Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics

Economic Analysis of Law and Legal Systems

Description

This cluster of papers explores the economic analysis of law and legal systems, focusing on topics such as public enforcement, contracts, litigation, regulation, transaction cost theory, property rights, judicial efficiency, plea bargaining, liability, and norms. The research delves into the intersection of economic principles with legal frameworks and their impact on societal behavior and outcomes.

Keywords

Enforcement; Contracts; Litigation; Regulation; Transaction Cost Theory; Property Rights; Judicial Efficiency; Plea Bargaining; Liability; Norms

The authors explore the twin hypotheses (1) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (2) that such … The authors explore the twin hypotheses (1) that high-performance incentives, worker ownership of assets, and worker freedom from direct controls are complementary instruments for motivating workers, and (2) that such instruments can be expected to covary positively in cross-sectional data. They also relate their conclusions to empirical evidence, particularly that on the organization, compensation, and management of sales forces. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.
It is commonly thought that a widely held corporation that is not being run in the interest of its shareholders will be vulnerable to a takeover bid. We show that … It is commonly thought that a widely held corporation that is not being run in the interest of its shareholders will be vulnerable to a takeover bid. We show that this is false, since shareholders can free ride on the raider's improvement of the corporation, thereby seriously limiting the raider's profit. We analyze exclusionary devices that can be built into the corporate charter to overcome this free-rider problem. We study privately and socially optimal corporate charters under the alternative assumptions of competition and monopoly in the market for corporate control.
Manufacturing is undergoing a revolution. The mass production model is being replaced by a vision of a flexible multiproduct firm that emphasizes quality and speedy response to market conditions while … Manufacturing is undergoing a revolution. The mass production model is being replaced by a vision of a flexible multiproduct firm that emphasizes quality and speedy response to market conditions while utilizing technologically advanced equipment and new forms of organization. The authors' optimizing model of the firm generates many of the observed patterns that mark modern manufacturing. Central to the authors' results is a method of handling optimization and comparative statics problems that requires neither differentiability nor convexity. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.
This chapter considers the claims of equality of welfare as an interpretation of treating people as equals, and considers the competing claims of equality of resources. It argues that an … This chapter considers the claims of equality of welfare as an interpretation of treating people as equals, and considers the competing claims of equality of resources. It argues that an equal division of resources presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly as an analytical device but also, to a certain extent, as an actual political institution. The market character of the auction is not simply a convenient or ad hoc device for resolving technical problems that arise for equality of resources in very simple exercises like our desert island case. Insurance, so far as it is available, provides a link between brute and option luck, because the decision to buy or reject catastrophe insurance is a calculated gamble. The premium of someone who barely earns the average coverage amount would be less than the premium the insurance market would have fixed on a flat-rate basis, though the premium of someone who earns much more would be much greater.
Economic analysis of law usually proceeds under the assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt these assumptions; people exhibit bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded … Economic analysis of law usually proceeds under the assumptions of neoclassical economics. But empirical evidence gives much reason to doubt these assumptions; people exhibit bounded rationality, bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower. This article offers a broad vision of how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior. It considers specific topics in the economic analysis of law and proposes new models and approaches for addressing these topics. The analysis of the article is organized into three categories: positive, prescriptive, and normative. Positive analysis of law concerns how agents behave in response to legal rules and how legal rules are shaped. Prescriptive analysis concerns what rules should be adopted to advance specified ends. Normative analysis attempts to assess more broadly the ends of the legal system: Should the system always respect people's choices? By drawing attention to cognitive and motivational problems of both citizens and government, behavioral law and economics offers answers distinct from those offered by the standard analysis.
This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: … This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: the goals or preferences of individuals (here, representatives seeking reelection) and the relevant transactions costs. We present three conclusions. First, we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators. Second, we explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange. Third, our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue.
A model of parties' litigation and settlement decisions under imperfect information is studied. The model shows how informational asymmetry influences parties' decisions, and how it might lead to parties' failure … A model of parties' litigation and settlement decisions under imperfect information is studied. The model shows how informational asymmetry influences parties' decisions, and how it might lead to parties' failure to settle. The model is used to identify how the likelihood of settlement and the settlement amount are shaped by various factors--the size of the amount at stake, the magnitude of the parties' litigation costs, and the nature of the parties' information. The model is also used to examine how the likelihood of settlement is affected by various legal rules, such as those governing the allocation of litigation costs.
