Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Works Count: 43207

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This cluster of papers encompasses a wide range of topics related to consciousness, phenomenal experience, grounding, cognitive science, neuroscience, perception, truth, philosophy of mind, modal logic, and self-awareness. The papers explore various aspects of consciousness and aim to understand the nature of subjective experience from philosophical and scientific perspectives.

Keywords

Consciousness; Phenomenal Experience; Grounding; Cognitive Science; Neuroscience; Perception; Truth; Philosophy of Mind; Modal Logic; Self-Awareness

The Logical Form of Action Sentences

2001-09-27

Donald Davidson

Abstract Davidson attempts to state the logical form of sentences in which actions are adverbially modified (e.g. ‘Jones buttered the toast slowly, with a knife, at midnight’); he wishes to … Abstract Davidson attempts to state the logical form of sentences in which actions are adverbially modified (e.g. ‘Jones buttered the toast slowly, with a knife, at midnight’); he wishes to regiment them into first‐order notation such that all valid inferences to sentences containing words of the original one are preserved. He claims that the only effective way of doing so is to transform the adverbs into predicates and recognize an implicit quantification over an entity to which the predicates apply (cf Appendix A); this entity he identifies as a dated, non‐recurrent particular––an event. Rival construals that do not require such an ontology either fail to preserve the inferences or end up assigning the adverbs to distinct actions. Davidson appends his replies to various critics of the paper in which he clarifies his methodology (applying the concept of logical form to sentences of natural language), the individuation of events (see further Essay 8), and suggests how his analysis can be extended to cover tensed action sentences.

Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation

2001-09-27

Donald Davidson

Abstract This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: … Abstract This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.

A Theory of Conditionals

1968-01-01

Robert Stalnaker

On What There is

1972-01-01

A. J. Ayer

TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS

1979-10-01

C. J. F. Williams

Content and Consciousness.

1970-10-01

N. J. H. Dent , Daniel C. Dennett

Book Reviews Get access Content and Consciousness. By D. C. Dennett. (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1969. Pp. xii + 198. 40s) N. J. H. Dent N. J. H. … Book Reviews Get access Content and Consciousness. By D. C. Dennett. (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1969. Pp. xii + 198. 40s) N. J. H. Dent N. J. H. Dent Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 81, October 1970, Pages 403–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217666 Published: 01 October 1970

Testability and Meaning

1936-10-01

Rudolf Carnap

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in … Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible.

MATERIALISM AND QUALIA: THE EXPLANATORY GAP

1983-10-01

Joseph Levine

How to Defeat Opposition to Moore

1999-10-01

Ernest Sosa

Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics.

1969-10-01

R. H. Robins , John Lyons

Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. By John Lyons. ( Cambridge University Press. 1968. Pp. x + 519. Price 70s) R. H. Robins R. H. Robins … Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. By John Lyons. ( Cambridge University Press. 1968. Pp. x + 519. Price 70s) R. H. Robins R. H. Robins Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 19, Issue 77, October 1969, Pages 371–372, https://doi.org/10.2307/2217864 Published: 01 October 1969

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

1990-01-01

Gilbert Harman

There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our … There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third claims that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.

New work for a theory of universals

1983-12-01

David Lewis

(1983). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 343-377. (1983). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 343-377.

Realism, Mathematics and Modality

1988-01-01

Hartry Field

Fictionalism, epistemology and modality realism and anti-realism about mathematics is mathematical knowledge just logical knowledge? on conservativeness and incompleteness Platonism for cheap? - Crispin Wright on Frege's context principle can … Fictionalism, epistemology and modality realism and anti-realism about mathematics is mathematical knowledge just logical knowledge? on conservativeness and incompleteness Platonism for cheap? - Crispin Wright on Frege's context principle can we dispense with space-time? realism, mathematics and modality.

