We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up …
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an open problem. We show that there exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm that always computes an allocation satisfying Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item even if the utilities are mixed and the agents have asymmetric weights. We point out that the result does not hold if either of Pareto optimality or PROP1 is replaced with slightly stronger concepts.
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up …
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under additive utilities. When the utilities can be negative, the existence and complexity of an allocation that satisfies Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item (PROP1) is an open problem. We show that there exists a strongly polynomial-time algorithm that always computes an allocation satisfying Pareto optimality and proportionality up to one item even if the utilities are mixed and the agents have asymmetric weights. We point out that the result does not hold if either of Pareto optimality or PROP1 is replaced with slightly stronger concepts.
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible …
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods, while Pareto optimality (PO) and its stronger variant, fractional Pareto optimality (fPO), are widely recognized efficiency criteria. Although each property is straightforward to achieve individually, simultaneously ensuring both fairness and efficiency is challenging. Caragiannis et al.~\cite{caragiannis2019unreasonable} established the surprising result that maximizing Nash social welfare yields an allocation that is both EF1 and PO; however, since maximizing Nash social welfare is NP-hard, this approach does not provide an efficient algorithm. To overcome this barrier, Barman, Krishnamurthy, and Vaish~\cite{barman2018finding} designed a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute an EF1 and PO allocation, and showed the existence of EF1 and fPO allocations. Nevertheless, the latter existence proof relies on a non-constructive convergence argument and does not directly yield an efficient algorithm for finding EF1 and fPO allocations. Whether a polynomial-time algorithm exists for finding an EF1 and PO (or fPO) allocation remains an important open problem. In this paper, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an allocation that achieves both EF1 and fPO under additive valuation functions when the number of agents is fixed. Our primary idea is to avoid processing the entire instance at once; instead, we sequentially add agents to the instance and construct an allocation that satisfies EF1 and fPO at each step.
The apportionment problem deals with the fair distribution of a discrete set of $k$ indivisible resources (such as legislative seats) to $n$ entities (such as parties or geographic subdivisions). Highest …
The apportionment problem deals with the fair distribution of a discrete set of $k$ indivisible resources (such as legislative seats) to $n$ entities (such as parties or geographic subdivisions). Highest averages methods are a frequently used class of methods for solving this problem. We present an $O(n)$-time algorithm for performing apportionment under a large class of highest averages methods. Our algorithm works for all highest averages methods used in practice.
We report a new optimal resolution for the statistical stratification problem under proportional sampling allocation among strata. Consider a finite population of N units, a random sample of n units …
We report a new optimal resolution for the statistical stratification problem under proportional sampling allocation among strata. Consider a finite population of N units, a random sample of n units selected from this population and a number L of strata. Thus, we have to define which units belong to each stratum so as to minimize the variance of a total estimator for one desired variable of interest in each stratum,and consequently reduce the overall variance for such quantity. In order to solve this problem, an exact algorithm based on the concept of minimal path in a graph is proposed and assessed. Computational results using real data from IBGE (Brazilian Central Statistical Office) are provided.
To address the rising demand for strong packet delivery guarantees in networking, we study a novel way to perform graph resource allocation. We first introduce allocation graphs, in which nodes …
To address the rising demand for strong packet delivery guarantees in networking, we study a novel way to perform graph resource allocation. We first introduce allocation graphs, in which nodes can independently set local resource limits based on physical constraints or policy decisions. In this scenario we formalize the distributed path-allocation (PAdist) problem, which consists in allocating resources to paths considering only local on-path information -- importantly, not knowing which other paths could have an allocation -- while at the same time achieving the global property of never exceeding available resources. Our core contribution, the global myopic allocation (GMA) algorithm, is a solution to this problem. We prove that GMA can compute unconditional allocations for all paths on a graph, while never over-allocating resources. Further, we prove that GMA is Pareto optimal with respect to the allocation size, and it has linear complexity in the input size. Finally, we show with simulations that this theoretical result could be indeed applied to practical scenarios, as the resulting path allocations are large enough to fit the requirements of practically relevant applications.
We consider the classical online scheduling problem P||C_{max} in which jobs are released over list and provide a nearly optimal online algorithm. More precisely, an online algorithm whose competitive ratio …
We consider the classical online scheduling problem P||C_{max} in which jobs are released over list and provide a nearly optimal online algorithm. More precisely, an online algorithm whose competitive ratio is at most (1+\epsilon) times that of an optimal online algorithm could be achieved in polynomial time, where m, the number of machines, is a part of the input. It substantially improves upon the previous results by almost closing the gap between the currently best known lower bound of 1.88 (Rudin, Ph.D thesis, 2001) and the best known upper bound of 1.92 (Fleischer, Wahl, Journal of Scheduling, 2000). It has been known by folklore that an online problem could be viewed as a game between an adversary and the online player. Our approach extensively explores such a structure and builds up a completely new framework to show that, for the online over list scheduling problem, given any \epsilon>0, there exists a uniform threshold K which is polynomial in m such that if the competitive ratio of an online algorithm is \rho<=2, then there exists a list of at most K jobs to enforce the online algorithm to achieve a competitive ratio of at least \rho-O(\epsilon). Our approach is substantially different from that of Gunther et al. (Gunther et al., SODA 2013), in which an approximation scheme for online over time scheduling problems is given, where the number of machines is fixed. Our method could also be extended to several related online over list scheduling models.
