We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations …
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works provided existence and algorithms for approximate MMS allocations. The Garg-Taki algorithm gives the current best approximation factor of (3/4 + 1/12n). Most of these results are based on complicated analyses, especially those providing better than 2/3 factor. Moreover, since no tight example is known of the Garg-Taki algorithm, it is unclear if this is the best factor of this approach. In this paper, we significantly simplify the analysis of this algorithm and also improve the existence guarantee to a factor of (3/4 + min(1/36, 3/(16n-4))). For small n, this provides a noticeable improvement. Furthermore, we present a tight example of this algorithm, showing that this may be the best factor one can hope for with the current techniques.
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations …
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works provided existence and algorithms for approximate MMS allocations. The Garg-Taki algorithm gives the current best approximation factor of $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n})$. Most of these results are based on complicated analyses, especially those providing better than $2/3$ factor. Moreover, since no tight example is known of the Garg-Taki algorithm, it is unclear if this is the best factor of this approach. In this paper, we significantly simplify the analysis of this algorithm and also improve the existence guarantee to a factor of $(\frac{3}{4} + \min(\frac{1}{36}, \frac{3}{16n-4}))$. For small $n$, this provides a noticeable improvement. Furthermore, we present a tight example of this algorithm, showing that this may be the best factor one can hope for with the current techniques.
We consider fair division of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based …
We consider fair division of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an agent finds an allocation fair to her if she receives goods worth at least her ($1$-out-of-$n$) MMS value. An allocation is called MMS if all agents receive their MMS values. However, since MMS allocations do not always exist, the focus shifted to investigating its ordinal and multiplicative approximations. In the ordinal approximation, the goal is to show the existence of $1$-out-of-$d$ MMS allocations (for the smallest possible $d>n$). A series of works led to the state-of-the-art factor of $d=\lfloor3n/2\rfloor$ [Hosseini et al.'21]. We show that $1$-out-of-$4\lceil n/3\rceil$ MMS allocations always exist, thereby improving the state-of-the-art of ordinal approximation. In the multiplicative approximation, the goal is to show the existence of $\alpha$-MMS allocations (for the largest possible $\alpha < 1$), which guarantees each agent at least $\alpha$ times her MMS value. We introduce a general framework of "approximate MMS with agent priority ranking". An allocation is said to be $T$-MMS, for a non-increasing sequence $T = (\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n)$ of numbers, if the agent at rank $i$ in the order gets a bundle of value at least $\tau_i$ times her MMS value. This framework captures both ordinal approximation and multiplicative approximation as special cases. We show the existence of $T$-MMS allocations where $\tau_i \ge \max(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n}, \frac{2n}{2n+i-1})$ for all $i$. Furthermore, we can get allocations that are $(\frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{12n})$-MMS ex-post and $(0.8253 + \frac{1}{36n})$-MMS ex-ante. We also prove that our algorithm does not give better than $(0.8631 + \frac{1}{2n})$-MMS ex-ante.
We initiate the study of fair allocations of a mixed manna under the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). A mixed manna allows an item to be a good …
We initiate the study of fair allocations of a mixed manna under the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). A mixed manna allows an item to be a good for some agents and chore for others, hence strictly generalizes the well-studied goods (chores) only manna. For the good manna, Procaccia and Wang [PW14] showed non-existence of MMS allocation. This prompted works on finding an $\alpha$-MMS allocation. A series of works obtained efficient algorithms, improving $\alpha$ to $\frac{3}{4}$ for $n\ge 5$ agents. Computing an $\alpha$-MMS allocation for the maximum $\alpha$ for which it exists is known to be NP-hard. But the question of finding $\alpha$-MMS for the near best $\alpha$ remains unresolved.
We make significant progress towards this question for mixed manna by showing a striking dichotomy: We derive two conditions and show that the problem is tractable under these, while dropping either renders the problem intractable. The conditions are: $(i)$ number of agents is constant, and $(ii)$ for every agent, her total value for goods differs significantly from that for chores. For instances satisfying $(i)$ and $(ii)$ we design a PTAS - an efficient algorithm to find $(\alpha-\epsilon)$-MMS allocation given $\epsilon>0$ for the best possible $\alpha$. We also show that if either condition is not satisfied then finding $\alpha$-MMS for any $\alpha\in(0,1]$ is NP-hard, even when solution exists for $\alpha=1$.