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist

2000-12-01

James Pryor

The Transparency of Experience

2002-09-01

M. G. F. Martin

A common objection to sense–datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or … A common objection to sense–datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind–independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sensedatum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naïve realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense–datum theories.

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Convention: A Philosophical Study.

1970-07-01

J. E. Llewelyn , David K. Lewis

Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Convention : A Philosophical Study. By David K. Lewis. (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. London : Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. xii + … Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Convention : A Philosophical Study. By David K. Lewis. (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press. London : Oxford University Press. 1969. Pp. xii + 213. Price 75s) Llewelyn J. E. Llewelyn J. E. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 20, Issue 80, July 1970, Pages 286–287, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218418 Published: 01 July 1970

A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND

1968-10-01

Elizabeth Kingdom

Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction

2010-03-25

Gideon Rosen

Abstract This chapter lays down principles for a relation of metaphysical grounding — the ‘in virtue of’ relation — understood as a relation among facts. The discussion makes it plausible … Abstract This chapter lays down principles for a relation of metaphysical grounding — the ‘in virtue of’ relation — understood as a relation among facts. The discussion makes it plausible that the relation is well understood and potentially useful for philosophical purposes. The chapter then explores the connections between the grounding relation and other metaphysical notions, including real definition, essential truth, and metaphysical reduction understood as a relation among facts.

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

1971-01-14

Harry G. Frankfurt

What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept at all. Strawson, whose usage represents the current … What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of that concept at all. Strawson, whose usage represents the current standard, identifies the concept of a person as “the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics...are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.”1 But there are many entities besides persons that have both mental and physical properties. As it happens—though it seems extraordinary that this should be so—there is no common English word for the type of entity Strawson has in mind, a type that includes not only human beings but animals of various lesser species as well. Still, this hardly justifies the misappropriation of a valuable philosophical term.

The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics

1944-03-01

Alfred Tarski

X is true if, and only if, p. [...] we shall call a definition of truth “adequate” if all these equivalences follow from it. [...] The definition of truth which … X is true if, and only if, p. [...] we shall call a definition of truth “adequate” if all these equivalences follow from it. [...] The definition of truth which was outlined above [...] implies all equivalences of the form (T). In this connnection it is important to notice that the conditions for the material adequacy of the definition determine uniquely the extension of the term “true.” Therefore, every definition of truth which is materially adequate would necessarily be equivalent to that actually constructed. The semantic conception of truth gives us, so to speak, no possibility of choice between variaous non-equivalent definitions of this notion..

Reference and Consciousness

2002-06-06

John Campbell

Abstract Conscious attention to an object, singling it out in experience, provides knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative term. Knowledge of reference is the foundation of the ability to … Abstract Conscious attention to an object, singling it out in experience, provides knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative term. Knowledge of reference is the foundation of the ability to verify propositions about the object and of the ability to act on the object. To understand the relations between knowledge of reference, verification, and action, we have to look at the relations between conscious attention, visual information processing, and the motor system. Why should it be specifically conscious attention that provides the knowledge of reference? Knowledge of reference demands acquaintance with the individual, categorical substances around us, and not merely collections of affordances. I argue that only experience of objects can provide this kind of acquaintance with individual substances. The approach is extended beyond understanding one's own uses of visual demonstratives to cases of joint attention and to memory demonstratives. The approach has implications for Dummett's anti‐realism and Quine's theses of inscrutability and indeterminacy. The book concludes with remarks on the metaphysics of individual substances.

The Extended Mind

1998-01-01

Andy Clark , David J. Chalmers

Journal Article The Extended Mind Get access Andy Clark, Andy Clark Washington UniversitySt Louis, MO 63130, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar David … Journal Article The Extended Mind Get access Andy Clark, Andy Clark Washington UniversitySt Louis, MO 63130, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar David Chalmers David Chalmers University of CaliforniaSanta Cruz, CA 95064, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 58, Issue 1, January 1998, Pages 7–19, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7 Published: 01 January 1998

Supervenience and Mind

1993-11-26

Jaegwon Kim

Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on … Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes. Professor Kim explores this problem in detail, criticises the nonreductionist solution of it, and offers a modified reductionist solution of his own. Both professional philosophers and their graduate students will find this an invaluable collection.