We develop a rounding method based on random walks in polytopes, which leads to improved approximation algorithms and integrality gaps for several assignment problems that arise in resource allocation and …
We develop a rounding method based on random walks in polytopes, which leads to improved approximation algorithms and integrality gaps for several assignment problems that arise in resource allocation and scheduling. In particular, it generalizes the work of Shmoys and Tardos on the generalized assignment problem to the setting where some jobs can be dropped. New concentration bounds for random bipartite matching are developed as well.
We develop a rounding method based on random walks in polytopes, which leads to improved approximation algorithms and integrality gaps for several assignment problems that arise in resource allocation and …
We develop a rounding method based on random walks in polytopes, which leads to improved approximation algorithms and integrality gaps for several assignment problems that arise in resource allocation and scheduling. In particular, it generalizes the work of Shmoys and Tardos on the generalized assignment problem to the setting where some jobs can be dropped. New concentration bounds for random bipartite matching are developed as well.
We study the Maximum Budgeted Allocation problem, which is the problem of assigning indivisible items to players with budget constraints. In its most general form, an instance of the MBA …
We study the Maximum Budgeted Allocation problem, which is the problem of assigning indivisible items to players with budget constraints. In its most general form, an instance of the MBA problem might include many different prices for the same item among different players, and different budget constraints for every player. So far, the best approximation algorithms we know for the MBA problem achieve a 3/4-approximation ratio, and employ a natural LP relaxation, called the Assignment-LP. In this paper, we give an algorithm for MBA, and prove that it achieves a 3/4 + c-approximation ratio, for some constant c > 0. This algorithm works by rounding solutions to an LP called the Configuration-LP, therefore also showing that the Configuration-LP is strictly stronger than the Assignment-LP (for which we know that the integrality gap is 3/4) for the MBA problem.
We study the Maximum Budgeted Allocation problem, which is the problem of assigning indivisible items to players with budget constraints. In its most general form, an instance of the MBA …
We study the Maximum Budgeted Allocation problem, which is the problem of assigning indivisible items to players with budget constraints. In its most general form, an instance of the MBA problem might include many different prices for the same item among different players, and different budget constraints for every player. So far, the best approximation algorithms we know for the MBA problem achieve a $3/4$-approximation ratio, and employ a natural LP relaxation, called the Assignment-LP. In this paper, we give an algorithm for MBA, and prove that it achieves a $3/4+c$-approximation ratio, for some constant $c>0$. This algorithm works by rounding solutions to an LP called the Configuration-LP, therefore also showing that the Configuration-LP is strictly stronger than the Assignment-LP (for which we know that the integrality gap is $3/4$) for the MBA problem.
This paper presents an algorithm for determining the optimal allocation to demand points when the distribution system is a capacitated arborescence of N arcs and the cost (return) functions are …
This paper presents an algorithm for determining the optimal allocation to demand points when the distribution system is a capacitated arborescence of N arcs and the cost (return) functions are convex (concave). It is proved that the algorithm generates an optimal solution by solving at most N(N + 1)/2 single-constraint subproblems. If the cost functions allow the Lagrange multiplier for the subproblems to be evaluated in polynomial time, then this is a polynomial algorithm. The analysis is motivated by the problem of allocating spare capacity in the loop plant portion of telephone networks.
Since the sum of linear ratios problem (SLRP) has many applications in real life, for globally solving it, an efficient branch and bound algorithm is presented in this paper. By …
Since the sum of linear ratios problem (SLRP) has many applications in real life, for globally solving it, an efficient branch and bound algorithm is presented in this paper. By utilizing the characteristic of the problem (SLRP), we propose a convex separation technique and a two-part linearization technique, which can be used to generate a sequence of linear programming relaxation of the initial nonconvex programming problem. For improving the convergence speed of this algorithm, a deleting rule is presented. The convergence of this algorithm is established, and some experiments are reported to show the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed algorithm.
When assets are to be divided among several partners, for example, a partnership split, fair division theory can be used to determine a fair allocation. The applicability of existing approaches …
When assets are to be divided among several partners, for example, a partnership split, fair division theory can be used to determine a fair allocation. The applicability of existing approaches is limited as they either treat assets as divisible resources that end up being shared among participants or deal with indivisible objects providing only approximate fairness. In practice, sharing is often possible but undesirable, and approximate fairness is not adequate, particularly for highly valuable assets. In “Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing,” Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi introduce a novel approach offering a middle ground: the number of shared objects is minimized while maintaining exact fairness and economic efficiency. This minimization can be conducted in polynomial time for generic instances if the number of agents or objects is fixed. Experiments on real data demonstrate a substantial improvement over current methods.