As a corollary, our algorithm resolves the open question of designing a PTAS for the goods only setting with constantly many agents (best known $\alpha=\frac{3}{4}$), and similarly also for chores only setting. In terms of techniques, we use market equilibrium as a tool to solve an MMS problem, which may be of independent interest.
We study the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items among n agents with additive valuations using the popular notion of maximin share (MMS) as our measure of fairness. …
We study the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items among n agents with additive valuations using the popular notion of maximin share (MMS) as our measure of fairness. An MMS allocation provides each agent a bundle worth at least her maximin share. While it is known that such an allocation need not exist [5, 7], a series of remarkable work [1-3, 6, 7] provided 2/3 approximation algorithms in which each agent receives a bundle worth at least 2/3 times her maximin share. More recently, [4] showed the existence of 3/4 MMS allocations and a PTAS to find a 3/4 - ε MMS allocation. Most of the previous works utilize intricate algorithms and require agents' approximate MMS values, which are computationally expensive to obtain.
In this paper we initiate the study of finding fair and efficient allocations of an indivisible mixed manna: Divide m indivisible items among n agents under the fairness notion of …
In this paper we initiate the study of finding fair and efficient allocations of an indivisible mixed manna: Divide m indivisible items among n agents under the fairness notion of maximin share (MMS) and the efficiency notion of Pareto optimality (PO). A mixed manna allows an item to be a good for some agents and a chore for others. The problem of finding $\alpha$-MMS allocation for the (near) best $\alpha\in(0,1]$ for which it exists, remains unresolved even for a goods manna with constantly many agents, while the problem of finding $\alpha$-MMS+PO allocation is unexplored for any $\alpha\in(0,1]$. We make significant progress on the above questions for a mixed manna. First, we show that for any $\alpha>0$, an $\alpha$-MMS allocation may not always exist, thus ruling out solving the problem for a fixed $\alpha$. Second, towards computing $\alpha$-MMS+PO allocation for the best possible $\alpha$, we obtain a dichotomous result: We derive two conditions and show that the problem is tractable under these two conditions, while dropping either renders the problem intractable. The two conditions are: (i) number of agents is a constant, and (ii) for every agent, her absolute value for all the items is at least a constant factor of her total (absolute) value for all the goods or all the chores. In particular, first, for instances satisfying (i) and (ii) we design a PTAS - an efficient algorithm to find an $(\alpha-\epsilon)$-MMS and $\gamma$-PO allocation when given $\epsilon,\gamma>0$, for the highest possible $\alpha\in(0,1]$. Second, we show that if either condition is not satisfied then finding an $\alpha$-MMS allocation for any $\alpha\in(0,1]$ is NP-hard, even when a solution exists for $\alpha=1$. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first algorithm that ensures both approximate MMS and PO guarantees.
Fair division is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings, where the goal is to divide a set of resources among agents in a fair manner. We study the case …
Fair division is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings, where the goal is to divide a set of resources among agents in a fair manner. We study the case where m indivisible items need to be divided among n agents with additive valuations using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). An MMS allocation provides each agent a bundle worth at least her maximin share. While it is known that such an allocation need not exist, a series of work provided approximation algorithms for a 2/3-MMS allocation in which each agent receives a bundle worth at least 2/3 times her maximin share. More recently, Ghodsi et al. [EC'2018] showed the existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation and a PTAS to find a (3/4-\epsilon)-MMS allocation for an \epsilon > 0. Most of the previous works utilize intricate algorithms and require agents' approximate MMS values, which are computationally expensive to obtain. In this paper, we develop a new approach that gives a simple algorithm for showing the existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation. Furthermore, our approach is powerful enough to be easily extended in two directions: First, we get a strongly polynomial-time algorithm to find a 3/4-MMS allocation, where we do not need to approximate the MMS values at all. Second, we show that there always exists a (3/4 + 1/(12n))-MMS allocation, improving the best previous factor. This improves the approximation guarantee, most notably for small n. We note that 3/4 was the best factor known for n> 4.
