extreme case when the privacy parameter goes to infinity. To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private.
Systems as diverse as genetic networks or the World Wide Web are best described as networks with complex topology. A common property of many large networks is that the vertex …
Systems as diverse as genetic networks or the World Wide Web are best described as networks with complex topology. A common property of many large networks is that the vertex connectivities follow a scale-free power-law distribution. This feature was found to be a consequence of two generic mechanisms: (i) networks expand continuously by the addition of new vertices, and (ii) new vertices attach preferentially to sites that are already well connected. A model based on these two ingredients reproduces the observed stationary scale-free distributions, which indicates that the development of large networks is governed by robust self-organizing phenomena that go beyond the particulars of the individual systems.
Let $X_i \geq 0$ be independent, $i = 1, \cdots, n$, and $X^\ast_n = \max(X_1, \cdots, X_n)$. Let $t(c) (s(c))$ be the threshold stopping rule for $X_1, \cdots, X_n$, defined …
Let $X_i \geq 0$ be independent, $i = 1, \cdots, n$, and $X^\ast_n = \max(X_1, \cdots, X_n)$. Let $t(c) (s(c))$ be the threshold stopping rule for $X_1, \cdots, X_n$, defined by $t(c) = \text{smallest} i$ for which $X_i \geq c(s(c) = \text{smallest} i$ for which $X_i > c), = n$ otherwise. Let $m$ be a median of the distribution of $X^\ast_n$. It is shown that for every $n$ and $\underline{X}$ either $EX^\ast_n \leq 2EX_{t(m)}$ or $EX^\ast_n \leq 2EX_{s(m)}$. This improves previously known results, [1], [4]. Some results for i.i.d. $X_i$ are also included.
We present algorithms for a class of resource allocation problems both in the online setting with stochastic input and in the offline setting. This class of problems contains many interesting …
We present algorithms for a class of resource allocation problems both in the online setting with stochastic input and in the offline setting. This class of problems contains many interesting special cases such as the Adwords problem. In the online setting we introduce a new distributional model called the adversarial stochastic input model, which is a generalization of the i.i.d model with unknown distributions, where the distributions can change over time. In this model we give a 1-O(ε) approximation algorithm for the resource allocation problem, with almost the weakest possible assumption: the ratio of the maximum amount of resource consumed by any single request to the total capacity of the resource, and the ratio of the profit contributed by any single request to the optimal profit is at most (ε2/log(1/ε)2)/(log n + log (1/ε)) where n is the number of resources available. There are instances where this ratio is #949;2/log n such that no randomized algorithm can have a competitive ratio of 1-o(ε) even in the i.i.d model. The upper bound on ratio that we require improves on the previous upper-bound for the i.i.d case by a factor of n.
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any …
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) buyers' types must be distributed independently (not necessarily identically), (ii) objective function must be linearly separable over the buyers, and (iii) except for the supply constraints, there should be no other inter-buyer constraints. Our framework is general in the sense that it makes no explicit assumption about buyers' valuations, type distributions, and single buyer constraints (e.g., budget, incentive compatibility, etc).
We present two generic multi buyer mechanisms which use single buyer mechanisms as black boxes; if an $\alpha$-approximate single buyer mechanism can be constructed for each buyer, and if no buyer requires more than $\frac{1}{k}$ of all units of each item, then our generic multi buyer mechanisms are $\gamma_k\alpha$-approximation of the optimal multi buyer mechanism, where $\gamma_k$ is a constant which is at least $1-\frac{1}{\sqrt{k+3}}$. Observe that $\gamma_k$ is at least 1/2 (for $k=1$) and approaches 1 as $k \to \infty$. As a byproduct of our construction, we present a generalization of prophet inequalities. Furthermore, as applications of our framework, we present multi buyer mechanisms with improved approximation factor for several settings from the literature.
Inspired by empirical studies of networked systems such as the Internet, social networks, and biological networks, researchers have in recent years developed a variety of techniques and models to help …
Inspired by empirical studies of networked systems such as the Internet, social networks, and biological networks, researchers have in recent years developed a variety of techniques and models to help us understand or predict the behavior of these systems. Here we review developments in this field, including such concepts as the small-world effect, degree distributions, clustering, network correlations, random graph models, models of network growth and preferential attachment, and dynamical processes taking place on networks.
