Social Sciences Political Science and International Relations

International Relations and Foreign Policy

Description

This cluster of papers encompasses a wide range of topics related to international relations, including power dynamics, the role of international institutions and global governance, the influence of norms and soft power, the security dilemma, international law and diplomacy, globalization, and hegemonic structures. The papers explore various theoretical perspectives and empirical case studies to understand the complexities of interactions between states and non-state actors in the global arena.

Keywords

Power; International Institutions; Global Governance; Norms; Soft Power; Security Dilemma; International Law; Diplomacy; Globalization; Hegemony

* Introduction: Superpower Politics * Hegemony of a New Type * The Eurasian Chessboard * The Democratic Bridgehead * The Black Hole * The Eurasian Balkans * The Far Eastern … * Introduction: Superpower Politics * Hegemony of a New Type * The Eurasian Chessboard * The Democratic Bridgehead * The Black Hole * The Eurasian Balkans * The Far Eastern Anchor * Conclusion
The second edition of this widely acclaimed book takes as its main theme the question of how states and societies pursue freedom from threat in an environment in which competitive … The second edition of this widely acclaimed book takes as its main theme the question of how states and societies pursue freedom from threat in an environment in which competitive relations are inescapable across the political, economic, military, societal and environmental landscapes. Throughout, attention is placed on the interplay of threats and vulnerabilities, the policy consequences of overemphasising one or the other, and the existence of contradictions within and between ideas about security. Barry Buzan argues that the concept of security is a versatile, penetrating and useful way to approach the study of international relations. Security provides an analytical framework which stands between the extremes of power and peace, incorporates most of their insights and adds more of its own.People, States and Fear. Is essential reading for all students and researchers of international politics and security studies. The ECPR Classics edition includes a new introduction from the author placing this classic text within a current context.
Since the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions. … Since the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions. In doing so, they explicitly reject balance-of-power politics as an organizing concept for the post-Cold War world. During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, President Clinton declared that, "in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era." Before taking office, Anthony Lake, the president's national security adviser, criticized the Bush administration for viewing the world through a "classic balance of power prism," whereas he and Mr. Clinton took a "more 'neo-Wilsonian' view." 1
Contemporary social science analysis is dominated by utilitarian or functional approaches in which institutional structures are assumed to adapt in an optimal fashion to changing environmental conditions, and the preferences … Contemporary social science analysis is dominated by utilitarian or functional approaches in which institutional structures are assumed to adapt in an optimal fashion to changing environmental conditions, and the preferences and capabilities of individual actors are ontologically posited. In contrast, an institutional perspective insists that past choices constrain present options; that the preferences and capabilities of individual actors are conditioned by institutional structures; and that historical trajectories are path dependent. Institutional structures persist even if circumstances change. In a world of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence, any adequate analysis of the nature of sovereignty operationalized with regard to transborder controls and extraterritoriality must be informed by an institutional perspective.
Drawing upon philosophy and social theory, Social Theory of International Politics develops a theory of the international system as a social construction. Alexander Wendt clarifies the central claims of the … Drawing upon philosophy and social theory, Social Theory of International Politics develops a theory of the international system as a social construction. Alexander Wendt clarifies the central claims of the constructivist approach, presenting a structural and idealist worldview which contrasts with the individualism and materialism which underpins much mainstream international relations theory. He builds a cultural theory of international politics, which takes whether states view each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant. Wendt characterises these roles as 'cultures of anarchy', described as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. These cultures are shared ideas which help shape state interests and capabilities, and generate tendencies in the international system. The book describes four factors which can drive structural change from one culture to another - interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint - and examines the effects of capitalism and democracy in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the West.
Scholars of security affairs can stop their dreary quarrels over military doctrine and balance assessments, and turn their attention to finding ways to prevent global warming and preserve the ozone … Scholars of security affairs can stop their dreary quarrels over military doctrine and balance assessments, and turn their attention to finding ways to prevent global warming and preserve the ozone layer. European leaders can contemplate how to spend peace dividends. This chapter assesses this optimistic view by exploring in detail the consequences for Europe of an end to the Cold War. It examines the effects of a scenario under which the Cold War comes to a complete end. The chapter argues that bipolarity, an equal military balance, and nuclear weapons have fostered peace in Europe. It offers an explanation for the peacefulness of the post-World War II order. The chapter examines the theories underlying claims that a multipolar Europe is likely to be as peaceful, if not more peaceful, than Cold War Europe. The peace-loving democracies theory holds that domestic political factors, not calculations about military power or the international economic system, are the principal determinant of peace.
July 01 2000 Structural Realism after the Cold War Kenneth N. Waltz Kenneth N. Waltz Former Ford Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a Research … July 01 2000 Structural Realism after the Cold War Kenneth N. Waltz Kenneth N. Waltz Former Ford Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a Research Associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor at Columbia University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Kenneth N. Waltz Former Ford Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a Research Associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor at Columbia University. Online ISSN: 1531-4804 Print ISSN: 0162-2889 © 2000 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2000 International Security (2000) 25 (1): 5–41. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560372 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Kenneth N. Waltz; Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security 2000; 25 (1): 5–41. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560372 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2000 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2000 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.
In this book Rob Walker offers an original analysis of the relationship between twentieth-century theories of international relations, and the political theory of civil society since the early modern period. … In this book Rob Walker offers an original analysis of the relationship between twentieth-century theories of international relations, and the political theory of civil society since the early modern period. He views theories of international relations both as an ideological expression of the modern state, and as a clear indication of the difficulties of thinking about a world politics characterized by profound spatiotemporal accelerations. International relations theories should be seen, the author argues, more as aspects of contemporary world politics than as explanations of contemporary world politics. These theories are examined in the light of recent debates about modernity and post-modernity, sovereignty and political identity, and the limits of modern social and political theory. This book is a major contribution to the field of critical international relations, and will be of interest to social and political theorists and political scientists, as well as students and scholars of international relations.
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Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I … Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.