We study the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items among n agents with additive valuations using the popular notion of maximin share (MMS) as our measure of fairness. …
We study the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items among n agents with additive valuations using the popular notion of maximin share (MMS) as our measure of fairness. An MMS allocation provides each agent a bundle worth at least her maximin share. While it is known that such an allocation need not exist [5, 7], a series of remarkable work [1-3, 6, 7] provided 2/3 approximation algorithms in which each agent receives a bundle worth at least 2/3 times her maximin share. More recently, [4] showed the existence of 3/4 MMS allocations and a PTAS to find a 3/4 - ε MMS allocation. Most of the previous works utilize intricate algorithms and require agents' approximate MMS values, which are computationally expensive to obtain.
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a …
We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees, a recently introduced fairness notion. Given a set of $n$ agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of a single agent is the best that she can guarantee to herself, if she would be allowed to partition the goods in any way she prefers, into $n$ bundles, and then receive her least desirable bundle. The objective then in our problem is to find a partition, so that each agent is guaranteed her maximin share. In settings with indivisible goods, such allocations are not guaranteed to exist, so we resort to approximation algorithms. Our main result is a $2/3$-approximation, that runs in polynomial time for any number of agents. This improves upon the algorithm of Procaccia and Wang, which also produces a $2/3$-approximation but runs in polynomial time only for a constant number of agents. To achieve this, we redesign certain parts of their algorithm. Furthermore, motivated by the apparent difficulty, both theoretically and experimentally, in finding lower bounds on the existence of approximate solutions, we undertake a probabilistic analysis. We prove that in randomly generated instances, with high probability there exists a maximin share allocation. This can be seen as a justification of the experimental evidence reported in relevant works. Finally, we provide further positive results for two special cases that arise from previous works. The first one is the intriguing case of $3$ agents, for which it is already known that exact maximin share allocations do not always exist (contrary to the case of $2$ agents). We provide a $7/8$-approximation algorithm, improving the previously known result of $3/4$. The second case is when all item values belong to $\{0, 1, 2\}$, extending the $\{0, 1\}$ setting studied in Bouveret and Lema\^itre. We obtain an exact algorithm for any number of agents in this case.
We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin …
We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself, if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle. Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin share) do not always exist, prior work has focussed on approximation results that aim to find allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amanatidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by developing a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee.
We consider the fair division of indivisible items using the maximin shares measure. Recent work on the topic has focused on extending results beyond the class of additive valuation functions. …
We consider the fair division of indivisible items using the maximin shares measure. Recent work on the topic has focused on extending results beyond the class of additive valuation functions. In this spirit, we study the case where the items form an hereditary set system. We present a simple algorithm that allocates each agent a bundle of items whose value is at least $0.3636$ times the maximin share of the agent. This improves upon the current best known guarantee of $0.2$ due to Ghodsi et al. The analysis of the algorithm is almost tight; we present an instance where the algorithm provides a guarantee of at most $0.3738$. We also show that the algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time given a valuation oracle for each agent.
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of …
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are categorized---and a limit is specified on the number of goods that can be allocated from each category to any agent. The objective here is to find a fair allocation in which the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality constraints. This problem naturally captures a number of resource-allocation applications, and is a generalization of the well-studied (unconstrained) fair division problem.
The two central notions of fairness, in the context of fair division of indivisible goods, are envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and the (approximate) maximin share guarantee (MMS). We show that the existence and algorithmic guarantees established for these solution concepts in the unconstrained setting can essentially be achieved under cardinality constraints. Specifically, we develop efficient algorithms which compute EF1 and approximately MMS allocations in the constrained setting.
Furthermore, focusing on the case wherein all the agents have the same additive valuation, we establish that EF1 allocations exist and can be computed efficiently even under laminar matroid constraints.
In this paper, we consider the problem of how to fairly dividing $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents. The fairness measure we considered here is the maximin share. The previous …
In this paper, we consider the problem of how to fairly dividing $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents. The fairness measure we considered here is the maximin share. The previous best known result is that there always exists a $\frac{4}{3}$ approximation maximin share allocation. With a novel algorithm, we can always find a $\frac{11}{9}$ approximation maximin share allocation for any instances. We also discuss how to improve the efficiency of the algorithm and its connection to the job scheduling problem.
