Leftover Hashing From Quantum Error Correction: Unifying the Two Approaches to the Security Proof of Quantum Key Distribution

Abstract

We show that the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach and Renner's approach to proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) are essentially the same. We begin our analysis by considering a special case of QKD called privacy amplification (PA). PA itself is an important building block of cryptography, both classical and quantum. The standard theoretical tool used for its security proof is called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL). We present a direct connection between the LHL and the coding theorem of a certain quantum error correction code. Then we apply this result to proving the equivalence between the two approaches to proving the security of QKD.

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• arXiv (Cornell University) - View - PDF
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• IEEE Transactions on Information Theory - View