Four-Dimensionalism

2001-10-25

Theodore Sider

Abstract According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language quantifies over and names—with aggregates of temporal parts (‘space‐time … Abstract According to ‘four‐dimensionalism’, temporally extended things are composed of temporal parts. Most four‐dimensionalists identify ordinary continuants—the persisting objects ordinary language quantifies over and names—with aggregates of temporal parts (‘space‐time worms’), but an attractive alternate version of four‐dimensionalism identifies ordinary continuants with instantaneous temporal slices and accounts for temporal predication using temporal counterpart theory. Arguments for four‐dimensionalism include the following: (1) Either substantivalism or relationalism about space‐time is true, but given substantivalism one might as well identify continuants with regions of space‐time, which have temporal parts, or with instantaneous slices of space‐time, whereas relationalism about space‐time cannot be made to work without temporal parts. (2) It can never be vague how many objects exist; if temporal parts do not exist, then a restrictive account of which filled regions of space‐time contain objects must be given, but no such account can be given that is plausible and non‐vague. (3) Four‐dimensionalism—especially the alternate, counterpart‐theoretic version—provides the most satisfying overall account of the ‘paradoxes of material constitution’, in which numerically distinct material objects (e.g. statues and lumps of clay) apparently share exactly the same parts. Objections to four‐dimensionalism (involving, e.g., motion in homogeneous substances and de re modal properties) may be answered. While logically independent of the question of four‐dimensionalism, the book also defends related theses, including (1) a robust meta‐ontology according to which unrestricted existence‐statements are non‐vague, non‐analytic, and uninfected by human convention; (2) the B‐theory of time (the opposite of presentism); (3) unrestricted composition; and (4) counterpart theory (both modal and temporal).

Naming and Necessity

1972-01-01

Saul A. Kripke

Essays on Actions and Events

2001-09-27

Donald Davidson

Abstract This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to … Abstract This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays

1969-12-31

W. V. Quine

Wholeness and the Implicate Order

2005-07-12

David Böhm

David Bohm was one of the foremost scientific thinkers and philosophers of our time. Although deeply influenced by Einstein, he was also, more unusually for a scientist, inspired by mysticism. … David Bohm was one of the foremost scientific thinkers and philosophers of our time. Although deeply influenced by Einstein, he was also, more unusually for a scientist, inspired by mysticism. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s he made contact with both J. Krishnamurti and the Dalai Lama whose teachings helped shape his work. In both science and philosophy, Bohm's main concern was with understanding the nature of reality in general and of consciousness in particular. In this classic work he develops a theory of quantum physics which treats the totality of existence as an unbroken whole. Writing clearly and without technical jargon, he makes complex ideas accessible to anyone interested in the nature of reality.

Common Ground

2002-12-01

Robert Stalnaker

Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective

2001-09-27

Donald Davidson

Abstract This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional … Abstract This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge—knowledge of one's own mind, knowledge of other people's minds, and knowledge of the external world—by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism–antirealism debate.

Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes

1981-02-01

Paul M. Churchland

Omnipresence as Ultimate Ground

2025-06-24

Jessica Frazier | Oxford University Press eBooks

Abstract If the divine is the complete cause of our space-time reality, in what sense is it ‘present’ to beings within it? The chapter explores grounding as a distinctive approach … Abstract If the divine is the complete cause of our space-time reality, in what sense is it ‘present’ to beings within it? The chapter explores grounding as a distinctive approach to omnipresence, discussing how India’s ‘Satkārya’ theory of identity suggested a conception of grounding as modal determination. Applied by scholastic philosophers such as Śrīnivāsa, the divine becomes the foundation of reality’s entangled relations, emergent levels, and localized experiences. It thus harbours world-defining ‘powers’ and generates the complex situation we call ‘placehood’. Finally, the chapter unpacks some implications. Firstly, all things exist within God, but do not exhaust God, and share an existence that is structural rather than material. Secondly, placehood is constituted not as Newtonian space-time, but as a triangulation of features like time, causation, and subjectivity. Thirdly, the significance of omnipresence is that it helps us recognize all we experience (and all we are) as expressions of the divine nature.

