The Same <i>F</i> _<i>1</i> but a Different <i>F</i> _<i>2</i> – with Absolute Identity

Abstract Here I present an analysis of what it is for an x and a y to be the same F . Unlike the Fregean Analysis (FRE), according to which ‘ x is the same F as y ’ is equivalent to ‘ x is an F , y is an F , and x = y ’, the analysis presented and defended here allows that there are possible cases in which x and y are the same F 1 but not the same F 2 even though x is an F 2 and y is an F 2 . The analysis offered here, FRE+, retains the conditions that FRE deems are necessary for being the same F while adding a further condition to allow that the same F 1 can be a different F 2 . Although FRE+ is compatible with there being such cases, FRE+ shares with FRE that the identity mentioned in the analysis is nothing other than absolute identity. Thus, FRE+ offers a way to allow that the same F 1 can be a different F 2 while avoiding conflict with the traditionally accepted logic of identity, and I argue without conflict with the Indiscernibility of Identicals in particular.

• Metaphysica
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