Both transaction cost-economics and property-rights theories offer explanations of the boundaries of the firm based on ideas of ex post bargaining and holdup. These theories are quite distinct in their … Both transaction cost-economics and property-rights theories offer explanations of the boundaries of the firm based on ideas of ex post bargaining and holdup. These theories are quite distinct in their empirical predictions, but neither offers a satisfactory account of a large variety of observed practices. The authors discuss a number of such examples, where the boundaries of the firm seem to be determined by factors other than the need to protect investments, and where other mechanisms than the allocation of asset ownership are used to provide investment incentives. These examples indicate the need to enrich their theory of firm boundaries.
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are … The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--help provide credible commitment or these purposes. In addition, the authors suggest that some federalism are self-sustaining.
Journal Article Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story Get access Terry M. Moe Terry M. Moe Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic … Journal Article Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story Get access Terry M. Moe Terry M. Moe Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 6, Issue special_issue, January 1990, Pages 213–253, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.213 Published: 01 January 1990
Empirical work testing for a negative trade‐off between risk and incentives has not had much success: the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than … Empirical work testing for a negative trade‐off between risk and incentives has not had much success: the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade‐off. I argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees. When workers operate in certain settings, firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs. By contrast, when the situation is more uncertain, they delegate responsibility to workers but, to constrain their discretion, base compensation on observed output.
A good reputation can be an effective bond for honest behavior in a community of traders if members of the community know how others have behaved in the past – … A good reputation can be an effective bond for honest behavior in a community of traders if members of the community know how others have behaved in the past – even if any particular pair of traders meets only infrequently. In a large community, it would be impossibly costly for traders to be perfectly informed about each other's behavior, but there exist institutions that can restore the effectiveness of a reputation system using much less extensive information. The system of judges used to enforce commercial law before the rise of the state was such an institution, and it successfully encouraged merchants (1) to behave honestly, (2) to impose sanctions on violators, (3) to become adequately informed about how others had behaved, (4) to provide evidence against violators of the code, and (5) to pay any judgments assessed against them, even though each of these behaviors might be personally costly.
This essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions. The model emphasizes the (economically … This essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions. The model emphasizes the (economically arbitrary, from a welfare point of view) importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation. We explore the implications of a legislator's objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale.
When should a government provide a service in-house, and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of … When should a government provide a service in-house, and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee has. However, the private contractor's incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on noncontractible quality. The model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization.
We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. … We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled firms and small firms. More than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family. Older firms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, significant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families.
Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three … Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'
This paper provides an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical work on the provision of incentives. It reviews the costs and benefits of many types of pay-for-performance, such as … This paper provides an overview of the existing theoretical and empirical work on the provision of incentives. It reviews the costs and benefits of many types of pay-for-performance, such as piece rates, promotions, and long-term incentives. The main conclusions are (i) while there is considerable evidence that individuals respond to pay-for-performance, there is less evidence that contracts are designed as predicted by the theory, (ii) there has been little progress made in distinguishing amongst plausible theories, and (iii) we still know little about how incentives are provided to workers whose output is difficult to measure.
Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment Howard A. Shelanski, Howard A. Shelanski Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, and Evans, Washington, D.C. Search for other works by this … Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment Howard A. Shelanski, Howard A. Shelanski Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, and Evans, Washington, D.C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Peter G. Klein Peter G. Klein University of Georgia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 11, Issue 2, October 1995, Pages 335–361, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036875 Published: 01 October 1995
THE USE OF CONFIDENCE OR FIDUCIAL LIMITS ILLUSTRATED IN THE CASE OF THE BINOMIAL Get access C. J. CLOPPER, B.Sc., C. J. CLOPPER, B.Sc. Search for other works by this … THE USE OF CONFIDENCE OR FIDUCIAL LIMITS ILLUSTRATED IN THE CASE OF THE BINOMIAL Get access C. J. CLOPPER, B.Sc., C. J. CLOPPER, B.Sc. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar E. S. PEARSON, D.Sc. E. S. PEARSON, D.Sc. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Biometrika, Volume 26, Issue 4, December 1934, Pages 404–413, https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/26.4.404 Published: 01 December 1934
The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through … The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two assumptions made in the literature, namely rationality and the existence of transaction costs. Last, it argues that, contrary to what is commonly argued, the complete contract methodology need not be unable to account for standard institutions such as authority and ownership; and it concludes with a discussion of the research agenda.