Omnipresence and Mathematical Reality

2025-06-24

Sam Cowling , Ley David Elliette Cray | Oxford University Press eBooks

Abstract Platonists affirm the existence of abstract entities and, according to some Platonists, abstract entities are distinctive precisely because of their lack of spatiotemporal location. According to other Platonists, universals, … Abstract Platonists affirm the existence of abstract entities and, according to some Platonists, abstract entities are distinctive precisely because of their lack of spatiotemporal location. According to other Platonists, universals, impure sets, and other abstracta have specific spatiotemporal locations—for example, {Socrates} is located precisely where Socrates is. This chapter examines a neglected Platonist metaphysical option: pervasive Platonism, the view that abstract entities—in particular, mathematical entities—are omnipresent. It considers how the omnipresence of mathematical entities bears upon a variety of epistemological and metaphysical problems for Platonism. After evaluating the general prospects for pervasive Platonism, we consider how competing accounts of omnipresence bear upon its tenability. The chapter argues that an existential conception of omnipresence, according to which omnipresent entities exist at all regions without being located at any regions, is superior to those versions of pervasive Platonism that assume occupation-based conceptions of omnipresence on which omnipresent entities are located everywhere.

Omnipresence and Special Presence

2025-06-24

Ben Page | Oxford University Press eBooks

Abstract Whilst God is said to be omnipresent, some religions also claim that God is specially present, or more present at/in certain locations. For example, a claim of special presence … Abstract Whilst God is said to be omnipresent, some religions also claim that God is specially present, or more present at/in certain locations. For example, a claim of special presence shared by Christians and Jews is that God was specially present at/in the first Temple. The chapter canvases various ways in which one can make sense of this claim whilst still affirming the omnipresence of God. This includes offering different accounts of special presence relying on derivative notions of presence, and offering other views of special presence that rely upon fundamental accounts of presence. The chapter itself does not argue for one view in particular, but instead offers a map of possible options and future areas for research.

Omnipresence

2025-06-24

A. J. Cotnoir | Oxford University Press eBooks

Abstract Recently analytic metaphysicians have been concerned with carefully examining the interaction between theories of location and theories of parthood. Mereological ‘Harmony’ or ‘Mirroring’ principles often necessitate that any entity … Abstract Recently analytic metaphysicians have been concerned with carefully examining the interaction between theories of location and theories of parthood. Mereological ‘Harmony’ or ‘Mirroring’ principles often necessitate that any entity occupying a complex location must have parts located there. On some understandings, these principles can come into conflict with the traditional view of an omnipresent yet mereologically simple God. This chapter lists the potential sources of conflict, showing how most occupation-based accounts of omnipresence (including the popular ‘ubiquitous entension’ view) must reject metaphysically important mirroring principles. I then outline a new occupation-based theory of omnipresence which avoids these conflicts. The central idea, motivated by considerations of divine transcendence and divine immensity, is that God is weakly located everywhere but lacks any exact location in spacetime.