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with matroid rank valuations --- every good provides a marginal value of 0 or 1 when …
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with matroid rank valuations --- every good provides a marginal value of 0 or 1 when added to a bundle and valuations are submodular. We generalize the Yankee Swap algorithm to create a simple framework, called General Yankee Swap, that can efficiently compute allocations that maximize any justice criterion (or fairness objective) satisfying some mild assumptions. Along with maximizing a justice criterion, General Yankee Swap is guaranteed to maximize utilitarian social welfare, ensure strategyproofness and use at most a quadratic number of valuation queries. We show how General Yankee Swap can be used to compute allocations for five different well-studied justice criteria: (a) Prioritized Lorenz dominance, (b) Maximin fairness, (c) Weighted leximin, (d) Max weighted Nash welfare, and (e) Max weighted p-mean welfare. In particular, our framework provides the first polynomial time algorithms to compute weighted leximin, max weighted Nash welfare and max weighted p-mean welfare allocations for agents with matroid rank valuations.
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. Our …
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. Our focus is on picking sequences derived from common apportionment methods, including five traditional divisor methods and the quota method. We paint a complete picture of these methods in relation to known envy-freeness and proportionality relaxations for indivisible items as well as monotonicity properties with respect to the resource, population, and weights. In addition, we provide characterizations of picking sequences satisfying each of the fairness notions, and show that the well-studied maximum Nash welfare solution fails resource- and population-monotonicity even in the unweighted setting. Our results serve as an argument in favor of using picking sequences in weighted fair division problems.
We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable …
We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and proportionality up to one item (PROP1). We consider two computational problems: (1) Among the utilitarian-maximal allocations, decide whether there exists one that is also fair; (2) among the fair allocations, compute one that maximizes the utilitarian welfare. We show that both problems are strongly NP-hard when the number of agents is variable, and remain NP-hard for a fixed number of agents greater than two. For the special case of two agents, we find that problem (1) is polynomial-time solvable, while problem (2) remains NP-hard. Finally, with a fixed number of agents, we design pseudopolynomial-time algorithms for both problems. We extend our results to the stronger fairness notions envy-freeness up to any item (EFx) and proportionality up to any item (PROPx).
While deep neural networks have achieved great success in graph analysis, recent work has shown that they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Compared with adversarial attacks on image classification, performing …
While deep neural networks have achieved great success in graph analysis, recent work has shown that they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Compared with adversarial attacks on image classification, performing adversarial attacks on graphs is more challenging because of the discrete and non-differential nature of the adjacent matrix for a graph. In this work, we propose Cluster Attack --- a Graph Injection Attack (GIA) on node classification, which injects fake nodes into the original graph to degenerate the performance of graph neural networks (GNNs) on certain victim nodes while affecting the other nodes as little as possible. We demonstrate that a GIA problem can be equivalently formulated as a graph clustering problem; thus, the discrete optimization problem of the adjacency matrix can be solved in the context of graph clustering. In particular, we propose to measure the similarity between victim nodes by a metric of Adversarial Vulnerability, which is related to how the victim nodes will be affected by the injected fake node, and to cluster the victim nodes accordingly. Our attack is performed in a practical and unnoticeable query-based black-box manner with only a few nodes on the graphs that can be accessed. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method by fooling the node classifiers with only a small number of queries.
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well-established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves …
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well-established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion for which, to qualify as fair, an allocation needs to give every agent at least a substantial fraction of the agent’s MMS. In this paper, we consider the case of arbitrary (unequal) entitlements. We explain shortcomings in previous attempts that extend the MMS to unequal entitlements. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a new notion of a share, the AnyPrice share (APS), that is appropriate for settings with arbitrary entitlements. Even for the equal entitlements case, this notion is new and satisfies [Formula: see text], for which the inequality is sometimes strict. We present two equivalent definitions for the APS (one as a minimization problem, the other as a maximization problem) and provide comparisons between the APS and previous notions of fairness. Our main result concerns additive valuations and arbitrary entitlements, for which we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives every agent at least a [Formula: see text] - fraction of the agent’s APS. This algorithm can also be viewed as providing strategies in a certain natural bidding game, and these strategies secure each agent at least a [Formula: see text] - fraction of the agent’s APS. Funding: T. Ezra’s research is partially supported by the European Research Council Advanced [Grant 788893] AMDROMA “Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets” and MIUR PRIN project ALGADIMAR “Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets.” U. Feige’s research is supported in part by the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 1122/22].
We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with possibly different entitlements represented by weights. Previous work has shown that guarantees for additive valuations with existing envy-based notions …
We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with possibly different entitlements represented by weights. Previous work has shown that guarantees for additive valuations with existing envy-based notions cannot be extended to the case where agents have matroid-rank (i.e., binary submodular) valuations. We propose two families of envy-based notions for matroid-rank and general submodular valuations, one based on the idea of transferability and the other on marginal values. We show that our notions can be satisfied via generalizations of rules such as picking sequences and maximum weighted Nash welfare. In addition, we introduce welfare measures based on harmonic numbers, and show that variants of maximum weighted harmonic welfare offer stronger fairness guarantees than maximum weighted Nash welfare under matroid-rank valuations.