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked …
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value from clicks; the value of a click is her private information. Initially, neither the auctioneer nor the advertisers have any information about the likelihood of clicks on the advertisements. The auctioneer's goal is to design a (dominant strategies) truthful mechanism that (approximately) maximizes the social welfare.
Complex networks describe a wide range of systems in nature and society, much quoted examples including the cell, a network of chemicals linked by chemical reactions, or the Internet, a …
Complex networks describe a wide range of systems in nature and society, much quoted examples including the cell, a network of chemicals linked by chemical reactions, or the Internet, a network of routers and computers connected by physical links. While traditionally these systems were modeled as random graphs, it is increasingly recognized that the topology and evolution of real networks is governed by robust organizing principles. Here we review the recent advances in the field of complex networks, focusing on the statistical mechanics of network topology and dynamics. After reviewing the empirical data that motivated the recent interest in networks, we discuss the main models and analytical tools, covering random graphs, small-world and scale-free networks, as well as the interplay between topology and the network's robustness against failures and attacks.
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for single-parameter domains: …
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for single-parameter domains: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a single call to a monotone allocation function. Our main result is a general procedure to take a monotone allocation rule and transform it (via a black-box reduction) into a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation and individually rational for every realization. Moreover, the mechanism implements the same outcome as the original allocation rule with probability arbitrarily close to 1, and requires evaluating that allocation rule only once.
A multi-armed bandit problem - or, simply, a bandit problem - is a sequential allocation problem defined by a set of actions. At each time step, a unit resource is …
A multi-armed bandit problem - or, simply, a bandit problem - is a sequential allocation problem defined by a set of actions. At each time step, a unit resource is allocated to an action and some observable payoff is obtained. The goal is to maximize the total payoff obtained in a sequence of allocations. The name bandit refers to the colloquial term for a slot machine (a "one-armed bandit" in American slang). In a casino, a sequential allocation problem is obtained when the player is facing many slot machines at once (a "multi-armed bandit"), and must repeatedly choose where to insert the next coin. Multi-armed bandit problems are the most basic examples of sequential decision problems with an exploration-exploitation trade-off. This is the balance between staying with the option that gave highest payoffs in the past and exploring new options that might give higher payoffs in the future. Although the study of bandit problems dates back to the 1930s, exploration-exploitation trade-offs arise in several modern applications, such as ad placement, website optimization, and packet routing. Mathematically, a multi-armed bandit is defined by the payoff process associated with each option. In this book, the focus is on two extreme cases in which the analysis of regret is particularly simple and elegant: independent and identically distributed payoffs and adversarial payoffs. Besides the basic setting of finitely many actions, it also analyzes some of the most important variants and extensions, such as the contextual bandit model. This monograph is an ideal reference for students and researchers with an interest in bandit problems.
We study packing LPs in an online model where the columns are presented to the algorithm in random order. This natural problem was investigated in various recent studies motivated, e.g., …
We study packing LPs in an online model where the columns are presented to the algorithm in random order. This natural problem was investigated in various recent studies motivated, e.g., by online ad allocations and yield management where rows correspond to resources and columns to requests specifying demands for resources. Our main contribution is a 1 -- O(√(log d/B))-competitive online algorithm. Here d denotes the column sparsity, i.e., the maximum number of resources that occur in a single column, and B denotes the capacity ratio B, i.e., the ratio between the capacity of a resource and the maximum demand for this resource. In other words, we achieve a (1--ε)-approximation if the capacity ratio satisfies B=Ω(logd/ε2), which is known to be best-possible for any (randomized) online algorithms.
We introduce a model for directed scale-free graphs that grow with preferential attachment depending in a natural way on the in- and out-degrees. We show that the resulting in- and …
We introduce a model for directed scale-free graphs that grow with preferential attachment depending in a natural way on the in- and out-degrees. We show that the resulting in- and out-degree distributions are power laws with different exponents, reproducing observed properties of the worldwide web. We also derive exponents for the distribution of in- (out-) degrees among vertices with fixed out- (in-) degree. We conclude by suggesting a corresponding model with hidden variables.