Journal Article Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics Get access Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics by Joseph S. Nye. New York, Public Affairs, … Journal Article Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics Get access Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics by Joseph S. Nye. New York, Public Affairs, 2004. 208 pp. $25.00. Barry M. Blechman Barry M. Blechman Henry L. Stimson Center Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 119, Issue 4, Winter 2004, Pages 680–681, https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2004.tb01291.x Published: 25 March 2013
Abstract Even when political rule is territorial, territoriality does not necessarily entail the practices of total mutual exclusion which dominant understandings of the modern territorial state attribute to it. However, … Abstract Even when political rule is territorial, territoriality does not necessarily entail the practices of total mutual exclusion which dominant understandings of the modern territorial state attribute to it. However, when the territoriality of the state is debated by international relations theorists the discussion is overwhelmingly in terms of the persistence or obsolescence of the territorial state as an unchanging entity rather than in terms of its significance and meaning in different historical‐geographical circumstances. Contemporary events call this approach into question. The end of the Cold War, the increased velocity and volatility of the world economy, and the emergence of political movements outside the framework of territorial states, suggest the need to consider the territoriality of states in historical context. Conventional thinking relies on three geographical assumptions ‐ states as fixed units of sovereign space, the domestic/foreign polarity, and states as ‘containers’ of societies ‐ that have led into the ‘territorial trap’.
Socialization theory is a neglected source of explanations for cooperation in international relations. Neorealism treats socialization (or selection, more properly) as a process by which autistic non-balancers are weeded out … Socialization theory is a neglected source of explanations for cooperation in international relations. Neorealism treats socialization (or selection, more properly) as a process by which autistic non-balancers are weeded out of the anarchical international system. Contractual institutionalists ignore or downplay the possibilities of socialization in international institutions in part because of the difficulties in observing changes in interests and preferences. For constructivists socialization is a central concept. But to date it has been undertheorized, or more precisely, the microprocesses of socialization have been generally left unexamined. This article focuses on two basic microprocesses in socialization theory—persuasion and social influence—and develops propositions about the social conditions under which one might expect to observe cooperation in institutions. Socialization theories pose questions for both the structural-functional foundations of contractual institutionalist hypotheses about institutional design and cooperation, and notions of optimal group size for collective action.
This article reformulates liberal international relations (IR) theory in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science. Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations—the relationship of … This article reformulates liberal international relations (IR) theory in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social science. Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations—the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded—have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics. Societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments. For liberals, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics—not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists)maintain, the configuration of information and institutions. This article codifies this basic liberal insight in the form of three core theoretical assumptions, derives from them three variants of liberal theory, and demonstrates that the existence of a coherent liberal theory has significant theoretical, methodological, and empirical implications. Restated in this way, liberal theory deserves to be treated as a paradigmatic alternative empirically coequal with and analytically more fundamental than the two dominant theories in contemporary IR scholarship: realism and institutionalism.
A challenger to the continuing dominance of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in the study of international relations in the United States, constructivism is regarded with a great deal of skepticism … A challenger to the continuing dominance of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in the study of international relations in the United States, constructivism is regarded with a great deal of skepticism by mainstream scholars.1 While the reasons for this reception are many, three central ones are the mainstream's miscasting of constructivism as necessarily postmodern and antipositivist; constructivism's own ambivalence about whether it can buy into mainstream social science methods without sacrificing its theoretical distinctiveness; and, related to this ambivalence, constructivism's failure to advance an alternative research program. In this article, I clarify constructivism's claims, outline the differences between conventional and critical constructivism, and suggest a research agenda that both provides alternative understandings of mainstream interna-
Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the … Cooperation and discord in world politics are explained to a considerable extent by the three factors discussed in the Introduction: mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future, and the number of players. Yet the context of interaction, perceptions, and strategies is also important. Issues are linked to one another through multilevel games, which may be compatible or incompatible. Whether reciprocity constitutes an effective strategy depends both on linkages among issues and on the institutions within which negotiations take place. Perceptions are always significant and often decisive. Decision makers often actively seek to change the contexts within which they act by linking issues, trying to alter others' perceptions, establishing institutions, and promoting new norms. This finding suggests the importance of linking the upward-looking theory of strategy with the downward-looking theory of regimes.
This study of perception and misperception in foreign policy was a landmark in application of cognitive psychology to political decision making. The New York Times called it, in an article … This study of perception and misperception in foreign policy was a landmark in application of cognitive psychology to political decision making. The New York Times called it, in an article published nearly ten years after book's appearance, the seminal statement of principles underlying political psychology. The perspective established by Jervis remains an important counterpoint to structural explanations of international politics, and from it has developed a large literature on psychology of leaders and problems of decision making under conditions of incomplete information, stress, and cognitive bias. Jervis begins by describing process of perception (for example, how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one's influence). Finally, he tests his ideas through a number of important events in international relations from nineteenth- and twentieth-century European history. In a contemporary application of Jervis's ideas, some argue that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 in part because he misread signals of American leaders with regard to independence of Kuwait. Also, leaders of United States and Iraq in run-up to most recent Gulf War might have been operating under cognitive biases that made them value certain kinds of information more than others, whether or not information was true. Jervis proved that, once a leader believed something, that perception would influence way leader perceived all other relevant information.
Questions about norm diffusion in world politics are not simply about whether and how ideas matter, but also which and whose ideas matter. Constructivist scholarship on norms tends to focus … Questions about norm diffusion in world politics are not simply about whether and how ideas matter, but also which and whose ideas matter. Constructivist scholarship on norms tends to focus on "hard" cases of moral transformation in which "good" global norms prevail over the "bad" local beliefs and practices. But many local beliefs are themselves part of a legitimate normative order, which conditions the acceptance of foreign norms. Going beyond an existential notion of congruence, this article proposes a dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the agents' cognitive priors and identities. Congruence building thus becomes key to acceptance. Localization, not wholesale acceptance or rejection, settles most cases of normative contestation. Comparing the impact of two transnational norms on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), this article shows that the variation in the norms' acceptance, indicated by the changes they produced in the goals and institutional apparatuses of the regional group, could be explained by the differential ability of local agents to reconstruct the norms to ensure a better fit with prior local norms, and the potential of the localized norm to enhance the appeal of some of their prior beliefs and institutions.I thank Peter Katzenstein, Jack Snyder, Chris Reus-Smit, Brian Job, Paul Evans, Iain Johnston, David Capie, Helen Nesadurai, Jeffrey Checkel, Kwa Chong Guan, Khong Yuen Foong, Anthony Milner, John Hobson, Etel Solingen, Michael Barnett, Richard Price, Martha Finnemore, and Frank Schimmelfennig for their comments on various earlier drafts of the article. This article is a revised version of a draft prepared for the American Political Science Association annual convention, San Francisco, 29 August–2 September 2001. Seminars on the article were offered at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, in April 2001; the Modern Asia Seminar Series at Harvard University's Asia Center, in May 2001; the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, in September 2001; and the Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, in April 2002. I thank these institutions for their lively seminars offering invaluable feedback. I gratefully acknowledge valuable research assistance provided by Tan Ban Seng, Deborah Lee, and Karyn Wang at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. I am also grateful to Harvard University Asia Centre and the Kennedy School's Asia Pacific Policy Program for fellowships to facilitate my research during 2000–2001.
