We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin …
We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself, if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle. Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin share) do not always exist, prior work has focussed on approximation results that aim to find allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amanatidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by developing a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee.
We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin …
We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself, if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle. Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin share) do not always exist, prior work has focussed on approximation results that aim to find allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amanatidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by developing a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee.
A number of recent results on optimization problems involving submodular functions have made use of the multilinear relaxation of the problem. These results hold typically in the value oracle model, …
A number of recent results on optimization problems involving submodular functions have made use of the multilinear relaxation of the problem. These results hold typically in the value oracle model, where the objective function is accessible via a black box returning $f(S)$ for a given $S$. We present a general approach to deriving inapproximability results in the value oracle model, based on the notion of symmetry gap. Our main result is that for any fixed instance that exhibits a certain symmetry gap in its multilinear relaxation, there is a naturally related class of instances for which a better approximation factor than the symmetry gap would require exponentially many oracle queries. This unifies several known hardness results for submodular maximization, e.g., the optimality of $(1-1/e)$-approximation for monotone submodular maximization under a cardinality constraint and the impossibility of $(\frac12+\epsilon)$-approximation for unconstrained (nonmonotone) submodular maximization. As a new application, we consider the problem of maximizing a nonmonotone submodular function over the bases of a matroid. A $(\frac16-o(1))$-approximation has been developed for this problem, assuming that the matroid contains two disjoint bases. We show that the best approximation one can achieve is indeed related to packings of bases in the matroid. Specifically, for any $k \geq 2$, there is a class of matroids of fractional base packing number $\nu = \frac{k}{k-1}$ such that any algorithm achieving a better than $(1-\frac{1}{\nu}) = \frac{1}{k}$-approximation for this class would require exponentially many value queries. In particular, there is no constant factor approximation for maximizing a nonmonotone submodular function over the bases of a general matroid. On the positive side, we present a $\frac12 (1-\frac{1}{\nu}-o(1))$-approximation algorithm assuming fractional base packing number at least $\nu$, where $\nu \in (1,2]$. We also present an improved $0.309$-approximation for maximization of a nonmonotone submodular function subject to a matroid independence constraint, improving the previously known factor of $\frac14-\epsilon$. For this problem, we obtain a hardness of $(\frac12 + \epsilon)$-approximation for any fixed $\epsilon>0$.
We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative submodular set function $f:2^N \rightarrow {\mathbb R}_+$ over a ground set $N$ subject to a variety of packing-type constraints including (multiple) matroid …
We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative submodular set function $f:2^N \rightarrow {\mathbb R}_+$ over a ground set $N$ subject to a variety of packing-type constraints including (multiple) matroid constraints, knapsack constraints, and their intersections. In this paper we develop a general framework that allows us to derive a number of new results, in particular, when $f$ may be a nonmonotone function. Our algorithms are based on (approximately) maximizing the multilinear extension $F$ of $f$ over a polytope $P$ that represents the constraints, and then effectively rounding the fractional solution. Although this approach has been used quite successfully, it has been limited in some important ways. We overcome these limitations as follows. First, we give constant factor approximation algorithms to maximize $F$ over a downward-closed polytope $P$ described by an efficient separation oracle. Previously this was known only for monotone functions. For nonmonotone functions, a constant factor was known only when the polytope was either the intersection of a fixed number of knapsack constraints or a matroid polytope. Second, we show that contention resolution schemes are an effective way to round a fractional solution, even when $f$ is nonmonotone. In particular, contention resolution schemes for different polytopes can be combined to handle the intersection of different constraints. Via linear programming duality we show that a contention resolution scheme for a constraint is related to the correlation gap of weighted rank functions of the constraint. This leads to an optimal contention resolution scheme for the matroid polytope. Our results provide a broadly applicable framework for maximizing linear and submodular functions subject to independence constraints. We give several illustrative examples. Contention resolution schemes may find other applications.