We study the allocation of indivisible goods among groups of agents using well-known fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. While these notions cannot always be satisfied, we provide several …
We study the allocation of indivisible goods among groups of agents using well-known fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality. While these notions cannot always be satisfied, we provide several bounds on the optimal relaxations that can be guaranteed. For instance, our bounds imply that when the number of groups is constant and the n agents are divided into groups arbitrarily, there exists an allocation that is envy-free up to Θ(n) goods, and this bound is tight. Moreover, we show that while such an allocation can be found efficiently, it is NP-hard to compute an allocation that is envy-free up to o(n) goods even when a fully envy-free allocation exists. Our proofs make extensive use of tools from discrepancy theory.
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the …
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are `chores' that yield negative utility for the agents. In this paper, we consider a more general scenario where an agent may have negative or positive utility for each item. This framework captures, e.g., fair task assignment, where agents can have both positive and negative utilities for each task. We show that whereas some of the positive axiomatic and computational results extend to this more general setting, others do not. We present several new and efficient algorithms for finding fair allocations in this general setting. We also point out several gaps in the literature regarding the existence of allocations satisfying certain fairness and efficiency properties and further study the complexity of computing such allocations.
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality. The indivisibility of the goods is long known to pose highly non-trivial …
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and focus on the classic fairness notion of proportionality. The indivisibility of the goods is long known to pose highly non-trivial obstacles to achieving fairness, and a very vibrant line of research has aimed to circumvent them using appropriate notions of approximate fairness. Recent work has established that even approximate versions of proportionality (PROPx) may be impossible to achieve even for small instances, while the best known achievable approximations (PROP1) are much weaker. We introduce the notion of proportionality up to the maximin item (PROPm) and show how to reach an allocation satisfying this notion for any instance involving up to five agents with additive valuations. PROPm provides a well-motivated middle-ground between PROP1 and PROPx, while also capturing some elements of the well-studied maximin share (MMS) benchmark: another relaxation of proportionality that has attracted a lot of attention.
In this paper we study how to fairly allocate a set of m indivisible chores to a group of n agents, each of which has a general additive cost function …
In this paper we study how to fairly allocate a set of m indivisible chores to a group of n agents, each of which has a general additive cost function on the items. Since envy-free (EF) allocation is not guaranteed to exist, we consider the notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). In contrast to the fruitful results regarding the (approximation of) EFX allocations for goods, very little is known for the allocation of chores. Prior to our work, for the allocation of chores, it is known that EFX allocations always exist for two agents, or general number of agents with identical ordering cost functions. For general instances, no non-trivial approximation result regarding EFX allocation is known. In this paper we make some progress in this direction by showing that for three agents we can always compute a 5-approximation of EFX allocation in polynomial time. For n>=4 agents, our algorithm always computes an allocation that achieves an approximation ratio of 3n^2 regarding EFX. We also study the bi-valued instances, in which agents have at most two cost values on the chores, and provide polynomial time algorithms for the computation of EFX allocation when n=3, and (n-1)-approximation of EFX allocation when n>=4.
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and …
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX$_0$, EFX$^3$ and EF1$^3$ - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1$^3$ allocation. With $-\alpha/0/\alpha$ utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX$^3$ and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With $-\alpha/0/\beta$ utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.
In fair division applications, agents may have unequal entitlements reflecting their different contributions. Moreover, the contributions of agents may depend on the allocation itself. Previous fairness notions designed for agents …
In fair division applications, agents may have unequal entitlements reflecting their different contributions. Moreover, the contributions of agents may depend on the allocation itself. Previous fairness notions designed for agents with equal or pre-determined entitlements fail to characterize fairness in these collaborative allocation scenarios.
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has …
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores to a number of (asymmetric) agents with additive cost functions. We consider the fairness notion of …
In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores to a number of (asymmetric) agents with additive cost functions. We consider the fairness notion of (weighted) proportionality up to any item (PROPX), and show that a (weighted) PROPX allocation always exists and can be computed efficiently. We also consider the partial information setting, where the algorithms can only use agents' ordinal preferences. We design algorithms that achieve 2-approximate (weighted) PROPX, and the approximation ratio is optimal. We complement the algorithmic results by investigating the relationship between (weighted) PROPX and other fairness notions such as maximin share and AnyPrice share, and bounding the social welfare loss by enforcing the allocations to be (weighted) PROPX.
The fair allocation of resources to agents is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in …
The fair allocation of resources to agents is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods), and (iii) fair division of indivisible goods with subsidy.
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has …
Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.
We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up …
We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong , where envy can be eliminated by removing an item from the envied agent’s bundle, and weak , where envy can be eliminated either by removing an item (as in the strong version) or by replicating an item from the envied agent’s bundle in the envying agent’s bundle. We show that for additive valuations, an allocation that is both Pareto optimal and strongly WEF1 always exists and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time; moreover, an allocation that maximizes the weighted Nash social welfare may not be strongly WEF1, but it always satisfies the weak version of the property. Moreover, we establish that a generalization of the round-robin picking sequence algorithm produces in polynomial time a strongly WEF1 allocation for an arbitrary number of agents; for two agents, we can efficiently achieve both strong WEF1 and Pareto optimality by adapting the adjusted winner procedure. Our work highlights several aspects in which weighted fair division is richer and more challenging than its unweighted counterpart.
Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since ancient times, with most of the early mathematical work on the problem focusing on resources …
Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since ancient times, with most of the early mathematical work on the problem focusing on resources that are infinitely divisible. Over the last decade, there has been a surge of papers studying computational questions regarding the indivisible case, for which exact fairness notions such as envy-freeness and proportionality are hard to satisfy. One main theme in the recent research agenda is to investigate the extent to which their relaxations, like maximin share fairness (MMS) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), can be achieved. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of the recent progress made in the related literature by highlighting different ways to relax fairness notions, common algorithm design techniques, and the most interesting questions for future research.
In this paper we initiate the study of finding fair and efficient allocations of an indivisible mixed manna: Divide m indivisible items among n agents under the fairness notion of …
In this paper we initiate the study of finding fair and efficient allocations of an indivisible mixed manna: Divide m indivisible items among n agents under the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS) and the efficiency notion of Pareto optimality (PO). A mixed manna allows an item to be a good for some agents and a chore for others. The problem of finding $\alpha$-MMS allocation for the (near) best $\alpha\in(0,1]$ for which it exists, remains unresolved even for a goods manna with constantly many agents, while the problem of finding $\alpha$-MMS+PO allocation is unexplored for any $\alpha\in(0,1]$. We make significant progress on the above questions for a mixed manna. First, we show that for any $\alpha>0$, an $\alpha$-MMS allocation may not always exist, thus ruling out solving the problem for a fixed $\alpha$. Second, towards computing $\alpha$-MMS+PO allocation for the best possible $\alpha$, we obtain a dichotomous result: We derive two conditions and show that the problem is tractable under these two conditions, while dropping either renders the problem intractable. The two conditions are: (i) number of agents is a constant, and (ii) for every agent, her absolute value for all the items is at least a constant factor of her total (absolute) value for all the goods or all the chores. In particular, first, for instances satisfying (i) and (ii) we design a PTAS - an efficient algorithm to find an $(\alpha-\epsilon)$-MMS and $\gamma$-PO allocation when given $\epsilon,\gamma>0$, for the highest possible $\alpha\in(0,1]$. Second, we show that if either condition is not satisfied then finding an $\alpha$-MMS allocation for any $\alpha\in(0,1]$ is NP-hard, even when a solution exists for $\alpha=1$. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first algorithm that ensures both approximate MMS and PO guarantees.
The real-world deployment of fair allocation algorithms usually involves a heterogeneous population of users, which makes it challenging for the users to get complete knowledge of the allocation except for …
The real-world deployment of fair allocation algorithms usually involves a heterogeneous population of users, which makes it challenging for the users to get complete knowledge of the allocation except for their own bundles. Recently, a new fairness notion, maximin-awareness (MMA) was proposed and it guarantees that every agent is not the worst-off one, no matter how the items that are not allocated to this agent are distributed. We adapt and generalize this notion to the case of indivisible chores and when the agents may have arbitrary weights. Due to the inherent difficulty of MMA, we also consider its up to one and up to any relaxations. A string of results on the existence and computation of MMA related fair allocations, and their connections to existing fairness concepts is given.
Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing …
Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing on infinitely divisible resources. Recently, there has been a surge of papers studying computational questions regarding various different notions of fairness for the indivisible case, like maximin share fairness (MMS) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). We survey the most important results in the discrete fair division literature, focusing on the case of additive valuation functions and paying particular attention to the progress made in the last 10 years.
Fair division of indivisible goods is a central challenge in artificial intelligence. For many prominent fairness criteria including envy-freeness (EF) or proportionality (PROP), no allocations satisfying these criteria might exist. …
Fair division of indivisible goods is a central challenge in artificial intelligence. For many prominent fairness criteria including envy-freeness (EF) or proportionality (PROP), no allocations satisfying these criteria might exist. Two popular remedies to this problem are randomization or relaxation of fairness concepts. A timely research direction is to combine the advantages of both, commonly referred to as Best of Both Worlds (BoBW). We consider fair division with entitlements, which allows to adjust notions of fairness to heterogeneous priorities among agents. This is an important generalization to standard fair division models and is not well-understood in terms of BoBW results. Our main result is a lottery for additive valuations and different entitlements that is ex-ante weighted envy-free (WEF), as well as ex-post weighted proportional up to one good (WPROP1) and weighted transfer envy-free up to one good (WEF(1, 1)). We show that this result is tight – ex-ante WEF is incompatible with any stronger ex-post WEF relaxation. In addition, we extend BoBW results on group fairness to entitlements and explore generalizations of our results to instances with more expressive valuation functions.