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is …
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible and agents have unequal entitlements. This problem is a generalization of the work by Procaccia and Wang (2014) wherein the agents are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their entitlements. Although Procaccia and Wang show an almost fair (constant approximation) allocation exists in their setting, our main result is in sharp contrast to their observation. We show that, in some cases with n agents, no allocation can guarantee better than 1/n approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements are not necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a 1/n approximation guarantee.
 Our second result is for a restricted version of the problem where the valuation of every agent for each good is bounded by the total value he wishes to receive in a fair allocation. Although this assumption might seem without loss of generality, we show it enables us to find a 1/2 approximation fair allocation via a greedy algorithm. Finally, we run some experiments on real-world data and show that, in practice, a fair allocation is likely to exist. We also support our experiments by showing positive results for two stochastic variants of the problem, namely stochastic agents and stochastic items.
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among n agents in a fair manner. For this problem, maximin share (MMS) is a well-studied solution concept which provides a fairness …
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among n agents in a fair manner. For this problem, maximin share (MMS) is a well-studied solution concept which provides a fairness threshold. Specifically, maximin share is defined as the minimum utility that an agent can guarantee for herself when asked to partition the set of goods into n bundles such that the remaining (n-1) agents pick their bundles adversarially. An allocation is deemed to be fair if every agent gets a bundle whose valuation is at least her maximin share. Even though maximin shares provide a natural benchmark for fairness, it has its own drawbacks and, in particular, it is not sufficient to rule out unsatisfactory allocations. Motivated by these considerations, in this work we define a stronger notion of fairness, called groupwise maximin share guarantee (GMMS). In GMMS, we require that the maximin share guarantee is achieved not just with respect to the grand bundle, but also among all the subgroups of agents. Hence, this solution concept strengthens MMS and provides an ex-post fairness guarantee. We show that in specific settings, GMMS allocations always exist. We also establish the existence of approximate GMMS allocations under additive valuations, and develop a polynomial-time algorithm to find such allocations. Moreover, we establish a scale of fairness wherein we show that GMMS implies approximate envy freeness. Finally, we empirically demonstrate the existence of GMMS allocations in a large set of randomly generated instances. For the same set of instances, we additionally show that our algorithm achieves an approximation factor better than the established, worst-case bound.
Previous chapter Next chapter Full AccessProceedings Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-FreenessBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Alkmini SgouritsaBhaskar …
Previous chapter Next chapter Full AccessProceedings Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-FreenessBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Alkmini SgouritsaBhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Telikepalli Kavitha, Kurt Mehlhorn, and Alkmini Sgouritsapp.2658 - 2672Chapter DOI:https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994.162PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAboutAbstract Fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute m goods to n agents in a “fair” manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume general valuations. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied notion of fairness. However, envy-free allocations do not always exist when goods are indivisible. The notion of fairness we consider here is “envy-freeness up to any good” (EFX) where no agent envies another agent after the removal of any single good from the other agent's bundle. It is not known if such an allocation always exists even when n = 3. We show there is always a partition of the set of goods into n + 1 subsets (X1, …, Xn, P) where for i ϵ [n], Xi is the bundle allocated to agent i and the set P is unallocated (or donated to charity) such that we have: (1)envy-freeness up to any good,(2)no agent values P higher than her own bundle, and(3)fewer than n goods go to charity, i.e., |P| < n (typically m ≫ n). Our proof is constructive. When agents have additive valuations and |P| is large (i.e., when |P| is close to n), our allocation also has a good maximin share (MMS) guarantee. Moreover, a minor variant of our algorithm also shows the existence of an allocation which is 4/7 groupwise maximin share (GMMS): this is a notion of fairness stronger than MMS. This improves upon the current best bound of 1/2 known for an approximate GMMS allocation. Previous chapter Next chapter RelatedDetails Published:2020eISBN:978-1-61197-599-4 https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994Book Series Name:ProceedingsBook Code:PRDA20Book Pages:xxii + 3011
The problem of fair division of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice. Recently, the problem was extended to the case when goods form a graph and the …
The problem of fair division of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice. Recently, the problem was extended to the case when goods form a graph and the goal is to allocate goods to agents so that each agent's bundle forms a connected subgraph. For the maximin share fairness criterion researchers proved that if goods form a tree, allocations offering each agent a bundle of at least her maximin share value always exist. Moreover, they can be found in polynomial time. We consider here the problem of maximin share allocations of goods on a cycle. Despite the simplicity of the graph, the problem turns out to be significantly harder than its tree version. We present cases when maximin share allocations of goods on cycles exist and provide results on allocations guaranteeing each agent a certain portion of her maximin share. We also study algorithms for computing maximin share allocations of goods on cycles.