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public … We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called “politicians”), or to nonaccountable officials (called “judges”).
This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a … This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.
This essay attempts to discern some of the general features of a legal system like the American by drawing on (and rearranging) commonplaces and less than systematic gleanings from the … This essay attempts to discern some of the general features of a legal system like the American by drawing on (and rearranging) commonplaces and less than systematic gleanings from the literature. The speculative and tentative nature of the assertions here will be apparent and is acknowledged here wholesale to spare myself and the reader repeated disclaimers. I would like to try to put forward some conjectures about the way in which the basic architecture of the legal system creates and limits the possibilities of using the system ;as a means of redistributive (that is, systemically equalizing) change. Our question, specifically, is, under what conditions can Iitigation be redistributive, taking litigation in the broadest sense of the presentation of claims to be decided by courts (or court-like agencies) and the whole penumbra of threats, feints, and so forth, surrounding such presentation.
J As an example, consider the problems faced by a homeowner who hires a real estate agent to sell her home.It may be difficult for the homeowner to determine whether … J As an example, consider the problems faced by a homeowner who hires a real estate agent to sell her home.It may be difficult for the homeowner to determine whether the agent is truly using his best efforts to market the house and also difficult to determine whether, if the house sells or does not sell, the agent is responsible.2 See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management 214-39 (1992) (devoting more than 25 pages to developing incentive contracting and other solutions to standard principal-agent problems, with no mention of the problem of getting the agent to perform).11 See infra Section I.B (discussing team production theory of corporations).
Recidivism prediction instruments (RPIs) provide decision-makers with an assessment of the likelihood that a criminal defendant will reoffend at a future point in time. Although such instruments are gaining increasing … Recidivism prediction instruments (RPIs) provide decision-makers with an assessment of the likelihood that a criminal defendant will reoffend at a future point in time. Although such instruments are gaining increasing popularity across the country, their use is attracting tremendous controversy. Much of the controversy concerns potential discriminatory bias in the risk assessments that are produced. This article discusses several fairness criteria that have recently been applied to assess the fairness of RPIs. We demonstrate that the criteria cannot all be simultaneously satisfied when recidivism prevalence differs across groups. We then show how disparate impact can arise when an RPI fails to satisfy the criterion of error rate balance.
Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined … Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. Naturally, objective and subjective measures often are substitutes, sometimes strikingly so: we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible (because the firm’s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive). We also show, however, that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other: if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures (because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship, and so reduce the firm’s incentive to renege). We also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures, and provide case-study evidence consistent with our analyses.
A theory of participation in illegitimate activities is developed and tested against data on variations in index crimes across states in the United States. Theorems and behavioral implications are derived … A theory of participation in illegitimate activities is developed and tested against data on variations in index crimes across states in the United States. Theorems and behavioral implications are derived using the state preference approach to behavior under uncertainty. The investigation deals directly with the interaction between offense and defense: crime and collective law enforcement. It indicates the existence of a deterrent effect of law-enforcement activity on all crimes and a strong positive correlation between income inequality and crimes against property. The empirical results also provide some tentative estimates of the effectiveness of law enforcement in reducing crime and the resulting social losses.
This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We … This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.
В статье представлена модель, объясняющая многие стилизованные факты о контрактах на поставку (procurement contracts). Согласно модели покупатель несет издержки дизайна контракта и сталкивается с дилеммой: либо создавать стимулы у продавцов … В статье представлена модель, объясняющая многие стилизованные факты о контрактах на поставку (procurement contracts). Согласно модели покупатель несет издержки дизайна контракта и сталкивается с дилеммой: либо создавать стимулы у продавцов не проявлять оппортунизм, либо снижать ex post трансакционные издержки, связанные с затратами на пересмотр контракта. Авторы показывают, в каких случаях контракты с фиксированной ценой и контракты, составленные по принципу издержки плюс, будут превалировать над остальными стимулирующими контрактами. Также делается вывод о том, что в случае высокой сложности товара внутрифирменное производство будет доминировать рыночные контракты на поставку.