Beyond Impossibility

2025-06-23

Zack Garrett , Zachariah Wrublewski | Acta Analytica

Abstract There has been a sharp increase in the use of impossible worlds as theoretical tools for solving difficult philosophical problems. Some philosophers, however, warn against their use. For example, … Abstract There has been a sharp increase in the use of impossible worlds as theoretical tools for solving difficult philosophical problems. Some philosophers, however, warn against their use. For example, Timothy Williamson argues that impossible worlds should not be used in an analysis of conditionals because they do not provide a compositional semantics. In this paper, we set out to resolve some of the potential problems associated with impossible worlds, thereby providing justification for their uses in a variety of contexts and applications. Graham Priest provides two directives for an account of impossible worlds. We argue that Priest’s directives, and, thus, the traditional view on impossibility, overextend the class of impossible worlds. We argue that all worlds, possible or impossible, are describable and that nonsense cannot play a role in a proper description. So, putative worlds that include nonsense are not worlds at all, possible or impossible. The exclusion of nonsense sentences from worlds undermines Priest’s two directives, but by separating nonsense from impossibility, we can resolve many of the worries about the use of impossible worlds.

Should metaphysics be (re)conceived as metalinguistic negotiation?

2025-06-23

Jonathan C. Knowles | Metaphilosophy

Abstract According to many so‐called anti‐representationalists , once one gives up on the idea that language functions by standing in genuine semantic relations to bits of the world, many of … Abstract According to many so‐called anti‐representationalists , once one gives up on the idea that language functions by standing in genuine semantic relations to bits of the world, many of the traditional projects of metaphysics lapse (see, e.g., Price 2004). Amie Thomasson also subscribes to anti‐representationalism but has her own take on metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics is certainly suspect, but many questions of ontology can be resolved by what Thomasson calls the “easy” approach, which sees questions about existence as following from the understanding of our own language plus relevant empirical input. Thomasson argues further that we should construe what appear to remain contentious metaphysical issues not as concerning inquiries into hidden truths but as instead veiled “metalinguistic negotiations” (Plunkett and Sundell 2013) with pragmatic aims in mind. The present paper takes the view that this line threatens to render philosophy largely irrelevant to culture: to reduce the philosopher to a kind of political activist. But nor, it argues, is Thomasson's way of holding open the door for contentious metaphysical debate the only one for anti‐representationalists.

Defending the medium‐independence of computation

2025-06-22

Zoe Drayson | Mind & Language

The computational properties of a system are generally thought to be independent in some sense from its physical properties, in virtue of the fact that computation is a formally characterized … The computational properties of a system are generally thought to be independent in some sense from its physical properties, in virtue of the fact that computation is a formally characterized concept. Several philosophers have recently challenged the idea that such “medium‐independence” is an essential feature of computation by arguing that some kinds of computation lack medium‐independence. This paper explores and rejects three such arguments in an attempt to defend the essential medium‐independence of computation.

The Paradox of Distance

2025-06-20

Noreen Herzfeld | Chapman and Hall/CRC eBooks

Neuroscience and the Free Will Debate

2025-06-20

Natalia Peraza , John Monterosso | CRC Press eBooks

A Theoretical Treatise on True Presence

2025-06-20

Edwin-Nikko R. Kabigting | Nursing Science Quarterly

The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on Parse’s theoretical notion of true presence. The purpose of this paper is to shed more light on Parse’s theoretical notion of true presence.

Propositionalism and Schiffer's Puzzle

2025-06-19

Stefan Rinner | Routledge eBooks

Neo-Russellian Abstractionism

2025-06-19

Bahram Assadian | Erkenntnis

Frege's Puzzle

2025-06-19

Stefan Rinner | Routledge eBooks

Frege Puzzles for Russellians

2025-06-19

Stefan Rinner | Routledge eBooks

Frege Puzzles for Fregeans

2025-06-19

Stefan Rinner | Routledge eBooks

A NOTE ON THE FAITHFULNESS OF THE EVALUATED GASSNER REPRESENTATION OF THE PURE BRAID GROUP

2025-06-19

Mohamad N. Nasser | International Journal of Apllied Mathematics

Weber’s law as a challenge to inheritance

2025-06-18

Ori Beck , Assaf Weksler | Synthese

Conditional oughts and contrastive reasons

2025-06-17

Thomas R. W. Schmidt | Philosophical Studies

Blindsight, blandsight, and blingsight: unconscious perception, attention, and the epistemology of perception

2025-06-17

Nicholas Silins | Synthese

How Should We Understand the Balancing View of Ought?

