SU\G(𝔸)/K·U

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All published works (11)

Action Title Date Authors
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On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms 2025-02-16 Shiri Ron Daniel Schoepflin
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Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier 2024-09-12 Shiri Ron Clayton Thomas S. Matthew Weinberg Qianfan Zhang
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Impossibilities for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms 2024-01-01 Shiri Ron
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On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings 2023-07-07 Moshe Babaioff Shahar Dobzinski Shiri Ron
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On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings 2023-01-01 Moshe Babaioff Shahar Dobzinski Shiri Ron
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Impossibilities for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms 2023-01-01 Shiri Ron
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On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design 2022-06-09 Shahar Dobzinski Shiri Ron Jan Vondrák
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On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design 2022-01-01 Shahar Dobzinski Shiri Ron Jan Vondrák
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The communication complexity of payment computation 2021-06-15 Shahar Dobzinski Shiri Ron
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The Communication Complexity of Payment Computation 2020-12-29 Shahar Dobzinski Shiri Ron
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The Communication Complexity of Payment Computation 2020-01-01 Shahar Dobzinski Shiri Ron

Common Coauthors

Coauthor Papers Together
Shahar Dobzinski 7
Jan Vondrák 2
Moshe Babaioff 2
Daniel Schoepflin 1
Clayton Thomas 1
S. Matthew Weinberg 1
Qianfan Zhang 1

Commonly Cited References

Action Title Date Authors # of times referenced
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Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation 2016-10-01 Shahar Dobzinski 3
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Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions 2020-06-07 Sepehr Assadi Hrishikesh Khandeparkar Raghuvansh R. Saxena S. Matthew Weinberg 3
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Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness 2021-06-15 Aviad Rubinstein Raghuvansh R. Saxena Clayton Thomas S. Matthew Weinberg Junyao Zhao 2
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Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation 2015-05-06 Moshe Babaioff Robert Kleinberg Aleksandrs Slivkins 1
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Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension 2015-06-03 Amit Daniely Michael Schapira Gal Shahaf 1
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On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions 2018-01-01 Mark Braverman Jieming Mao S. Matthew Weinberg 1
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Welfare Maximization with Limited Interaction 2015-10-01 Noga Alon Noam Nisan Ran Raz Omri Weinstein 1
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Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders 2019-10-21 Shahar Dobzinski 1
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Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction 2020-02-29 Sepehr Assadi 1
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Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness 2020-01-01 Aviad Rubinstein Raghuvansh R. Saxena Clayton Thomas S. Mathew Weinberg Junyao Zhao 1
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Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions: Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier 2021-01-01 Sepehr Assadi Thomas Keßelheim Sahil Singla 1
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Improved Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders 2019-11-01 Sepehr Assadi Sahil Singla 1
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Economic efficiency requires interaction 2014-05-31 Shahar Dobzinski Noam Nisan Sigal Oren 1
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Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions 2003-09-12 Ron Holzman Noa Kfir-Dahav Dov Monderer Moshe Tennenholtz 1