A. Ultimatums and Fairness A. Ultimatums and Fairness
ABSTRACT Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As … ABSTRACT Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of … In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies with imperfect information.These compensation schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties; … This article analyzes the role of competitive compensation schemes (in which pay depends on relative performance) in economies with imperfect information.These compensation schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties; they provide for an automatic adjustment of rewards and incentives in response to common changes in the environment.When environmental uncertainty is large, such schemes are shown to be preferable to individualistic reward structures; in the limit, as the number of contestants becomes large, expected utility may approach the first-best (perfect information) level.We study the design of contests, including the optimal use of prizes versus punishments and absolute versus relative performance standards.The analysis can also be viewed as a contribution to the multiagent, single-principal problem.Contests are one way of doing this; rewards based on performance standards, which, in turn, are based on the performance of the group, are another.Compensation structures also serve a second, critical function: they enable the differentiation and screening of workers of different abilities (Stiglitz, 1975).This article focuses on the incentive properties of compensation schemes; hence, except as noted briefly below, we shall assume that all individuals have the same abilities.We first present the general theory of compensation in Sections 3-5.We then examine the theory of contests (Sections 6-8) and compare contests with other compensation schemes (Sections 9-11).Sections 12-14 provide some important extensions of the basic theory. A summary of the results• After setting up the general problem, we focus our attention on certain special cases; for example, in most of the analysis, output is assumed to be linear in effort.We ask under what circumstances would contests (where it is only the individual's rank that 'This is not, of course, the most general form of linear structures: we could have written (Ib) QI = Hi0 + «, + 7 + fiitfi, i.e., there is also an idiosyncratic effect on marginal productivity and a common effect on total output.
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning: An Introduction by Ruth Chang Incommensurability: What's the Problem by James Griffin Incommensurability: Four Proposals by David Wiggins Is Incommensurability Vagueness? by John Broome Practical … Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning: An Introduction by Ruth Chang Incommensurability: What's the Problem by James Griffin Incommensurability: Four Proposals by David Wiggins Is Incommensurability Vagueness? by John Broome Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods by Elizabeth Anderson Incommensurability and Agency by Joseph Raz Comparability, Value, and Choice by Donald Regan Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning by Elijah Millgram Comparing the Incomparable: Tradeoffs and Sacrifices by Steven Lukes Abstract and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and Maximization by Michael Stocker Leading a Life by Charles Taylor Commensuration and Public Reason by John Finnis Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law by Cass Sunstein
O artigo investiga a necessidade de repensar o papel do inventariante no processo de inventário judicial brasileiro. Deste modo, parte da constatação de que a sociedade brasileira evita o debate … O artigo investiga a necessidade de repensar o papel do inventariante no processo de inventário judicial brasileiro. Deste modo, parte da constatação de que a sociedade brasileira evita o debate aberto sobre a morte, o que contribui, sobremaneira, para um sistema sucessório burocrático, moroso e muitas vezes tumultuado. Assim, a função do inventariante ganha destaque, em razão de ser o responsável pela administração da herança até a partilha, conforme previsto no art. 1.991 do Código Civil de 2002. No entanto, esta atuação, hodiernamente, é limitada, muitas vezes meramente formal e sem mecanismos efetivos para impulsionar o processo, o que compromete demasiadamente a celeridade e a efetividade processual. Com base nisso, propõe-se uma releitura da atuação do inventariante à luz de modelos mais eficazes, como o do administrador judicial - na recuperação judicial e falência (Lei nº 11.101/2005) - em razão da racionalidade sistêmica do CPC/2015 que legítima a importação de técnicas entre procedimentos especiais, desde que compatíveis com seus fins. Ademais, o artigo propõe ainda a nomeação plúrima de inventariantes como solução viável à crescente complexidade das relações familiares pós-modernas, marcadas pela pluralidade e por múltiplos núcleos afetivos e patrimoniais. Assim, a designação de mais de um inventariante, poderia colaborar para a fluidez, imparcialidade e resolução mais pacífica dos inventários, em consonância com a nova realidade plural da sociedade brasileira e com os princípios constitucionais de eficiência e razoável duração do processo.