We consider the fair division problem of indivisible items. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist, and a relaxed version of envy-freeness, envy-freeness up to one item …
We consider the fair division problem of indivisible items. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist, and a relaxed version of envy-freeness, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), has been widely considered. In an EF1 allocation, an agent may envy others' allocated shares, but only up to one item. In many applications, we may wish to specify a subset of prioritized agents where strict envy-freeness needs to be guaranteed from these agents to the remaining agents, while ensuring the whole allocation is still EF1. Prioritized agents may be those agents who are envious in a previous EF1 allocation, those agents who belong to underrepresented groups, etc. Motivated by this, we propose a new fairness notion named envy-freeness with prioritized agents EFprior, and study the existence and the algorithmic aspects for the problem of computing an EFprior allocation. With additive valuations, the simple round-robin algorithm is able to compute an EFprior allocation. In this paper, we mainly focus on general valuations. In particular, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that outputs an EFprior allocation with most of the items allocated. When all the items need to be allocated, we also present polynomial-time algorithms for some well-motivated special cases.
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior …
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior work showed that there exists an allocation that satisfies this notion of fairness for instances involving up to five agents, but fell short of proving that this is true in general. We extend this result to show that a PROPm allocation is guaranteed to exist for all instances, independent of the number of agents or goods. Our proof is constructive, providing an algorithm that computes such an allocation and, unlike prior work, the running time of this algorithm is polynomial in both the number of agents and the number of goods.
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior …
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior work showed that there exists an allocation that satisfies this notion of fairness for instances involving up to five agents, but fell short of proving that this is true in general. We extend this result to show that a PROPm allocation is guaranteed to exist for all instances, independent of the number of agents or goods. Our proof is constructive, providing an algorithm that computes such an allocation and, unlike prior work, the running time of this algorithm is polynomial in both the number of agents and the number of goods.
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to n agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied …
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to n agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) for agents with equal entitlements, we present, in this study, the first set of impossibility results alongside algorithmic guarantees for fairness among agents with unequal entitlements. Within this paper, we expand the concept of envy-freeness up to any good or chore to the weighted context (WEFX and XWEF respectively), demonstrating that these allocations are not guaranteed to exist for two or three agents. Despite these negative results, we develop a WEFX procedure for two agents with integer weights, and furthermore, we devise an approximate WEFX procedure for two agents with normalized weights. We further present a polynomial-time algorithm that guarantees a weighted envy-free allocation up to one chore (1WEF) for any number of agents with additive cost functions. Our work underscores the heightened complexity of the weighted fair division problem when compared to its unweighted counterpart.
We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the …
We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the same for weighted proportionality; the parameters indicate whether smaller-weight or larger-weight agents should be given a higher priority. We show that each notion in these families can always be satisfied, but any two cannot necessarily be fulfilled simultaneously. We then introduce an intuitive weighted generalization of maximin share fairness and establish the optimal approximation of it that can be guaranteed. Furthermore, we characterize the implication relations between the various weighted fairness notions introduced in this and prior work, and relate them to the lower and upper quota axioms from apportionment.
The leximin solution -- which selects an allocation that maximizes the minimum utility, then the second minimum utility, and so forth -- is known to provide EFX (envy-free up to …
The leximin solution -- which selects an allocation that maximizes the minimum utility, then the second minimum utility, and so forth -- is known to provide EFX (envy-free up to any good) fairness guarantee in some contexts when allocating indivisible goods. However, it remains unknown how fair the leximin solution is when used to allocate indivisible chores. In this paper, we demonstrate that the leximin solution can be modified to also provide compelling fairness guarantees for the allocation of indivisible chores. First, we generalize the definition of the leximin solution. Then, we show that the leximin solution finds a PROP1 (proportional up to one good) and PO (Pareto-optimal) allocation for 3 or 4 agents in the context of chores allocation with additive distinct valuations. Additionally, we prove that the leximin solution is EFX for combinations of goods and chores for agents with general but identical valuations.
We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up …
We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong, where envy can be eliminated by removing an item from the envied agent's bundle, and weak, where envy can be eliminated either by removing an item (as in the strong version) or by replicating an item from the envied agent's bundle in the envying agent's bundle. We show that for additive valuations, an allocation that is both Pareto optimal and strongly WEF1 always exists and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time; moreover, an allocation that maximizes the weighted Nash social welfare may not be strongly WEF1, but always satisfies the weak version of the property. Moreover, we establish that a generalization of the round-robin picking sequence algorithm produces in polynomial time a strongly WEF1 allocation for an arbitrary number of agents; for two agents, we can efficiently achieve both strong WEF1 and Pareto optimality by adapting the adjusted winner procedure. Our work highlights several aspects in which weighted fair division is richer and more challenging than its unweighted counterpart.
We study the fair allocation of undesirable indivisible items, or chores. While the case of desirable indivisible items (or goods) is extensively studied, with many results known for different notions …
We study the fair allocation of undesirable indivisible items, or chores. While the case of desirable indivisible items (or goods) is extensively studied, with many results known for different notions of fairness, less is known about the fair division of chores. We study the envy-free division of chores, and make three contributions. First, we show that determining the existence of an envy-free allocation is NP-complete, even in the simple case when agents have binary additive valuations. Second, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an allocation that satisfies envy-freeness up to one chore (EF1), correcting an existing proof in the literature. A straightforward modification of our algorithm can be used to compute an EF1 allocation for doubly monotone instances (wherein each agent can partition the set of items into objective goods and objective chores). Our third result applies to a mixed resources model consisting of indivisible items and a divisible, undesirable heterogeneous resource (i.e., a bad cake). We show that there always exists an allocation that satisfies envy-freeness for mixed resources (EFM) in this setting, complementing a recent result of Bei et al. (Art. Int. 2021) for indivisible goods and divisible cake.