Journal Article ON A CLASS OF SKEW DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS Get access HERBERT A. SIMON HERBERT A. SIMON Carnegie Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford …
Journal Article ON A CLASS OF SKEW DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS Get access HERBERT A. SIMON HERBERT A. SIMON Carnegie Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Biometrika, Volume 42, Issue 3-4, December 1955, Pages 425–440, https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/42.3-4.425 Published: 01 December 1955
We review the recent rapid progress in the statistical physics of evolving networks. Interest has focused mainly on the structural properties of complex networks in communications, biology, social sciences and …
We review the recent rapid progress in the statistical physics of evolving networks. Interest has focused mainly on the structural properties of complex networks in communications, biology, social sciences and economics. A number of giant artificial networks of this kind have recently been created, which opens a wide field for the study of their topology, evolution, and the complex processes which occur in them. Such networks possess a rich set of scaling properties. A number of them are scale-free and show striking resilience against random breakdowns. In spite of the large sizes of these networks, the distances between most of their vertices are short - a feature known as the 'small-world' effect. We discuss how growing networks self-organize into scale-free structures, and investigate the role of the mechanism of preferential linking. We consider the topological and structural properties of evolving networks, and percolation and disease spread on these networks. We present a number of models demonstrating the main features of evolving networks and discuss current approaches for their simulation and analytical study. Applications of the general results to particular networks in nature are discussed. We demonstrate the generic connections of the network growth processes with the general problems of non-equilibrium physics, econophysics, evolutionary biology, and so on.
Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent …
Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent observation. The famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the distribution of each random variable can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a "prophet" who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. We generalize this result to the setting in which the gambler and the prophet are allowed to make more than one selection, subject to a matroid constraint. We show that the gambler can still achieve at least half as much reward as the prophet; this result is the best possible, since it is known that the ratio cannot be improved even in the original prophet inequality, which corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids. Generalizing the result still further, we show that under an intersection of $p$ matroid constraints, the prophet's reward exceeds the gambler's by a factor of at most $O(p)$, and this factor is also tight.
The optimal allocation of resources in complex environments—like allocation of dynamic wireless spectrum, cloud computing services, and Internet advertising—is computationally challenging even given the true preferences of the participants. In …
The optimal allocation of resources in complex environments—like allocation of dynamic wireless spectrum, cloud computing services, and Internet advertising—is computationally challenging even given the true preferences of the participants. In the theory and practice of optimization in complex environments, a wide variety of special and general purpose algorithms have been developed; these algorithms produce outcomes that are satisfactory but not generally optimal or incentive compatible. This paper develops a very simple approach for converting any, potentially non-optimal, algorithm for optimization given the true participant preferences, into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that weakly improves social welfare and revenue. (JEL D82, H82, L82)
For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to …
For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the optimal mechanisms. In this paper, we give a theoretical explanation of this fact, based on a connection to the notion of correlation gap. Loosely speaking, for auction environments with matroid constraints, we can relate the performance of a mechanism to the expectation of a monotone submodular function over a random set. This random set corresponds to the winner set for the optimal mechanism, which is highly correlated, and corresponds to certain demand set for SPMs, which is independent. The notion of correlation gap of Agrawal et al.\ (SODA10) quantifies how much we {}"lose" in the expectation of the function by ignoring correlation in the random set, and hence bounds our loss in using certain SPM instead of the optimal mechanism. Furthermore, the correlation gap of a monotone and submodular function is known to be small, and it follows that certain SPM can approximate the optimal mechanism by a good constant factor. Exploiting this connection, we give tight analysis of a greedy-based SPM of Chawla et al.\ for several environments. In particular, we show that it gives an $e/(e-1)$-approximation for matroid environments, gives asymptotically a $1/(1-1/\sqrt{2\pi k})$-approximation for the important sub-case of $k$-unit auctions, and gives a $(p+1)$-approximation for environments with $p$-independent set system constraints.
We consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential …
We consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers ("agents") that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agent's value for an item is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown) distribution with support [0,1]. The seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each arriving agent (possibly different for different agents), and aims to maximize his expected revenue.
We present the first nontrivial approximation algorithm for the bottleneck asymmetric traveling salesman problem. Given an asymmetric metric cost between n vertices, the problem is to find a Hamiltonian cycle …
We present the first nontrivial approximation algorithm for the bottleneck asymmetric traveling salesman problem. Given an asymmetric metric cost between n vertices, the problem is to find a Hamiltonian cycle that minimizes its bottleneck (or maximum-length edge) cost. We achieve an O(log n / log log n) approximation performance guarantee by giving a novel algorithmic technique to shortcut Eulerian circuits while bounding the lengths of the shortcuts needed. This allows us to build on a related result of Asadpour, Goemans, M\k{a}dry, Oveis Gharan, and Saberi to obtain this guarantee. Furthermore, we show how our technique yields stronger approximation bounds in some cases, such as the bounded orientable genus case studied by Oveis Gharan and Saberi. We also explore the possibility of further improvement upon our main result through a comparison to the symmetric counterpart of the problem.