2025-06-16

A. S. Arridge | Ethics

When counting conscious subjects, the result needn’t always be a determinate whole number

2025-06-16

Eric Schwitzgebel , Sophie R. Nelson | Philosophical Psychology

The White Horse Paradox and Inheritance Logic

2025-06-15

Miguel López Astorga | Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum

Several studies have addressed the White Horse Paradox from different perspectives. Although the essential elements of the sentence in the paradox can already be found in Mozi’s work, it is … Several studies have addressed the White Horse Paradox from different perspectives. Although the essential elements of the sentence in the paradox can already be found in Mozi’s work, it is thought that Gongsun Long presented the paradoxical version of that very sentence. Here, I comment on some possible accounts related to logic, cognitive science and philosophy of science. However, my main goal is to show how Inheritance Logic deals with the paradox. It has been thought that the acceptance of the paradox depends on its interpretation: whether it relates the animal ‘horse’ to the color ‘white’ or the term ‘horse’ to the term ‘white’. I claim that, while it is easy to give reasons for rejecting the first interpretation, a logic such as Inheritance Logic is necessary to support the second interpretation. The reason is that the latter is a term logic, not a propositional or predicate logic.

Illusionism and the distortion thesis

2025-06-12

Maxim D. Gorbachev , Keith Frankish | Synthese

Cognitive phenomenology and the arbitrariness problem for rationalism

2025-06-12

Torrance Fung | Synthese

Deflationism and propositional quantification

2025-06-11

Arvid Båve | Inquiry

‘There is no <i>reason</i> for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction.’ Margaret Macdonald on logical necessity

2025-06-09

Giulia Felappi | The Philosophical Quarterly

Abstract This paper aims at contributing to the recent enterprise of rediscovering Margaret Macdonald's views, by focusing on her reflections on the necessity of logic, a theme that runs through … Abstract This paper aims at contributing to the recent enterprise of rediscovering Margaret Macdonald's views, by focusing on her reflections on the necessity of logic, a theme that runs through many of her papers and reviews. We will see both Macdonald's negative views about what the necessity of logic is not (Section I), and her positive view about what it is and how it supports her claim that it is in fact irrational to ask for a reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction, such as the Principle of Contradiction (Section II). To show how her view on the necessity of logic is different from others, such as David Lewis's, we will then consider what she would reply to current rejectors of the Principle of Contradiction (Section III).

Assertions in Being and Time

2025-06-07

A. Liland | European Journal of Philosophy

Abstract This paper challenges a key assumption shared by current readings of Heidegger's account of assertions in Being and Time §33 and provides a Heideggerian analysis of predication. Previous readings … Abstract This paper challenges a key assumption shared by current readings of Heidegger's account of assertions in Being and Time §33 and provides a Heideggerian analysis of predication. Previous readings disagree about whether assertions can make us aware of or be about beings in the mode of Zuhandensein (practical significance) because they disagree about whether a principle of determination that characterizes assertions, Vorhandenheitsbestimmung , is supposed to apply to all assertions or only extreme cases. I argue that while Vorhandenheitsbestimmung is responsible for bringing about an awareness of properties entities might instantiate independently of the practical significance they have for us ( Vorhandenheit ), Vorhandenheitsbestimmung does not stop a practically significant context from contributing to the contents assertions convey. This allows us to accept Heidegger's analysis of assertions without endorsing a conception on which assertions cannot bring about an awareness of the kinds of beings that Heidegger claims we for the most part have to do with, and lets us better understand the relationship between assertions, perceptions, and truth in the context of Being and Time.