States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary international theory does not explain the existence or form … States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary international theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational-institutionalist perspective that sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their ends, the authors examine power and distributive questions and the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding. Centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of formal organizations, and their importance is illustrated with a wide array of examples. IOs as community representatives further allow states to create and implement community values and enforce international commitments.
July 01 1999 The Stability of a Unipolar World William C. Wohlforth William C. Wohlforth Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at … July 01 1999 The Stability of a Unipolar World William C. Wohlforth William C. Wohlforth Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information William C. Wohlforth Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Online ISSN: 1531-4804 Print ISSN: 0162-2889 © 1999 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology1999 International Security (1999) 24 (1): 5–41. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560031 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation William C. Wohlforth; The Stability of a Unipolar World. International Security 1999; 24 (1): 5–41. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560031 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 1999 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology1999 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.
The concept of power is central to international relations. Yet disciplinary discussions tend to privilege only one, albeit important, form: an actor controlling another to do what that other would … The concept of power is central to international relations. Yet disciplinary discussions tend to privilege only one, albeit important, form: an actor controlling another to do what that other would not otherwise do. By showing conceptual favoritism, the discipline not only overlooks the different forms of power in international politics, but also fails to develop sophisticated understandings of how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates. We argue that scholars of international relations should employ multiple conceptions of power and develop a conceptual framework that encourages rigorous attention to power in its different forms. We first begin by producing a taxonomy of power. Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate. This general concept entails two crucial, analytical dimensions: the kinds of social relations through which power works (in relations of interaction or in social relations of constitution); and the specificity of social relations through which effects are produced (specific/direct or diffuse/indirect). These distinctions generate our taxonomy and four concepts of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. We then illustrate how attention to the multiple forms of power matters for the analysis of global governance and American empire. We conclude by urging scholars to beware of the idea that the multiple concepts are competing, and instead to see connections between them in order to generate more robust understandings of how power works in international politics.This article was first presented at a conference, "Who Governs in Global Governance?" at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. We thank the participants at the conference, including Emanuel Adler, Alex Wendt, Neta Crawford, Kathryn Sikkink, Helen Kinsella, Martha Finnemore, Jutta Weldes, Jon Pevehouse, Andrew Hurrell, John Ruggie, and especially Duncan Snidal, Robert Keohane, and Charles Kupchan. Other versions were presented at the University of Minnesota and the International Studies Association meetings in Budapest, Hungary in June, 2003. We also want to thank Kurt Burch, Thomas Diez, Tom Donahue, William Duvall, Ayten Gundogdu, Stefano Guzzini, Colin Kahl, Amit Ron, Latha Varadarajan, Michael Williams, Anne-Marie Slaughter, the editors of the journal, and two anonymous reviewers. We also acknowledge the bibliographic assistance of Emilie Hafner-Burton and Jonathan Havercroft.
Although formal work on war generally sees war as a kind of bargaining breakdown resulting from asymmetric information, bargaining indivisibilities, or commitment problems, most analyses have focused on informational issues. … Although formal work on war generally sees war as a kind of bargaining breakdown resulting from asymmetric information, bargaining indivisibilities, or commitment problems, most analyses have focused on informational issues. But informational explanations and the models underlying them have at least two major limitations: they often provide a poor account of prolonged conflict, and they give an odd reading of the history of some cases. This article describes these limitations and argues that bargaining indivisibilities should really be seen as commitment problems. The present analysis then shows that a common mechanism links three important kinds of commitment problem: (1) preventive war, (2) preemptive attacks arising from first-strike or offensive advantages, and (3) conflicts resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power. In each case, large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power can lead to war. Finally, the analysis elaborates a distinctly different mechanism based on a comparison of the cost of deterring an attack on the status quo with the expected cost of trying to eliminate the threat to the status quo.For helpful comments and criticisms, I thank James Fearon, Hein Goemans, Lisa Martin, Sebastian Mazzuca, Branislav Slantchev, and seminar participants at the University of Montreal–McGill Research Group in International Security, the Institute in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, and University of California, Santa Barbara. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0315037).
Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” in … Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” in their foreign policy. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant, a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts for what we are. Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, with Kant and other democratic republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. They are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's internationalism are not arbitrary. They are rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state.
The neorealist-neoliberal debate about the possibilities for collective action in international relations has been based on a shared commitment to Mancur Olson's rationalist definition of the problem as one of … The neorealist-neoliberal debate about the possibilities for collective action in international relations has been based on a shared commitment to Mancur Olson's rationalist definition of the problem as one of getting exogenously given egoists to cooperate. Treating this assumption as a de facto hypothesis about world politics, I articulate the rival claim that interaction at the systemic level changes state identities and interests. The causes of state egoism do not justify always treating it as given. Insights from critical international relations and integration theories suggest how collective identity among states could emerge endogenously at the systemic level. Such a process would generate cooperation that neither neorealists nor neoliberals expect and help transform systemic anarchy into an “international state”—a transnational structure of political authority that might undermine territorial democracy. I show how broadening systemic theory beyond rationalist concerns can help it to explain structural change in world politics.
In recent years, constructivist thinking about global politics has brought a breath of fresh auto international relations. By exploring questions of identity and interest, constructivist scholars have articulated an important … In recent years, constructivist thinking about global politics has brought a breath of fresh auto international relations. By exploring questions of identity and interest, constructivist scholars have articulated an important corrective to the methodological individualism and materialism that have come to dominate much of IR. As the books under review indicate, constructivism has also succeeded in demonstrating its empirical value—documenting a new and important causal role for norms and social structure in global politics. Theoretically, however, the approach remains underspecified. In particular, constructivists typically fail to explain the origins of such structures, how they change over time, how their effects vary cross nationally, or the mechanisms through which they constitute states and individuals. Missing is the substantive theory and attention to agency that will provide answers to such puzzles, as well as ensure the development of a productive research program.