We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with …
We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces.
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to the mechanism design problem for each individual buyer. Our frame- …
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to the mechanism design problem for each individual buyer. Our frame- work can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) the buyer's types must be distributed independently (not necessarily identically), (ii) the objective function must be linearly separable over the set of buyers, and (iii) the supply constraints must be the only constraints involving more than one buyer. Our framework is general in the sense that it makes no explicit assumption about any of the following: (i) the buyer's valuations (e.g., submodular, additive, etc), (ii) The distribution of types for each buyer, and (iii) the other constraints involving individual buyers (e.g., budget constraints, etc). We present two generic ra-buyer mechanisms that use 1- buyer mechanisms as black boxes. Assuming that we have an α-approximate 1-buyer mechanism for each buyer and assuming that no buyer ever needs more than 1/k of all copies of each item for some integer k ≥ 1, then our generic n- buyer mechanisms are γ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">k</sub> · α-approximation of the optimal n-buyer mechanism, in which γ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">k</sub> is a constant which is at least 1 - 1/√(k+3). Observe that γ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">k</sub> is at least1/2 (for k = 1) and approaches 1 as k increases. As a byproduct of our construction, we improve a generalization of prophet inequalities. Furthermore, as applications of our main theorem, we improve several results from the literature.
Introduction Classical models of random graphs Results for classical random graphs The Watts-Strogatz ‘small-world’ model Scale-free models The Barabási-Albert model The LCD model and Gm(n) The Buckley-Osthus model The copying …
Introduction Classical models of random graphs Results for classical random graphs The Watts-Strogatz ‘small-world’ model Scale-free models The Barabási-Albert model The LCD model and Gm(n) The Buckley-Osthus model The copying model The Cooper-Frieze model Directed scale-free graphs Clustering coefficient and small subgraphs Pairings on [0, 1] and the diameter of the LCD model Robustness and vulnerability The case [0, 1]: plane-oriented recursive trees Conclusion References
We consider a multiround auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked …
We consider a multiround auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value from clicks; the value of a click is her private information. Initially, neither the auctioneer nor the advertisers have any information about the likelihood of clicks on the advertisements. The auctioneer's goal is to design a (dominant strategies) truthful mechanism that (approximately) maximizes the social welfare. If the advertisers bid their true private values, our problem is equivalent to the multi-armed bandit problem, and thus can be viewed as a strategic version of the latter. In particular, for both problems the quality of an algorithm can be characterized by regret, the difference in social welfare between the algorithm and the benchmark which always selects the same "best" advertisement. We investigate how the design of multi-armed bandit algorithms is affected by the restriction that the resulting mechanism must be truthful. We find that deterministic truthful mechanisms have certain strong structural properties---essentially, they must separate exploration from exploitation---and they incur much higher regret than the optimal multi-armed bandit algorithms. Moreover, we provide a truthful mechanism which (essentially) matches our lower bound on regret.
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized …
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a single call to a monotone allocation rule. Our main result is a general procedure to take a monotone allocation rule for a single-parameter domain and transform it (via a black-box reduction) into a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation and individually rational for every realization. The mechanism implements the same outcome as the original allocation rule with probability arbitrarily close to 1, and requires evaluating that allocation rule only once. We also provide an extension of this result to multiparameter domains and cycle-monotone allocation rules, under mild star-convexity and nonnegativity hypotheses on the type space and allocation rule, respectively. Because our reduction is simple, versatile, and general, it has many applications to mechanism design problems in which re-evaluating the allocation rule is either burdensome or informationally impossible. Applying our result to the multiarmed bandit problem, we obtain truthful randomized mechanisms whose regret matches the information-theoretic lower bound up to logarithmic factors, even though prior work showed this is impossible for truthful deterministic mechanisms. We also present applications to offline mechanism design, showing that randomization can circumvent a communication complexity lower bound for deterministic payments computation, and that it can also be used to create truthful shortest path auctions that approximate the welfare of the VCG allocation arbitrarily well, while having the same running time complexity as Dijkstra's algorithm.