We evaluate the fairness of a rule allocating among agents with equal rights by computing their utility for a hypothetical worst-case share, that only depends on their own valuation and …
We evaluate the fairness of a rule allocating among agents with equal rights by computing their utility for a hypothetical worst-case share, that only depends on their own valuation and the number of agents. For indivisible goods, Budish [J. Political Econ., 2011] proposed the maximin share : the least utility of a bundle in the best partition of the objects; unfortunately maximin share is not always satisfiable. Earlier, Hill [Ann. Probab., 1987] proposed the worst maximin share over all utilities with the same largest possible single-object value. More conservative than maximin share, it is guaranteed to be satisfiable for any possible profile of utilities and its computation is elementary whereas it is NP-hard to compute maximin share. We apply Hill’s approach to the allocation of indivisible bads (objects with disutilities) and compute in closed form the worst-case minimax share for a given value of the worst single bad. We show that the worst-case minimax share is close to the original minimax share and that its monotonic closure is the best guaranteed share for all allocation instances with a common upper bound on the value of the worst single bad.
We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the …
We revisit the setting of fairly allocating indivisible items when agents have different weights representing their entitlements. First, we propose a parameterized family of relaxations for weighted envy-freeness and the same for weighted proportionality; the parameters indicate whether smaller-weight or larger-weight agents should be given a higher priority. We show that each notion in these families can always be satisfied, but any two cannot necessarily be fulfilled simultaneously. We then introduce an intuitive weighted generalization of maximin share fairness and establish the optimal approximation of it that can be guaranteed. Furthermore, we characterize the implication relations between the various weighted fairness notions introduced in this and prior work, and relate them to the lower and upper quota axioms from apportionment.
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and efficient allocation of goods [Foley'67, Varian'74]. Every agent receives an equal budget of artificial …
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a classic solution to the problem of fair and efficient allocation of goods [Foley'67, Varian'74]. Every agent receives an equal budget of artificial currency with which to purchase goods, and prices match demand and supply. However, a CEEI is not guaranteed to exist when the goods are indivisible, even in the simple two-agent, single-item market. Yet, it is easy to see that once the two budgets are slightly perturbed (made generic), a competitive equilibrium does exist.
In this paper we aim to extend this approach beyond the single-item case, and study the existence of equilibria in markets with two agents and additive preferences over multiple items. We show that for agents with equal budgets, making the budgets generic -- by adding vanishingly small random perturbations -- ensures the existence of an equilibrium. We further consider agents with arbitrary non-equal budgets, representing non-equal entitlements for goods. We show that competitive equilibrium guarantees a new notion of fairness among non-equal agents, and that it exists in cases of interest (like when the agents have identical preferences) if budgets are perturbed. Our results open opportunities for future research on generic equilibrium existence and fair treatment of non-equals.
We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of fair public decision making, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, …
We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of fair public decision making, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a decision can provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the popular fairness notion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our more general setting, and introduce three novel relaxations --- proportionality up to one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic proportional share --- that are also interesting in the classic goods allocation setting. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare solution, which is known to satisfy appealing fairness properties in the classic setting, satisfies or approximates all three relaxations in our framework. We also provide polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for finding allocations satisfying these axioms, with or without insisting on Pareto optimality.
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is …
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible and agents have unequal entitlements. This problem is a generalization of the work by Procaccia and Wang (2014) wherein the agents are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their entitlements. Although Procaccia and Wang show an almost fair (constant approximation) allocation exists in their setting, our main result is in sharp contrast to their observation. We show that, in some cases with n agents, no allocation can guarantee better than 1/n approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements are not necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a 1/n approximation guarantee.
 Our second result is for a restricted version of the problem where the valuation of every agent for each good is bounded by the total value he wishes to receive in a fair allocation. Although this assumption might seem without loss of generality, we show it enables us to find a 1/2 approximation fair allocation via a greedy algorithm. Finally, we run some experiments on real-world data and show that, in practice, a fair allocation is likely to exist. We also support our experiments by showing positive results for two stochastic variants of the problem, namely stochastic agents and stochastic items.
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities, when money transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known to be the best …
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities, when money transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known to be the best mechanism for goods with additive utilities and was recently extended to chores by Bogomolnaia et al (2017). For both goods and chores, the rule produces Pareto optimal and envy-free allocations. In the case of goods, the outcome of the competitive rule can be easily computed. Competitive allocations solve the Eisenberg-Gale convex program; hence the outcome is unique and can be approximately found by standard gradient methods. An exact algorithm that runs in polynomial time in the number of agents and goods was given by Orlin.