Joseph Nye coined the term in the late 1980s. It is now used frequently-and often incorrectly-by political leaders, editorial writers, and academics around the world. So what is soft power? … Joseph Nye coined the term in the late 1980s. It is now used frequently-and often incorrectly-by political leaders, editorial writers, and academics around the world. So what is soft power? Soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade. Whereas hard power-the ability to coerce-grows out of a country's military or economic might, soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. Hard power remains crucial in a world of states trying to guard their independence and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence. It forms the core of the Bush administration's new national security strategy. But according to Nye, the neo-conservatives who advise the president are making a major miscalculation: They focus too heavily on using America's military power to force other nations to do our will, and they pay too little heed to our soft power. It is soft power that will help prevent terrorists from recruiting supporters from among the moderate majority. And it is soft power that will help us deal with critical global issues that require multilateral cooperation among states. That is why it is so essential that America better understands and applies our soft power. This book is our guide.
Preface A note about the revised edition Introduction 1. Provocations of our time 2. Rethinking foreign policy 3. Foreign policy and identity 4. Foreign policy and difference 5. Imagining America … Preface A note about the revised edition Introduction 1. Provocations of our time 2. Rethinking foreign policy 3. Foreign policy and identity 4. Foreign policy and difference 5. Imagining America 6. Writing security 7. Rewriting security 8. The politics of theorizing identity Epilogue: The disciplinary politics of theorising identity
Studies in this issue show that the epistemic communities approach amounts to a progressive research program with which students of world politics can empirically study the role of reason and … Studies in this issue show that the epistemic communities approach amounts to a progressive research program with which students of world politics can empirically study the role of reason and ideas in international relations. By focusing on epistemic communities, analysts may better understand how states come to recognize interests under conditions of uncertainty. According to this research program, international relations can be seen as an evolutionary process in which epistemic communities play meaningful roles as sources of policy innovation, channels by which these innovations diffuse internationally, and catalysts in the political and institutional processes leading to the selection of their shared goals. The influence of epistemic communities persists mainly through the institutions that they help create and inform with their preferred world vision. By elucidating the cause-and-effect understandings in the particular issue-area and familiarizing policymakers with the reasoning processes by which decisions are made elsewhere, epistemic communities contribute to the transparency of action and the development of common inferences and expectations and thereby contribute to policy coordination. International cooperation and, indeed, the development of new world orders based on common meanings and understandings may thus depend on the extent to which nation-states apply their power on behalf of practices that epistemic communities may have helped create, diffuse, and perpetuate.
The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory. Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is … The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory. Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by “structure” (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus “process” (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?
In his usual direct way, John J. Mearsheimer has sharpened the theoretical issues dividing realist from institutionalist theory, and for this service we are grateful. We are also pleased that … In his usual direct way, John J. Mearsheimer has sharpened the theoretical issues dividing realist from institutionalist theory, and for this service we are grateful. We are also pleased that he has read the institutionalist literature so thoroughly He correctly asserts that liberal institutionalists treat states as rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced, and that institutionalists only expect interstate cooperation to occur if states have significant common interests. Hence institutionalist heory does not espouse the Wilsonian concept of collective security-which Charles and Clifford Kupchan refer to as ideal collective security-critiqued so well by I.L. Claude thirty years ago.1 Nor does institutionalism embrace the aspirations to transform international relations put forward by some critical theorists. Like realism, institutionalist theory is utilitarian and rationalistic.2 However, Professor Mearsheimer's version of realism has some rather serious flaws. Among them are its penchant for assertions that turn out to be incorrect; its propensity to privilege its own viewpoint, so that in the absence of decisive evidence either way it invariably seems to prevail; its failure to explicate the conditions for the operation of its generalizations; and its logical contradictions, escaped only through verbal sleight-of-hand. We will begin by pointing out such errors from his own recent articles in this journal, then
This article introduces a mode of social action and interaction that has so far been largely overlooked in the U.S.-dominated international relations debate between rational choice and social constructivism that … This article introduces a mode of social action and interaction that has so far been largely overlooked in the U.S.-dominated international relations debate between rational choice and social constructivism that focuses mainly on the differences between instrumental rationality and norm-guided behavior. Drawing on insights from a theoretical debate within the Germanspeaking international relations community, I suggest that actors have a third mode of social action at their disposal: arguing and deliberating about the validity claims inherent in any communicative statement about identities, interests, and the state of the world. Arguing and truth-seeking behavior presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges, and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a reasoned consensus. The preconditions for argumentative rationality, particularly a “common lifeworld” and the mutual recognition of speakers as equals in a nonhierarchical relationship, are more common in international relations than is usually assumed. Arguing processes are more likely to occur the more actors are uncertain about their interests and even identities, the less they know about the situation in which they find themselves and the underlying “rules of the game,” and the more apparently irreconcilable differences prevent them from reaching an optimal rather than a merely satisfactory solution for a widely perceived problem (“problem solving”). Moreover, arguing is likely to increase the influence of the materially less powerful, be it small states or nonstate actors such as INGOs. I illustrate these claims empirically with two plausibility probes. The first concerns the East–West talks leading to a negotiated settlement of the Cold War in Europe and German unification within NATO. The second case focuses on the implementation of international human rights norms into domestic practices of Third World states.
In recent years, a great deal has been written about a `constructivist' approach in International Relations, which argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning … In recent years, a great deal has been written about a `constructivist' approach in International Relations, which argues that international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world. Nevertheless, most of the epistemological, theoretical, empirical and methodological foundations of constructivism remain unclear. Nor are its potential contributions to a better understanding of International Relations widely appreciated. The present article seeks to fill some of these gaps. Constructivism occupies the middle ground between rationalist approaches (whether realist or liberal) and interpretive approaches (mainly postmodernist, poststructuralist and critical), and creates new areas for theoretical and empirical investigation. The bulk of the article lays out the social-epistemological basis of the constructivist approach; juxtaposes constructivism to rationalism and poststructuralism and explains its advantages; presents the concept of cognitive evolution as a way of explaining the social construction of reality; and suggests ways of expanding constructivist research agendas.