Usharani Bhimavarapu | Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series
In today's digital era, the rise in privacy infringement cases highlights the urgent need for robust legal frameworks and causations. This study focuses on predicting court verdicts in online privacy … In today's digital era, the rise in privacy infringement cases highlights the urgent need for robust legal frameworks and causations. This study focuses on predicting court verdicts in online privacy cases under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) by combining advanced text processing and machine learning techniques. The textual data from court case judgments is transformed into numerical features using TF-IDF, followed by feature selection through Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) to prioritize the most relevant information. A hybrid GRU+ANN model is proposed, leveraging the sequential processing capabilities of GRU and the deep learning strength of ANN to predict court outcomes effectively. The methodology enhances model accuracy, reduces feature redundancy, and provides insights into factors influencing judicial decisions. This approach demonstrates the potential of AI-driven models in legal analytics and decision prediction.
<title>Abstract</title> As it pertains to court cases, the predilection toward a 50% plaintiff win rate is a well-known proposition, first put forward in the Priest-Klein theory (Priest and Klein 1984). … <title>Abstract</title> As it pertains to court cases, the predilection toward a 50% plaintiff win rate is a well-known proposition, first put forward in the Priest-Klein theory (Priest and Klein 1984). Numerous studies have verified this proposition by analyzing the relationship between litigation rates and judgments. However, the question remains as to whether any change in litigation rates, triggered by any factor, would cause the plaintiff win rate to trend towards 50%. The present study aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge by conducting a theoretical analysis and empirical tests to explore the influencing mechanism of the Priest-Klein theory on judgments. In the theoretical analysis, the mechanism of the litigation selection on the judgment is reformulated by distinguishing between estimation-error-screened litigation and cost-benefit-screened litigation. The former involves lawsuits that prioritize disputes with more uncertain outcomes, resulting in judgments that approximate the 50% plaintiff win rate. In contrast, the latter involves lawsuits that prioritize disputes with more certain outcomes, leading to judgments that deviate significantly from the 50% plaintiff win rate. In the empirical tests, the influence of the cost-benefit-screened litigation on judgments as opposed to the original Priest-Klein theory is verified by taking the cost-benefit ratio of litigation as the observation in China’s commercial lawsuits. This finding serves to improve our understanding of the Priest-Klein theory by elucidating that the decline in litigation probability engendered by the cost-benefit ratio cannot invariably result in a 50% win rate for the plaintiff. JEL classification numbers: K15, K41, P48
Toru Suzuki | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Yong‐Shik Lee | Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks
Alexander H. Türk | Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks
| Cambridge University Press eBooks
O instituto do Juiz das Garantias foi implementado ao sistema processual penal brasileiro pela Lei 13.964/2019 (Pacote Anticrime), buscando a plena efetivação do sistema acusatório através da preservação cognitiva do … O instituto do Juiz das Garantias foi implementado ao sistema processual penal brasileiro pela Lei 13.964/2019 (Pacote Anticrime), buscando a plena efetivação do sistema acusatório através da preservação cognitiva do Juiz criminal. Todavia, após os julgamentos das Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade 6298, 6299, 6300 e 6305, pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, trouxeram mudanças significativas no modelo e na forma como esse instituto vem sendo implementado atualmente pelos tribunais brasileiros. Assim, o presente artigo tem por objetivo analisar a eficácia do Juiz das Garantias na preservação cognitiva do julgador no processo penal brasileiro. Os objetivos específicos foram: Esclarecer os sistemas processuais penais, ou seja, o sistema inquisitivo, o sistema acusatório e o sistema misto, bem como funciona o sistema processual penal adotado pelo Brasil; analisar, com base na teoria da dissonância cognitiva de Festinger, a ausência de imparcialidade do julgador criminal e como o instituto do Juiz das Garantias apresenta soluções para esse problema; entender os possíveis impactos do juiz das garantias na persecução penal brasileira. A pesquisa bibliográfica deste artigo foi conduzida pela abordagem qualitativa, utilizando o método hipotético dedutivo, na medida em que foram observados artigos, doutrinas, julgados e a legislação nacional. O Juiz das Garantias é uma importante inovação no sistema processual brasileiro, que já vem sendo debatido desde 2009 pelo Senado Federal, bem como por diversos doutrinadores. Nessa senda, verificou-se o grande impacto do Juiz das Garantias no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, sendo um passo fundamental no estabelecimento de um sistema verdadeiramente acusatório, caminhado em direção a um sistema penal mais imparcial e eficiente.