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, …
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is the following: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain. This paper, restricted to the case where the agents have numerical additive preferences over objects, revisits to some extent the seminal paper by Brams and King [9] which was specific to ordinal and linear order preferences over items. We point out similarities and differences with this latter context. In particular, we show that any Pareto-optimal allocation (under additive preferences) is sequenceable, but that the converse is not true anymore. This asymmetry leads naturally to the definition of a "scale of efficiency" having three steps: Pareto-optimality, sequenceability without Pareto-optimality, and non-sequenceability. Finally, we investigate the links between these efficiency properties and the "scale of fairness" we have described in an earlier work [7]: we first show that an allocation can be envy-free and non-sequenceable, but that every competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is sequenceable. Then we experimentally explore the links between the scales of efficiency and fairness.
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of …
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are categorized---and a limit is specified on the number of goods that can be allocated from each category to any agent. The objective here is to find a fair allocation in which the subset of goods assigned to any agent satisfies the given cardinality constraints. This problem naturally captures a number of resource-allocation applications, and is a generalization of the well-studied unconstrained fair division problem. The two central notions of fairness, in the context of fair division of indivisible goods, are envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and the (approximate) maximin share guarantee (MMS). We show that the existence and algorithmic guarantees established for these solution concepts in the unconstrained setting can essentially be achieved under cardinality constraints. Furthermore, focusing on the case wherein all the agents have the same additive valuation, we establish that EF1 allocations exist even under matroid constraints.
We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allocation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS) fairness. We consider three previously studied …
We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allocation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS) fairness. We consider three previously studied models of information elicited from the agents: the ordinal model, the cardinal model, and the public ranking model in which the ordinal preferences are publicly known. We present both positive and negative results on the level of MMS approximation that can be guaranteed if we require the algorithm to be strategyproof. Our results uncover some interesting contrasts between the approximation ratios achieved for chores versus goods.
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in …
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution concepts which are tailored to address allocation of indivisible goods and, hence, provide an appropriate framework for fair division of goods. This work specifically considers fairness in terms of envy freeness up to one good (EF1), maximin share guarantee (MMS), and Nash social welfare (NSW). Our first result shows that (in a single-parameter environment) the problem of maximizing welfare, subject to the constraint that the allocation of the indivisible goods is EF1, admits a polynomial-time, 1/2-approximate, truthful auction. We further prove that this problem is NP-Hard and, hence, an approximation is warranted. This hardness result also complements prior works which show that an arbitrary EF1 allocation can be computed efficiently. We also establish a bi-criteria approximation guarantee for the problem of maximizing social welfare under MMS constraints. In particular, we develop a truthful auction which efficiently finds an allocation wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least $\left(1/2 - \varepsilon \right)$ times her maximin share and the welfare of the computed allocation is at least the optimal, here $\varepsilon >0$ is a fixed constant. We complement this result by showing that maximizing welfare is computationally hard even if one aims to only satisfy the MMS constraint approximately.