Although international relations theory has been dominated for two decades by debates over theories of international politics, recently there has been a surge of interest in theories of foreign policy. … Although international relations theory has been dominated for two decades by debates over theories of international politics, recently there has been a surge of interest in theories of foreign policy. These seek to explain, not the pattern of outcomes of state interactions, but rather the behavior of individual states. The author surveys three prominent theories of foreign policy and shows how the works under review set out a compelling alternative, one that updates and systematizes insights drawn from classical realist thought. Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country's relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and state structure. Understanding the links between power and policy thus requires close examination of both the international and the domestic contexts within which foreign policy is formulated and implemented.
International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening … International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables, standing between basic causal factors and related outcomes and behavior. There are three views about the importance of regimes: conventional structural orientations dismiss regimes as being at best ineffectual; Grotian orientations view regimes as an intimate component of the international system; and modified structural perspectives see regimes as significant only under certain constrained conditions. For Grotian and modified structuralist arguments, which endorse the view that regimes can influence outcomes and behavior, regime development is seen as a function of five basic causal variables: egoistic self-interest, political power, diffuse norms and principles, custom and usage, and knowledge.
Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards … Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war. The new dispute data set generated by the Correlates of War project contains information on over 2,000 such disputes found to have occurred in the period 1816–1992. As in the earlier version of the data set, the participants, start and end dates, fatality totals, and hostility levels for each dispute are identified, but the newer version disaggregates this information for each participant and provides additional information about the revisionist state(s), type(s) of revision sought, outcome, and method of settlement for each dispute. A preliminary analysis of the data shows some interesting empircal patterns. Contagion and a slight upward trend are found in the frequency of disputes at the system level. The duration of disputes appears to be positively associated with the level of hostility reached and the number of states involved, and disputes appear to have a feud-like character. The single most important factor found to increase the fatality level of a dispute is the number of states that join after its onset. However, most disputes begin and end as one-on-one confrontations, and this tendency is stronger in the current period than in the past. An examination of dispute escalation reveals that many disputes begin with uses of force rather than less intense threats or displays of force and that states joining an ongoing dispute raise the likelihood that the dispute will reach higher levels of hostility. With respect to the settlement of disputes it was found that the longer a dispute continues, the higher the likelihood of some settlement, either negotiated or imposed, being achieved, althogh there is a discernable trend away from such settlements over the period studied. A related trend was found with respect to the outcome of disputes as stalemate has become a much more likely outcome in the present than in the past.
October 01 1997 Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes Stephen John Stedman Stephen John Stedman Stephen John Stedman is Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control … October 01 1997 Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes Stephen John Stedman Stephen John Stedman Stephen John Stedman is Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Stephen John Stedman Stephen John Stedman is Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. Online Issn: 1531-4804 Print Issn: 0162-2889 © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.1997 International Security (1997) 22 (2): 5–53. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.5 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Stephen John Stedman; Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security 1997; 22 (2): 5–53. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.2.5 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.1997 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.
The concept of territoriality has been studied surprisingly little by students of international politics. Yet, territoriality most distinctively defines modernity in international politics, and changes in few other factors can … The concept of territoriality has been studied surprisingly little by students of international politics. Yet, territoriality most distinctively defines modernity in international politics, and changes in few other factors can so powerfully transform the modern world polity. This article seeks to frame the study of the possible transformation of modern territoriality by examining how that system of relations was instituted in the first place. The historical analysis suggests that “unbundled” territoriality is a useful terrain for exploring the condition of postmodernity in international politics and suggests some ways in which that exploration might proceed. The emergence of multiperspectival institutional forms is identified as a key dimension of the condition of postmodernity in international politics.
This article examines the evolution of security studies, focusing on recent developments in the field. It provides a survey of the field, a guide to the current research agenda, and … This article examines the evolution of security studies, focusing on recent developments in the field. It provides a survey of the field, a guide to the current research agenda, and some practical lessons for managing the field in the years ahead. Security studies remains an interdisciplinary enterprise, but its earlier preoccupation with nuclear issues has broadened to include topics such as grand strategy, conventional warfare, and the domestic sources of international conflict, among others. Work in the field is increasingly rigorous and theoretically inclined, which reflects the marriage between security studies and social science and its improved standing within the academic world. Because national security will remain a problem for states and because an independent scholarly community contributes to effective public policy in this area, the renaissance of security studies is an important positive development for the field of international relations.
Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” in … Building on a growing literature in international political science, I reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise “restraint” and “peaceful intentions” in their foreign policy. I look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three theorists: Schumpeter, a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism we often invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism we often practice; and Kant, a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best accounts for what we are. Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find, with Kant and other democratic republicans, that liberalism does leave a coherent legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. They are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism, and Kant's internationalism are not arbitrary. They are rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the state.