In the case of chores, the competitive rule does not solve any convex optimization problem; instead, competitive allocations correspond to local minima, local maxima, and saddle points of the Nash Social Welfare on the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible utilities. The rule becomes multivalued and none of the standard methods can be applied to compute its outcome.
In this paper, we show that all the outcomes of the competitive rule for chores can be computed in strongly polynomial time if either the number of agents or the number of chores is fixed. The approach is based on a combination of three ideas: all consumption graphs of Pareto optimal allocations can be listed in polynomial time; for a given consumption graph, a candidate for a competitive allocation can be constructed via explicit formula; and a given allocation can be checked for being competitive using a maximum flow computation as in Devanur et al (2002).
Our algorithm immediately gives an approximately-fair allocation of indivisible chores by the rounding technique of Barman and Krishnamurthy (2018).
We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with …
We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of Fisher markets with additive valuations (Eisenberg and Gale 1959; Orlin 2010), such equilibria, in general, assign goods fractionally to agents. Hence, Fisher markets are not directly applicable in the context of indivisible goods. In this work we show that one can always bypass this hurdle and, up to a bounded change in agents’ budgets, obtain markets that admit an integral equilibrium. We refer to such markets as pure markets and show that, for any given Fisher market (with additive valuations), one can efficiently compute a “near-by,” pure market with an accompanying integral equilibrium.Our work on pure markets leads to novel algorithmic results for fair division of indivisible goods. Prior work in discrete fair division has shown that, under additive valuations, there always exist allocations that simultaneously achieve the seemingly incompatible properties of fairness and efficiency (Caragiannis et al. 2016); here fairness refers to envyfreeness up to one good (EF1) and efficiency corresponds to Pareto efficiency. However, polynomial-time algorithms are not known for finding such allocations. Considering relaxations of proportionality and EF1, respectively, as our notions of fairness, we show that fair and Pareto efficient allocations can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
A set of objects, some goods and some bads, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so …
A set of objects, some goods and some bads, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely allocated to a single agent, then fair division may not exist. What is the smallest number of objects that must be shared between two or more agents in order to attain a fair division?
We focus on Pareto-optimal, envy-free and/or proportional allocations. We show that, for a generic instance of the problem --- all instances except of a zero-measure set of degenerate problems --- a fair and Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found in polynomial time, assuming that the number of agents is fixed. The problem becomes computationally hard for degenerate instances, where the agents' valuations are aligned for many objects.
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an …
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a welfare-achieving allocation, we embed such an oracle into a flexible algorithm called the Constrained Round Robin (CRR) algorithm, that achieves the required welfare level. Our algorithm also allows the system designer to lower the welfare requirements in order to achieve a higher degree of fairness. If the welfare requirement is lowered enough, a strengthening of envy-freeness up to one item is guaranteed. Hence, our algorithm can be viewed as a computationally efficient way to interpolate between welfare and approximate envy-freeness in allocation problems.
We initiate the study of indivisible chore allocation for agents with asymmetric shares. The fairness concept we focus on is the weighted natural generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fairness and …
We initiate the study of indivisible chore allocation for agents with asymmetric shares. The fairness concept we focus on is the weighted natural generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fairness and OWMMS fairness. We first highlight the fact that commonly-used algorithms that work well for allocation of goods to asymmetric agents, and even for chores to symmetric agents do not provide good approximations for allocation of chores to asymmetric agents under WMMS. As a consequence, we present a novel polynomial-time constant-approximation algorithm, via linear program, for OWMMS. For two special cases: the binary valuation case and the 2-agent case, we provide exact or better constant-approximation algorithms.
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for its remarkable fairness …
We study the problem of allocating divisible bads (chores) among multiple agents with additive utilities when monetary transfers are not allowed. The competitive rule is known for its remarkable fairness and efficiency properties in the case of goods. This rule was extended to chores in prior work by Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy, and Yanovskaya (2017). The rule produces Pareto optimal and envy-free allocations for both goods and chores. In the case of goods, the outcome of the competitive rule can be easily computed. Competitive allocations solve the Eisenberg-Gale convex program; hence the outcome is unique and can be approximately found by standard gradient methods. An exact algorithm that runs in polynomial time in the number of agents and goods was given by Orlin (2010). In the case of chores, the competitive rule does not solve any convex optimization problem; instead, competitive allocations correspond to local minima, local maxima, and saddle points of the Nash social welfare on the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible utilities. The Pareto frontier may contain many such points; consequently, the competitive rule's outcome is no longer unique. In this paper, we show that all the outcomes of the competitive rule for chores can be computed in strongly polynomial time if either the number of agents or the number of chores is fixed. The approach is based on a combination of three ideas: all consumption graphs of Pareto optimal allocations can be listed in polynomial time; for a given consumption graph, a candidate for a competitive utility profile can be constructed via an explicit formula; each candidate can be checked for competitiveness, and the allocation can be reconstructed using a maximum flow computation. Our algorithm gives an approximately-fair allocation of indivisible chores by the rounding technique of Barman and Krishnamurthy (2018).