Previous chapter Next chapter Full AccessProceedings Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)MatchingsJugal Garg, Pooja Kulkarni, and Rucha KulkarniJugal …
Previous chapter Next chapter Full AccessProceedings Proceedings of the 2020 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)MatchingsJugal Garg, Pooja Kulkarni, and Rucha KulkarniJugal Garg, Pooja Kulkarni, and Rucha Kulkarnipp.2673 - 2687Chapter DOI:https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994.163PDFBibTexSections ToolsAdd to favoritesExport CitationTrack CitationsEmail SectionsAboutAbstract We study the problem of approximating maximum Nash social welfare (NSW) when allocating m indivisible items among n asymmetric agents with submodular valuations. The NSW is a well-established notion of fairness and efficiency, defined as the weighted geometric mean of agents' valuations. For special cases of the problem with symmetric agents and additive(-like) valuation functions, approximation algorithms have been designed using approaches customized for these specific settings, and they fail to extend to more general settings. Hence, no approximation algorithm with factor independent of m is known either for asymmetric agents with additive valuations or for symmetric agents beyond additive(-like) valuations. In this paper, we extend our understanding of the NSW problem to far more general settings. Our main contribution is two approximation algorithms for asymmetric agents with additive and submodular valuations respectively. Both algorithms are simple to understand and involve non-trivial modifications of a greedy repeated matchings approach. Allocations of high valued items are done separately by un-matching certain items and re-matching them, by processes that are different in both algorithms. We show that these approaches achieve approximation factors of O(n) and O(n log n) for additive and submodular case respectively, which is independent of the number of items. For additive valuations, our algorithm outputs an allocation that also achieves the fairness property of envy-free up to one item (EF1). Furthermore, we show that the NSW problem under submodular valuations is strictly harder than all currently known settings with an factor of the hardness of approximation, even for constantly many agents. For this case, we provide a different approximation algorithm that achieves a factor of , hence resolving it completely. Previous chapter Next chapter RelatedDetails Published:2020eISBN:978-1-61197-599-4 https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994Book Series Name:ProceedingsBook Code:PRDA20Book Pages:xxii + 3011
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how …
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with additive valuation functions and our purpose is twofold. First, our main result provides a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to the players. Our characterization reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthful mechanisms, showing that they can be decomposed into two components: a selection part where players pick their best subset among prespecified choices determined by the mechanism, and an exchange part where players are offered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. In the remaining paper, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mechanisms with fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness, (indicatively, maximin share guarantees and envy-freeness up to one item) and provide tight bounds for their approximability. Our work settles some of the open problems in this agenda, and we conclude by discussing possible extensions to more players.
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is …
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition the items in any way she prefers, into $n$ bundles, and then receive her least desirable bundle. The objective then is to find an allocation, so that each player is guaranteed her maximin share. Previous works have studied this problem mostly algorithmically, providing constant factor approximation algorithms. In this work we embark on a mechanism design approach and investigate the existence of truthful mechanisms. We propose three models regarding the information that the mechanism attempts to elicit from the players, based on the cardinal and ordinal representation of preferences. We establish positive and negative (impossibility) results for each model and highlight the limitations imposed by truthfulness on the approximability of the problem. Finally, we pay particular attention to the case of two players, which already leads to challenging questions.
The goal of division is to distribute resources among competing players in a fair way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in division. Envy-free allocations do not always …
The goal of division is to distribute resources among competing players in a fair way. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied fairness notion in division. Envy-free allocations do not always exist with indivisible goods, motivating the study of relaxed versions of envy-freeness. We study the envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) property, which states that no player prefers the bundle of another player following the removal of any single good, and prove the first general results about this property. We use the leximin solution to show existence of EFX allocations in several contexts, sometimes in conjunction with Pareto optimality. For two players with valuations obeying a mild assumption, one of these results provides stronger guarantees than the currently deployed algorithm on Spliddit, a popular division website. Unfortunately, finding the leximin solution can require exponential time. We show that this is necessary by proving an exponential lower bound on the number of value queries needed to identify an EFX allocation, even for two players with identical valuations. We consider both additive and more general valuations, and our work suggests that there is a rich landscape of problems to explore in the division of indivisible goods with different classes of player valuations.
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin …
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share , which is defined to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself, if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle. Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin share) do not always exist, prior work has focused on approximation results that aim to find allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amanatidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations, a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by developing a simple and efficient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee. Furthermore, we initiate the study of approximate maximin fair division under submodular valuations . Specifically, we show that when the valuations of the agents are nonnegative , monotone , and submodular, then a 0.21-approximate maximin fair allocation is guaranteed to exist. In fact, we show that such an allocation can be efficiently found by using a simple round-robin algorithm. A technical contribution of the article is to analyze the performance of this combinatorial algorithm by employing the concept of multilinear extensions .