Journal Article International regimes Get access International regimes. Edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press for Center for International Affairs, University of California and the World Peace … Journal Article International regimes Get access International regimes. Edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press for Center for International Affairs, University of California and the World Peace Foundation. 1983. 372pp. Index. Pb.: £8.50; $12.95. R. J. Barry Jones R. J. Barry Jones 1University of Reading Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 60, Issue 1, Winter 1983, Pages 109–110, https://doi.org/10.2307/2618936 Published: 01 January 1983
Martha Finnemore gir i sin bok National Interests in International Society et fint bidrag til den konstruktivistiske debatten innen fagfeltet internasjonal politikk. Boka er et resultat av at den kalde … Martha Finnemore gir i sin bok National Interests in International Society et fint bidrag til den konstruktivistiske debatten innen fagfeltet internasjonal politikk. Boka er et resultat av at den kalde krigens dager er over. Under den kalde krigen og dens endimensjonale sikkerhetsbilde var realismen eller nyrealismen et fruktbart perspektiv for a beskrive internasjonal politikk. Da vi sa enden pa denne perioden med Murens fall i 1989, fikk det store konsekvenser for den teoretiske debatten i fagfeltet. En stormakt var borte, og USA sto alene igjen. Hvordan skulle man na definere det internasjonale systemets natur? Hva var na USAs interesser pa den internasjonale arena? Hva star USA for, hvilke normer og verdier bekjenner man seg til? Under den kalde krigen var de politiske frontene klare, stormaktene fa og deres interesser lette a definere og sto som en kausal forklaringsfaktor for statlig adferd. Det var liten debatt omkring disse interessene – hva de var og hvordan de virket inn pa staters handlinger. Finnemore onsker a problematisere interessebegrepet. Hun onsker a besvare sporsmal av typen: Hvordan vet stater hva de vil? Hvem definerer staters interesser? Hvor kommer interessene fra? Og hun noyer seg ikke med a definere. Hun vil forsta. Det er dette som er mye av kjernen i konstruktivismen: forstaelse av hvorfor ting og forhold har blitt som de har blitt. Det er ikke alltid staters handlinger er rasjonelle. Kan det hende at det eksisterer normer og verdier stater bekjenner seg til som ikke direkte er i deres interesse? Hvordan skal man i tilfelle forklare dem i et realistisk perspektiv hvor alt staten gjor er styrt av nettopp interesser? Det er her konstruktivismen trenger seg fram, og Martha Finnemores bok er et eksempel pa dette nye perspektivet. Boka bestar av til sammen 5 kapitler som kan deles inn i 3 deler. I kapittel 1 introduseres bokas tema: Hvordan statlige interesser Bokspalte
| Cambridge University Press eBooks
India–China relations are shaped by cultural legacies, historical perceptions, border positions, and contemporary realities that have fostered a sense of uncertainty and deep mistrust for the last seven decades and … India–China relations are shaped by cultural legacies, historical perceptions, border positions, and contemporary realities that have fostered a sense of uncertainty and deep mistrust for the last seven decades and beyond. The dilemma, rooted in the question of greatness or cultural superiority, extends into border disputes and subsequently to broader geopolitical calculus and games in the context of Asia’s rise. These narratives are characterised by distrust, and hence, bilateral interactions, especially on the border, are played out on the logic of a zero-sum game. The insights of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) theory, through a standard four-by-four payoff matrix, are used to capture the nuances of this erratic and zero-sum pattern in India–China relations. We argue that the PD is internalised in India–China behaviour, starting from cultural and historical perceptions to border disputes and overlapping into contemporary geopolitical dynamics of competition and rivalry. This explains why India–China relations remain unresolved. We also argue that the lingering tensions between India and China are rooted in differing perceptions and positions, which compel them to choose a dominant strategy based on individual rationality instead of a Pareto-optimal outcome based on collective rationality.
Kyung-joo Jeon | Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
Abstract South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has stressed marked change with his predecessor in launching the nation as a strong, proactive, and globally oriented middle power. By way of … Abstract South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has stressed marked change with his predecessor in launching the nation as a strong, proactive, and globally oriented middle power. By way of testing four core assumptions on progressives and conservatives’ policy proclivities, this article evaluates these (asserted) changes in South Korea’s foreign security policy. It finds a sharp change in Seoul’s policy toward the North’s nuclear and missile program but continuity with the Moon administration in strengthening South Korea’s force structure. Fearing potential American abandonment, the Yoon administration has further sought deeper integration with American forces on the Peninsula. Yoon breaking with China is a big policy shift, as is his taking incremental steps toward the tripartite alliance with the USA and Japan that is much-dreaded by Beijing. South Korea establishing ties with European countries and NATO on the other side of the world is also significant.
Abstract As one of the most discussed theories in IR, Thucydides’ trap is based on the belief in US exceptionalism and the Wilsonian role of the US as champion of … Abstract As one of the most discussed theories in IR, Thucydides’ trap is based on the belief in US exceptionalism and the Wilsonian role of the US as champion of democracy, whereby the US presence in East Asia is taken for granted. Instead of confirming the loftiness of Wilsonianism, Allison’s misleading creation, significantly informed by Huntington, shows that America’s creedal nationalism is as an exceptional ideology that is different from other nationalisms in its appropriation and distortion of a particular political system and values as distinctively American, yet similar in the creation of conceptually feeble narratives. This interdisciplinary paper, which straddles political theory and nationalism scholarship, addresses Thucydides’ trap as an attempt, steeped in America’s distinct form of national chauvinism, to legitimize imperialism and messianic understandings of the US global reach through structural dynamics of power politics.
This research article aims to provide a concise overview of geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically focusing on China’s ambitious role, India’s interests, and its security concerns. The article … This research article aims to provide a concise overview of geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically focusing on China’s ambitious role, India’s interests, and its security concerns. The article aims to inform potential readers about the central hypothesis that the nations in the Indo-Pacific region have experienced direct pressure stemming from China’s hegemonic ambitions. This study relies on qualitative research methods involving collecting and analyzing written and spoken content and textual data. It aims to delve into the conceptual understanding of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, underpinned by theoretical frameworks, and offers a critical analysis of China’s ambitions and India’s role in addressing its security concerns.
Gregory A. Daddis | Oxford University Press eBooks
Abstract This chapter discusses the uncertainties that shaped US foreign policy after the Cold War, as the Soviet Union collapsed and liberal democracy seemed triumphant. Rising nationalism in Eastern Europe, … Abstract This chapter discusses the uncertainties that shaped US foreign policy after the Cold War, as the Soviet Union collapsed and liberal democracy seemed triumphant. Rising nationalism in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and the Baltic states, and the challenge of German reunification created fears of instability, even as policymakers like President Bush sought to promote a “new world order.“While Bush aimed to manage the geopolitical transition, his administration was criticized for being both too passive and too forceful. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), especially involving Germany, fueled concerns about antagonizing Russia and reigniting its fears of encirclement. Ultimately, the chapter underscores the tension between America’s desire for global leadership and the fear of new, unpredictable threats in the post–Cold War era.
Gregory A. Daddis | Oxford University Press eBooks
Abstract This chapter examines the uncertainties and contradictions in US foreign policy following the Cold War's conclusion, especially after the Gulf War. While the military victory in Iraq was celebrated … Abstract This chapter examines the uncertainties and contradictions in US foreign policy following the Cold War's conclusion, especially after the Gulf War. While the military victory in Iraq was celebrated as a triumph over the “Vietnam syndrome," it raised concerns about a potential “Iraq syndrome" that might instead make war fighting seem too easy. Policymakers and citizens faced a new geopolitical landscape where the threat of instability persisted despite the absence of the Soviet Union. Calls for a sustained American presence in regions like the Middle East reflected fears of potential threats from failing states and rogue actors. Ultimately, this period marked the struggle to define a coherent post-Cold War strategy as faith in military power clashed with a need for global stability.