In this paper, we consider a very general model for exploration-exploitation tradeoff which allows arbitrary concave rewards and convex constraints on the decisions across time, in addition to the customary …
In this paper, we consider a very general model for exploration-exploitation tradeoff which allows arbitrary concave rewards and convex constraints on the decisions across time, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. This model subsumes the classic multi-armed bandit (MAB) model, and the Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK) model of Badanidiyuru et al.[2013]. We also consider an extension of this model to allow linear contexts, similar to the linear contextual extension of the MAB model. We demonstrate that a natural and simple extension of the UCB family of algorithms for MAB provides a polynomial time algorithm that has near-optimal regret guarantees for this substantially more general model, and matches the bounds provided by Badanidiyuru et al.[2013] for the special case of BwK, which is quite surprising. We also provide computationally more efficient algorithms by establishing interesting connections between this problem and other well studied problems/algorithms such as the Blackwell approachability problem, online convex optimization, and the Frank-Wolfe technique for convex optimization.
In this paper we show that the Index Coding problem captures several important properties of the more general Network Coding problem. An instance of the Index Coding problem includes a …
In this paper we show that the Index Coding problem captures several important properties of the more general Network Coding problem. An instance of the Index Coding problem includes a server that holds a set of information messages X = {x <inf xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">1</inf> , …, x <inf xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">k</inf> } and a set of receivers R. Each receiver has some side information, known to the server, represented by a subset of X and demands another subset of X. The server uses a noiseless communication channel to broadcast encodings of messages in X to satisfy the receivers' demands. The goal of the server is to find an encoding scheme that requires the minimum number of transmissions. We show that any instance of the Network Coding problem can be efficiently reduced to an instance of the Index Coding problem. Our reduction shows that several important properties of the Network Coding problem carry over to the Index Coding problem. In particular, we prove that both scalar linear and vector linear codes are insufficient for achieving the minimal number of transmissions.
We present a 1.91457-approximation algorithm for the prize-collecting travelling salesman problem. This is obtained by combining a randomized variant of a rounding algorithm of Bienstock et al. and a primal-dual …
We present a 1.91457-approximation algorithm for the prize-collecting travelling salesman problem. This is obtained by combining a randomized variant of a rounding algorithm of Bienstock et al. and a primal-dual algorithm of Goemans and Williamson.
A natural optimization model that formulates many online resource allocation problems is the online linear programming (LP) problem in which the constraint matrix is revealed column by column along with …
A natural optimization model that formulates many online resource allocation problems is the online linear programming (LP) problem in which the constraint matrix is revealed column by column along with the corresponding objective coefficient. In such a model, a decision variable has to be set each time a column is revealed without observing the future inputs, and the goal is to maximize the overall objective function. In this paper, we propose a near-optimal algorithm for this general class of online problems under the assumptions of random order of arrival and some mild conditions on the size of the LP right-hand-side input. Specifically, our learning-based algorithm works by dynamically updating a threshold price vector at geometric time intervals, where the dual prices learned from the revealed columns in the previous period are used to determine the sequential decisions in the current period. Through dynamic learning, the competitiveness of our algorithm improves over the past study of the same problem. We also present a worst case example showing that the performance of our algorithm is near optimal.
For some positive constant ϵ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> , we give a (3/2-ϵ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> )-approximation algorithm for the following problem: given a graph G <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> = …
For some positive constant ϵ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> , we give a (3/2-ϵ <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> )-approximation algorithm for the following problem: given a graph G <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> = (V,V <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">0</sub> ), find the shortest tour that visits every vertex at least once. This is a special case of the metric traveling salesman problem when the underlying metric is defined by shortest path distances in Go. The result improves on the 3/2-approximation algorithm due to Christofides [13] for this special case. Similar to Christofides, our algorithm finds a spanning tree whose cost is upper bounded by the optimum, then it finds the minimum cost Eulerian augmentation (or T-join) of that tree. The main difference is in the selection of the spanning tree. Except in certain cases where the solution of LP is nearly integral, we select the spanning tree randomly by sampling from a maximum entropy distribution defined by the linear programming relaxation. Despite the simplicity of the algorithm, the analysis builds on a variety of ideas such as properties of strongly Rayleigh measures from probability theory, graph theoretical results on the structure of near minimum cuts, and the integrality of the T-join polytope from polyhedral theory. Also, as a byproduct of our result, we show new properties of the near minimum cuts of any graph, which may be of independent interest.