This paper aims to investigate, in light of the Economic Analysis of Law, ways to enhance the efficiency of public debt collection by altering the incentive structure presented to taxpayers. … This paper aims to investigate, in light of the Economic Analysis of Law, ways to enhance the efficiency of public debt collection by altering the incentive structure presented to taxpayers. The objective is to increase litigation costs for tax debtors, so that early-stage compliance in the collection process, whether judicial or extrajudicial, becomes a means of maximizing their interests. To this end, the paper reflects on some of the potential causes behind the high congestion rates in Brazilian tax enforcement actions and proposes parametersto guide the improvement of the actions of tax authorities and national legislation, with a view to achieving greater efficiency in satisfying the tax authorities’ credit rights.
O. M. Yefimov , N. А. Bilousova , N. I. Brozhko | Scientific and informational bulletin of Ivano-Frankivsk University of Law named after King Danylo Halytskyi
Purpose. The purpose of the work is to analyze the phenomenon of erroneous procedural action committed by the appellate court, to determine the ways of its correction, to study the … Purpose. The purpose of the work is to analyze the phenomenon of erroneous procedural action committed by the appellate court, to determine the ways of its correction, to study the analogy of the procedural law regarding procedural errors and their impact on the powers of the court that committed the procedural error, to study the consequences of the procedural error. Methodology. The methodology includes a comprehensive analysis and generalization of the available scientific and theoretical material and the formulation of relevant conclusions and recommendations. The following methods of scientific knowledge were used during the research: terminological, logical-semantic, functional, systemic-structural, logical-normative. Results. In the course of the research, it was recognized that the erroneous opening of the proceedings by the appellate court is not the only error that is foreseen and regulated by the norms of procedural legislation. Applying the analogy of the law to the settlement of procedural legal relations not directly regulated by the procedural law, the appellate court, which made a mistake in assessing the circumstances of missing the procedural term, renewed the missed procedural term and opened appeal proceedings, is obliged to carry out an appellate review of the case. Originality. In the course of the research, it was established that the erroneous extension of the deadline for appeal proceedings and acceptance of the case for appeal consideration is not a reason for closing such appeal proceedings. In such a case, the rule of the procedural law, which regulates similar legal relations, shall be applied. And this despite the imperative method of legal regulation of procedural legal relations. Practical significance. The results of the research can be used in law-making and law-enforcement activities during the administration of justice both by the court of appeal and by courts of other instances.
In an increasingly complex commercial landscape, the legal implications arising from the expiry of contracts demand critical attention. While contract formation and enforcement have been thoroughly examined in commercial law, … In an increasingly complex commercial landscape, the legal implications arising from the expiry of contracts demand critical attention. While contract formation and enforcement have been thoroughly examined in commercial law, post-expiry obligations and the associated risk exposures remain underexplored. This paper investigates the residual responsibilities and liabilities that may persist or emerge following contract termination due to expiry. Drawing on comparative legal analysis, case law, and regulatory frameworks across multiple jurisdictions, this study identifies legal ambiguities and practical challenges that can lead to disputes or financial loss. The research further develops a structured framework aimed at clarifying post-expiry duties and enhancing risk management strategies for both parties. By bridging the gap between legal theory and commercial practice, the proposed framework provides actionable guidance for legal practitioners, businesses, and policymakers to mitigate risks and ensure compliance beyond contract expiration.
This paper investigates the systemic nature of ethical failures in accounting by examining four high-profile cases: Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers, and Pitcher Partners. Through a qualitative desk-based analysis of publicly … This paper investigates the systemic nature of ethical failures in accounting by examining four high-profile cases: Enron, WorldCom, Lehman Brothers, and Pitcher Partners. Through a qualitative desk-based analysis of publicly available documents, academic literature, and regulatory reports, the study explores how corporate misconduct in each case reflected deeper institutional weaknesses, rather than isolated lapses in individual judgement. Common themes—such as compromised auditor independence, ineffective board oversight, ethical leadership vacuums, and the normalization of deviance—emerged as recurring patterns across all cases. The study also considers how whistleblower suppression and ethical fading contributed to delayed accountability. By critically synthesizing secondary sources, this research highlights the limitations of compliance-based reforms and calls for a broader governance model grounded in ethical leadership, professional skepticism, and stakeholder accountability. The paper contributes to the growing discourse on ethical resilience in the accounting profession and identifies future research directions related to sustainability reporting, whistleblower protection, and the ethical challenges posed by technological advancements.