Gregory A. Daddis | Oxford University Press eBooks
Abstract This chapter examines the deep anxiety that gripped America in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis, when anti-American sentiment surged and left the … Abstract This chapter examines the deep anxiety that gripped America in the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis, when anti-American sentiment surged and left the nation questioning its global power. The overthrow of the Shah, coupled with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, spurred fears that American influence in the Middle East was slipping, with President Carter unable to dispel the growing doubts about US strength. The failed rescue mission Operation Eagle Claw only exacerbated these concerns, symbolizing military impotence and further weakening Carter’s presidency. Ronald Reagan, seizing on these fears, positioned himself as the candidate who would restore America’s military might and honor, presenting a stark choice between strength and decline. As the Cold War entered its final phase, Americans wrestled with the dual fears of war and weakness, setting the stage for a new chapter in US foreign policy.
Gregory A. Daddis | Oxford University Press eBooks
Abstract This chapter explores President Reagan's belief in the utility of war, particularly his focus on “low-intensity conflict" to project American power. Drawing from Eisenhower’s legacy, Reagan believed that military … Abstract This chapter explores President Reagan's belief in the utility of war, particularly his focus on “low-intensity conflict" to project American power. Drawing from Eisenhower’s legacy, Reagan believed that military force could support diplomacy without risking escalation to full-scale war. Despite this emphasis, the armed forces prepared primarily for conventional warfare, shifting focus back to threats from the Soviet Union in Europe. Reagan's foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East and Latin America, struggled between showcasing American strength and navigating the complexities of local conflicts, often facing criticism for prioritizing military solutions over diplomatic ones. As the chapter progresses, it becomes clear that Reagan’s faith in military intervention, despite some strategic successes like Grenada, led to mixed results and underscored the limits of America's global reach during the Cold War.
Uluslararası sistemin kaç kutuplu olduğu realist yaklaşımların temel sorduğu sorulardan biridir çünkü kutup sayısı birbirine benzeyen aktörler olan devletlerin davranışını doğrudan etkileyen faktörlerden biri olarak kabul edilir. Sistemin tek, iki … Uluslararası sistemin kaç kutuplu olduğu realist yaklaşımların temel sorduğu sorulardan biridir çünkü kutup sayısı birbirine benzeyen aktörler olan devletlerin davranışını doğrudan etkileyen faktörlerden biri olarak kabul edilir. Sistemin tek, iki veya çok kutuplu olması uluslararası ilişkilerin anarşik yapısıyla birleştiğinde istikrarı doğrudan etkilemektedir. Nitekim sistemde devletler arası savaşların olduğu dönemlerde realizmin yükselmesi ve kutupluluğa dair sorular sorması doğaldır. Rusya Federasyonu-Ukrayna Savaşı ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti’nin yükselişi günümüzde bu soruların daha sık sorulmasına neden olmaktadır. Bu çalışma sistem düzeyinde bir soruyu, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri istihbarat topluluğu tarafından stratejik düzeyde üretilen bir istihbarat ürünü olan Yıllık Tehdit Değerlendirme belgeleri üzerinden cevaplandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla çalışma Python programlama dili kullanarak kelime analizi ve konu modelleme analizi gerçekleştirmektedir. Çalışmanın sonuçları 2017 yılı itibarıyla ABD’nin büyük güç rekabetini Yıllık Tehdit Değerlendirmesine taşımaya başladığı, 2021 itibariyle de büyük güç rekabetini kabul ettiğini göstermektedir.
Uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri arasında en çok tercih edilen realizm tüm eleştirilere rağmen akademisyenlerin ve uzmanların gözdesi olmaya devam etmektedir. Diğer teorilerde olduğu gibi realizmin kendi içinde de ayrımlar yaşanmakta ve … Uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri arasında en çok tercih edilen realizm tüm eleştirilere rağmen akademisyenlerin ve uzmanların gözdesi olmaya devam etmektedir. Diğer teorilerde olduğu gibi realizmin kendi içinde de ayrımlar yaşanmakta ve bu ayrımların uluslararası politikanın doğası için sunduğu vizyon hakkında güçlü çıkarımları bulunmaktadır. Söz konusu ayrım literatürde ofansif ve defansif realizm olarak ele alınmasına karşın neorealist temeller göz önüne alındığında ikisinin neden farklılaştığını anlamakta güçlük çekmekteyiz. Bu çalışma yaşanan bu farklılığı daha belirgin hâle getirme amacı taşımaktadır. Bunu yaparken ofansif ve defansif realizmin sadece farklı olduğu hususlar değil aynı zamanda ortak argümanları da ortaya konacaktır. Bununla birlikte defansif ve ofansif realizmin literatürde gereken önemi görmediği argümanlar detaylıca incelecenek olup, ofansif ve defansif realizmin aslında çıkış noktalarının aynı ancak ulaştıkları sonuçların farklılıkları üzerinde durulacaktır. Çalışma öncelikle realist teorinin kısa bir değerlendirmesi üzerinde duracak, devamında ise ofansif ve defansif realizmin savunduğu argümanlar detaylıca açıklanacaktır. Sonrasında defansif ve ofansif realizmin her ne kadar bir iç tartışma sonucu ortaya çıkmasına karşın uluslararası ilişkileri açıklamaya dair savunduğu düşüncelerin oldukça farklılıklar barındırdığı belirtilecektir. Çalışma araştırma yöntemlerinden betimsel nitelikte olmakla beraber yazındaki teorik eksikliği giderme amacı da taşımaktadır. Ofansif ve defansif realizme yönelik literatürde benzer çalışmaların oldukça az olması, ofansif ve defansif realizmin görünenden daha keskin çizgiler bağlamında farklılaştığının ortaya konması çalışmanın önemini oluşturmaktadır. Nihai olarak teorik içi tartışmanın detaylı bir incelemesi olan bu çalışma tartışma ve sonuç bölümüyle tamamlanacaktır.