We consider the Max-Min Allocation problem: given a set A of m agents and a set I of n items, where agent A ¿ A has utility u <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" …
We consider the Max-Min Allocation problem: given a set A of m agents and a set I of n items, where agent A ¿ A has utility u <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">A</sub> ,i for item i ¿ I, our goal is to allocate items to agents so as to maximize fairness. Specifically, the utility of an agent is the sum of its utilities for the items it receives, and we seek to maximize the minimum utility of any agent. While this problem has received much attention recently, its approximability has not been well-understood thus far: the best known approximation algorithm achieves an O¿(¿m)-approximation, and in contrast, the best known hardness of approximation stands at 2. Our main result is an algorithm that achieves an O¿(n <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">¿</sup> )-approximation for any ¿ = ¿((log log n)/(log n)) in time n <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">O(1/¿)</sup> . In particular, we obtain poly-logarithmic approximation in quasipolynomial time, and for every constant ¿ > 0, we obtain an O¿(n <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">¿</sup> )-approximation in polynomial time. An interesting technical aspect of our algorithm is that we use as a building block a linear program whose integrality gap is ¿(¿m). We bypass this obstacle by iteratively using the solutions produced by the LP to construct new instances with significantly smaller integrality gaps, eventually obtaining the desired approximation. As a corollary of our main result, we also show that for any constant ¿ > 0, an O(m <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">¿</sup> )-approximation can be achieved in quasi-polynomial time. We also investigate the special case of the problem, where every item has non-zero utility for at most two agents. This problem is hard to approximate up to any factor better than 2. We give a factor 2-approximation algorithm.
We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations …
We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations of goods and chores have some fundamental connections but differences as well. We prove that like in the case for goods, an MmS allocation does not need to exist for chores and computing an MmS allocation - if it exists - is strongly NP-hard. In view of these non-existence and complexity results, we present a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for MmS fairness for chores. We then introduce a new fairness concept called optimal MmS that represents the best possible allocation in terms of MmS that is guaranteed to exist. For both goods and chores, we use connections to parallel machine scheduling to give (1) an exponential-time exact algorithm and (2) a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing an optimal MmS allocation when the number of agents is fixed.
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were …
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. In contrast to what real-world experiments suggest, they show that a maxmin guarantee (1-MMS allocation) is not always possible even when the number of agents is limited to 3. While the existence of an approximation solution (e.g. a $1/2$-MMS allocation) is quite straightforward, improving the guarantee becomes subtler for larger constants. Procaccia provide a proof for existence of a $2/3$-MMS allocation and leave the question open for better guarantees. Our main contribution is an answer to the above question. We improve the result of [Procaccia and Wang] to a $3/4$ factor in the additive setting. The main idea for our $3/4$-MMS allocation method is clustering the agents. To this end, we introduce three notions and techniques, namely reducibility, matching allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness, and prove the approximation guarantee of our algorithm via non-trivial applications of these techniques. Our analysis involves coloring and double counting arguments that might be of independent interest. One major shortcoming of the current studies on fair allocation is the additivity assumption on the valuations. We alleviate this by extending our results to the case of submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give constant approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS agents, and a logarithmic approximation for the case of subadditive agents. Furthermore, we complement our results by providing close upper bounds for each class of valuation functions. Finally, we present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in polynomial time.
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, …
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain. This paper, restricted to the case where the agents have numerical additive preferences over objects, revisits to some extent the seminal paper by Brams and King [9] which was specific to ordinal and linear order preferences over items. We point out similarities and differences with this latter context. In particular, we show that any Pareto-optimal allocation (under additive preferences) is sequenceable, but that the converse is not true anymore. This asymmetry leads naturally to the definition of a "scale of efficiency" having three steps: Pareto-optimality, sequenceability without Pareto-optimality, and non-sequenceability. Finally, we investigate the links between these efficiency properties and the "scale of fairness" we have described in an earlier work [7]: we first show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. Then we experimentally explore the links between the scales of efficiency and fairness.