We present a framework for approximating the metric TSP based on a novel use of matchings. Traditionally, matchings have been used to add edges in order to make a given …
We present a framework for approximating the metric TSP based on a novel use of matchings. Traditionally, matchings have been used to add edges in order to make a given graph Eulerian, whereas our approach also allows for the removal of certain edges leading to a decreased cost. For the TSP on graphic metrics (graph-TSP), the approach yields a 1.461-approximation algorithm with respect to the Held-Karp lower bound. For graph-TSP restricted to a class of graphs that contains degree three bounded and claw-free graphs, we show that the integrality gap of the Held-Karp relaxation matches the conjectured ratio 4/3. The framework allows for generalizations in a natural way and also leads to a 1.586-approximation algorithm for the traveling salesman path problem on graphic metrics where the start and end vertices are prespecified.
We introduce a mechanism for generating power law distributions, referred to as highly optimized tolerance (HOT), which is motivated by biological organisms and advanced engineering technologies. Our focus is on …
We introduce a mechanism for generating power law distributions, referred to as highly optimized tolerance (HOT), which is motivated by biological organisms and advanced engineering technologies. Our focus is on systems which are optimized, either through natural selection or engineering design, to provide robust performance despite uncertain environments. We suggest that power laws in these systems are due to tradeoffs between yield, cost of resources, and tolerance to risks. These tradeoffs lead to highly optimized designs that allow for occasional large events. We investigate the mechanism in the context of percolation and sand pile models in order to emphasize the sharp contrasts between HOT and self-organized criticality (SOC), which has been widely suggested as the origin for power laws in complex systems. Like SOC, HOT produces power laws. However, compared to SOC, HOT states exist for densities which are higher than the critical density, and the power laws are not restricted to special values of the density. The characteristic features of HOT systems include: (1) high efficiency, performance, and robustness to designed-for uncertainties; (2) hypersensitivity to design flaws and unanticipated perturbations; (3) nongeneric, specialized, structured configurations; and (4) power laws. The first three of these are in contrast to the traditional hallmarks of criticality, and are obtained by simply adding the element of design to percolation and sand pile models, which completely changes their characteristics.
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the …
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general reduction that takes any allocation rule which satisfies "cyclic monotonicity" (a known necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness) and converts it to a truthful mechanism using a single call to the allocation rule, with arbitrarily small loss to the expected social welfare.
The following source coding problem was introduced by Birk and Kol: a sender holds a word x isin {0, 1} <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">n</sup> , and wishes to broadcast a codeword …
The following source coding problem was introduced by Birk and Kol: a sender holds a word x isin {0, 1} <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">n</sup> , and wishes to broadcast a codeword to n receivers, R <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">n</sub> ,..., R <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">n</sub> . The receiver R <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">i</sub> is interested in x <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">i</sub> , and has prior side information comprising some subset of the n bits. This corresponds to a directed graph G on n vertices, where i j is an edge R <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">i</sub> Ri knows the bit x <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">j</sub> . An index code for G is an encoding scheme which enables each Ri to always reconstruct x <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">i</sub> , given his side information. The minimal word length of an index code was studied by Bar-Yossef, Birk, Jayram, and Kol (FOCS'06). They introduced a graph parameter, minrk <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">2</sub> (G), which completely characterizes the length of an optimal linear index code for G. They showed that in various cases linear codes attain the optimal word length, and conjectured that linear index coding is in fact always optimal. In this work, we disprove the main conjecture of Bar-Yossef, Birk, Jayram, and Kol in the following strong sense: for any epsiv > 0 and sufficiently large n, there is an n-vertex graph G so that every linear index code for G requires codewords of length at least n <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">epsiv</sup> and yet a nonlinear index code for G has a word length of ne. This is achieved by an explicit construction, which extends Alon's variant of the celebrated Ramsey construction of Frankl and Wilson. In addition, we study optimal index codes in various, less restricted, natural models, and prove several related properties of the graph parameter minrk(G).
Let S⊂(0,1). Given a known function f:S→(0,1), we consider the problem of using independent tosses of a coin with probability of heads p (where p∈S is unknown) to simulate a …
Let S⊂(0,1). Given a known function f:S→(0,1), we consider the problem of using independent tosses of a coin with probability of heads p (where p∈S is unknown) to simulate a coin with probability of heads f(p). We prove that if S is a closed interval and f is real analytic on S, then f has a fast simulation on S (the number of p-coin tosses needed has exponential tails). Conversely, if a function f has a fast simulation on an open set, then it is real analytic on that set.