Abstract This study advances neorealist theory by examining how systemic constraints shape state behavior through economic statecraft, focusing on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Iran’s strategic calculations. Employing … Abstract This study advances neorealist theory by examining how systemic constraints shape state behavior through economic statecraft, focusing on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Iran’s strategic calculations. Employing methodological triangulation – network analysis, discourse examination, and institutional assessment – this research explores the strategic logic underpinning the China-Iran engagement. For Iran, the BRI emerges as a mechanism for institutional resilience and sanctions circumvention, though its integration remains constrained by systemic limitations and regional competition. For China, the BRI serves as a geopolitical infrastructure strategy to expand influence and secure resources, despite concerns over economic sustainability. By framing economic statecraft as a strategic response to systemic constraints, this study challenges conventional materialist and militaristic paradigms of international relations. It critically assesses the generalizability of BRI partnerships, illustrating how states, bound by structural limitations, use economic instruments to reshape their strategic environments. Ultimately, the research offers nuanced insight into emerging power dynamics in a multipolar world, extending beyond traditional power-centric models.
Abstract The extant literature on Eurasian regionalism predominantly employs a hegemony-centric instrumental approach that views regional organisations as tools of control by the hegemon—Russia, implicitly considering secondary states as unwaveringly … Abstract The extant literature on Eurasian regionalism predominantly employs a hegemony-centric instrumental approach that views regional organisations as tools of control by the hegemon—Russia, implicitly considering secondary states as unwaveringly loyal to Russia. This article advocates the shift of perspective to the arena approach that allows secondary state strategies both within Russia-led regional organisations and across the wider spectrum of regional organisations in post-Soviet Eurasia. At the regional level, these strategies are illustrated through interpretative analysis based on the existing literature. At the organisational level, secondary state strategies are evidenced through a novel dataset on the high-level document-signing patterns within the Commonwealth of Independent States from 1996 to 2022. The results suggest that secondary states, including those that bandwagoned with Russia, have consistently exercised significant agency in the post-Soviet Eurasian regionalism. The study contributes to varying degrees to the literature strands of secondary state strategies, international organisations, and Eurasian regionalism.
Portugal, a founding NATO member, holds a strategic role in diplomatic relations with Portuguese-speaking states, particularly in the South Atlantic, where most of its former colonies are located. Over its … Portugal, a founding NATO member, holds a strategic role in diplomatic relations with Portuguese-speaking states, particularly in the South Atlantic, where most of its former colonies are located. Over its 76-year history, NATO has expanded beyond its traditional sphere, recognizing the need for global partnerships to uphold security. The 1996 Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) between Portugal and Angola exemplifies a strategic alliance that goes beyond historical and cultural ties. The DCA reinforces bilateral relations while promoting NATO's core values, such as collective security and regional stability. Given the South Atlantic's growing relevance, Portugal aligns NATO's interests with those of Angola in areas like maritime security, counterterrorism, and combating illicit trafficking. This chapter examines how Portugal's cooperation with Angola strengthens its role within NATO, reinforcing its geopolitical influence. Additionally, it analyses how this partnership projects NATO's values and presence in Africa and the South Atlantic.
| University of Wisconsin Press eBooks
Computational methods have been increasingly used in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Text analysis, geospatial analysis, and network analysis are among the most used computational methods. This article examines the FPA … Computational methods have been increasingly used in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Text analysis, geospatial analysis, and network analysis are among the most used computational methods. This article examines the FPA literature that utilizes computational methods and discusses their theoretical and empirical implications for future research. I argue that while these methods are not without their criticisms, the integration of computational tools enables FPA researchers to create and use big data sets, improve sampling, and collect and analyze data. Computational methods in FPA enable theory-driven analysis of big data, providing both theoretical and empirical insights, and allowing testing of micro-level foundations of FPA theories. However, challenges such as the validity of measures and selection bias should be taken into account. While computational methods present significant opportunities for advancing FPA, these challenges need consideration.
S. Vorobyov | Nauchno-analiticheskii zhurnal Obozrevatel - Observer
The article presents the discursive problematics of politicization of falsification of the history of international relations, linked to the critical analysis of education of the young generation of post-Soviet states … The article presents the discursive problematics of politicization of falsification of the history of international relations, linked to the critical analysis of education of the young generation of post-Soviet states on the basis of distorted perception of international relations, formed in the interests of creating a special socio-psychological climate in the postSoviet states.
Abstract The scandal of the Cuban Missile Crisis lies in the fact that it brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war for actions … Abstract The scandal of the Cuban Missile Crisis lies in the fact that it brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war for actions associated with relatively minor strategic and political gains. In this article I will treat this crisis as a diagnostic event to identify two significant interinstitutional dynamics that drove Nikita Khrushchev and President John F. Kennedy to this rationality-defying precipice. The first of these dynamics explores the consequences of transitioning military units from peacetime routines to crisis-level field deployment, which quickly created considerable command-and-control problems for both political leaders. Yet each believed that the other side remained in control of its forces, erroneously understanding local action by the other side as strategic moves ordered by central command. This created the potential for uncontrollable escalation. The second dynamic resulted from the interaction of two institutional arrangements in the United States. American presidents are simultaneously the country’s highest decision makers in foreign affairs and political campaigners interested in their own reelection. Foreign policy decisions thus become potential campaign moves. After World War II, a campaigning tradition emerged in which both parties felt compelled to outdo each other with anticommunist rhetoric and policies. This strategy built on deeply instituted anticommunism in the electorate, which politicians felt compelled to further cultivate. This dynamic significantly limited Kennedy’s response options, making it more likely than not that he would have called for an invasion of Cuba if Khrushchev had not backed down. The consequences would have been disastrous. The article concludes with tentative lessons to learn from these two dynamics.
Abstract This article examines US engagement with El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during the twenty-first century through the lens of Womack’s asymmetry theory, arguing that the US’s interactions with … Abstract This article examines US engagement with El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua during the twenty-first century through the lens of Womack’s asymmetry theory, arguing that the US’s interactions with these weaker neighbors reveal the limitations of its power. By integrating the role of internal actors within weaker states, this study extends Womack’s theory, offering new insights into how asymmetrical power dynamics constrain both dominant and subordinate states. The article demonstrates how these dynamics result in inconsistent US policies characterized by cycles of neglect and crisis-driven interventions. This inconsistency, combined with stereotyped perceptions of regional actors, has ultimately empowered Central American elites while marginalizing other potential agents of change, raising important considerations for future US foreign policy and its practical implications in the region.
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