A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 2016. évi CXXX. törvény 2018. január 1-jei, továbbá a büntetőeljárásról szóló 2017. évi XC. törvény 2018. július 1-jei hatálybalépése a bírósági tolmácsokat is érintő alapvető változásokat … A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 2016. évi CXXX. törvény 2018. január 1-jei, továbbá a büntetőeljárásról szóló 2017. évi XC. törvény 2018. július 1-jei hatálybalépése a bírósági tolmácsokat is érintő alapvető változásokat hozott a polgári peres és a büntetőeljárások szerkezetében és részletszabályaiban egyaránt. Ezeknek a változásoknak a bírósági tolmácsok szemszögéből történő részletes fel- dolgozásával azonban a jogi és a tolmácsolástudományi szakirodalom is adós maradt. A jelen tanulmány a terjedelmi korlátokra tekintettel szintén nem vállalkozhat a bírósági tolmácsolást szabályozó teljes hazai joganyag elemzésére, de segítséget kíván nyújtani a jelenleg hatályos polgári perrendtartási törvénynek és a büntető- eljárási törvénynek mint a bírósági tolmácsokra vonatkozó két legfontosabb eljárásjogi kódexnek a tolmácsolást érintő rendelkezései megértéséhez, elsősorban a hazai tolmácsképzésben tanulók és a kezdő bírósági tolmácsok számára. A polgári és a büntetőeljárások alkotmányos alapjainak, a nyelvhasználat jogának és a bírósági tolmácsok jogállására vonatkozó jogszabályoknak az áttekintése után a tanulmány a polgári peres eljárás és a büntetőeljárás szerkezetét, szakaszait, menetét ismerteti.
Roland Strausz | German Economic Review
Abstract Consumer consent regulation is the cornerstone of modern data privacy regulation such as the European GDPR and the Californian CCPA. By ensuring that consumers can reject any harmful data … Abstract Consumer consent regulation is the cornerstone of modern data privacy regulation such as the European GDPR and the Californian CCPA. By ensuring that consumers can reject any harmful data collection, the regulation seems an effective tool for protecting consumers against price discrimination. By contrast, I provide the insight that consent regulation alone is ineffective because it provides firms with the loophole to commit to unattractive offers to dissenting consumers. Effective consent regulation therefore requires an explicit regulation of the firm’s dissent offer. This is informationally demanding; regulation that merely insists on “reasonable” (sequential rational) offers is ineffective.
Az irreguláris migráció napjainkra biztonsági kockázattá és a (büntető)jogi szabályozás egyik legégetőbb problémájává vált. Hazánk mellett számos más európai ország is szembesült az illegális migráció jelentette kihívásokkal, ám közülük is … Az irreguláris migráció napjainkra biztonsági kockázattá és a (büntető)jogi szabályozás egyik legégetőbb problémájává vált. Hazánk mellett számos más európai ország is szembesült az illegális migráció jelentette kihívásokkal, ám közülük is kiemelkedik Olaszország, amely már az 1980-as évek óta küzd a tömeges illegális migráció problémájával. Szintén új keletű probléma a büntetőjogi populizmus, amely a migráció területén sem szokatlan jelenség. Dolgozatomban felvázolom a bevándorlók bűnözésének kriminálmorfológiáját, és megvizsgálom az olasz büntetőjogi populizmus egyik legjellemzőbb példájának számító tényállást, az illegális bevándorlás/tartózkodás szabálysértését, végül pedig bemutatom a migráció büntetőjogi szabályozásának legújabb fejleményeit.
The full judgment consists of four parts: the introductory part, the descriptive part, the reasoning and the resolution part. In its reasoning, the court must indicate the circumstances of the … The full judgment consists of four parts: the introductory part, the descriptive part, the reasoning and the resolution part. In its reasoning, the court must indicate the circumstances of the case as established by the court, the evidence on which its conclusions regarding those circumstances are based, the arguments put forward by the court in rejecting certain evidence, and the laws which guided the court. However, unfortunately, we have an established "culture" of limited reasoning of judgments, which explains why judges avoid highlighting the arguments put forward when adopting the order. Therefore, we will present how different ways of structuring thinking about legal issues, how methods of legal writing and analysis can be integrated into the process of reasoning of court decisions in order to improve the quality of court decisions.