We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for …
We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items. For this model, we give several general impossibility results and special possibility results for three common fairness concepts (i.e. EF1, EFX, EFX3) and one popular efficiency concept (i.e. PO). We also study how these interact with common welfare objectives such as the Nash, disutility Nash and egalitarian welfares. For example, we show that maximizing the Nash welfare with mixed manna (or minimizing the disutility Nash welfare) does not ensure an EF1 allocation whereas with goods and the Nash welfare it does. We also prove that an EFX3 allocation may not exist even with identical utilities. By comparison, with tertiary utilities, EFX and PO allocations, or EFX3 and PO allocations always exist. Also, with identical utilities, EFX and PO allocations always exist. For these cases, we give polynomial-time algorithms, returning such allocations and approximating further the Nash, disutility Nash and egalitarian welfares in special cases.
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and quantify the loss of fairness when we impose a constraint that each agent must receive a connected …
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and quantify the loss of fairness when we impose a constraint that each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on the well-studied fairness notion of maximin share fairness. We introduce the price of connectivity to capture the largest gap between the graph-specific and the unconstrained maximin share, and derive bounds on this quantity which are tight for large classes of graphs in the case of two agents and for paths and stars in the general case. For instance, with two agents we show that for biconnected graphs it is possible to obtain at least 3/4 of the maximin share with connected allocations, while for the remaining graphs the guarantee is at most 1/2. Our work demonstrates several applications of graph-theoretic tools and concepts to fair division problems.
We consider the problem of fairly dividing m indivisible chores among n agents. The fairness measure we consider here is the maximin share. The previous best known result is that …
We consider the problem of fairly dividing m indivisible chores among n agents. The fairness measure we consider here is the maximin share. The previous best known result is that there always exists a 4/3-approximation maximin share allocation[3]. With our algorithm, we can always find a 11/9-approximation maximin share allocation for any instance. We also discuss how to improve the efficiency of the algorithm and its connection to the job scheduling problem. The full paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04505.
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents, with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well established notion of the maximin share (MMS) …
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to n agents, with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion, where to qualify as fair, an allocation needs to give every agent at least a substantial fraction of her MMS. In this paper we consider the case of arbitrary (unequal) entitlements. We explain shortcomings in previous attempts that extend the MMS to unequal entitlements. Our conceptual contribution is the introduction of a new notion of a share, the AnyPrice share (APS), that is appropriate for settings with arbitrary entitlements. The AnyPrice share of an agent is the value she can guarantee to herself if she is given a budget equal to her entitlement, and she buys her highest value affordable set when items are adversarially priced with a total price equal to the total entitlements. Even for the equal entitlements case, this notion is new, and satisfies APS ≥ MMS, where the inequality is sometimes strict. We also present an alternative definition for the APS as a maximization problem (a fractional version of the MMS), and provide comparisons between the APS and previous notions of fairness. Our main result concerns additive valuations and arbitrary entitlements, for which we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that gives every agent at least a 3/5-fraction of her APS. This algorithm can also be viewed as providing a strategy in a certain natural bidding game, and this strategy secures each agent that uses it at least a 3/5-fraction of her APS, regardless of the strategies used by other agents.
The maximin share (MMS) guarantee is a desirable fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods. While MMS allocations do not always exist, several approximation techniques have been developed to ensure that …
The maximin share (MMS) guarantee is a desirable fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods. While MMS allocations do not always exist, several approximation techniques have been developed to ensure that all agents receive a fraction of their maximin share. We focus on an alternative approximation notion, based on the population of agents, that seeks to guarantee MMS for a fraction of agents. We show that no optimal approximation algorithm can satisfy more than a constant number of agents, and discuss the existence and computation of MMS for all but one agent and its relation to approximate MMS guarantees. We then prove the existence of allocations that guarantee MMS for 2/3 of agents, and devise a polynomial time algorithm that achieves this bound for up to nine agents. A key implication of our result is the existence of allocations that guarantee the value that an agent receives by partitioning the goods into 3n/2 bundles, improving the best known guarantee when goods are partitioned into 2n-2 bundles. Finally, we provide empirical experiments using synthetic data.
The fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every …
The fair division of indivisible goods is a very well-studied problem. The goal of this problem is to distribute $m$ goods to $n$ agents in a "fair" manner, where every agent has a valuation for each subset of goods. We assume monotone valuations. Envy-freeness is the most extensively studied notion of fairness. However, envy-free allocations do not always exist when goods are indivisible. The notion of fairness we consider here is "envy-freeness up to any good," EFX, where no agent envies another agent after the removal of any single good from the other agent's bundle. It is not known if such an allocation always exists. We show there is always a partition of the set of goods into $n+1$ subsets $(X_1,\ldots,X_n,P)$, where for $i \in [n]$, $X_i$ is the bundle allocated to agent $i$ and the set $P$ is unallocated (or donated to charity) such that we have (1) envy-freeness up to any good, (2) no agent values $P$ higher than her own bundle, and (3) fewer than $n$ goods go to charity, i.e., $|P| < n$ (typically $m \gg n$). Our proof is constructive and leads to a pseudopolynomial time algorithm to find such an allocation. When agents have additive valuations and $|{P}|$ is large (i.e., when $|P|$ is close to $n$), our allocation also has a good maximin share (MMS) guarantee. Moreover, a minor variant of our algorithm also shows the existence of an allocation that is 4/7 groupwise maximin share (GMMS): this is a notion of fairness stronger than MMS. This improves upon the current best bound of 1/2 known for an approximate GMMS allocation. (Very recently and independently, Amanatidis, Ntokos, and Markakis [Theoret. Comput. Sci., 841 (2020), pp. 94--109], also showed the existence of a 4/7-GMMS allocation.)
We consider the problem of approximate maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among three agents with additive valuation functions. For goods, we show that an $\frac{11}{12}$ - MMS allocation …
We consider the problem of approximate maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among three agents with additive valuation functions. For goods, we show that an $\frac{11}{12}$ - MMS allocation always exists, improving over the previously known bound of $\frac{8}{9}$ . Moreover, in our allocation, we can prespecify an agent that is to receive her full proportional share (PS); we also present examples showing that for such allocations the ratio of $\frac{11}{12}$ is best possible. For chores, we show that a $\frac{19}{18}$-MMS allocation always exists. Also in this case, we can prespecify an agent that is to receive no more than her PS, and we present examples showing that for such allocations the ratio of $\frac{19}{18}$ is best possible.
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how …
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on the case of two players with additive valuation functions and our purpose is twofold. First, our main result provides a complete characterization of truthful mechanisms that allocate all the items to the players. Our characterization reveals an interesting structure underlying all truthful mechanisms, showing that they can be decomposed into two components: a selection part where players pick their best subset among prespecified choices determined by the mechanism, and an exchange part where players are offered the chance to exchange certain subsets if it is favorable to do so. In the remaining paper, we apply our main result and derive several consequences on the design of mechanisms with fairness guarantees. We consider various notions of fairness, (indicatively, maximin share guarantees and envy-freeness up to one item) and provide tight bounds for their approximability. Our work settles some of the open problems in this agenda, and we conclude by discussing possible extensions to more players.
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations …
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among n agents with additive valuations, using the popular fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). Since MMS allocations do not always exist, a series of works provided existence and algorithms for approximate MMS allocations. The Garg-Taki algorithm gives the current best approximation factor of (3/4 + 1/12n). Most of these results are based on complicated analyses, especially those providing better than 2/3 factor. Moreover, since no tight example is known of the Garg-Taki algorithm, it is unclear if this is the best factor of this approach. In this paper, we significantly simplify the analysis of this algorithm and also improve the existence guarantee to a factor of (3/4 + min(1/36, 3/(16n-4))). For small n, this provides a noticeable improvement. Furthermore, we present a tight example of this algorithm, showing that this may be the best factor one can hope for with the current techniques.
Makespan scheduling on identical machines is one of the most basic and fundamental packing problems studied in the discrete optimization literature. It asks for an assignment of $n$ jobs to …
Makespan scheduling on identical machines is one of the most basic and fundamental packing problems studied in the discrete optimization literature. It asks for an assignment of $n$ jobs to a set of $m$ identical machines that minimizes the makespan. The problem is strongly NP-hard, and thus we do not expect a $(1+\epsilon)$-approximation algorithm with a running time that depends polynomially on $1/\epsilon$. Furthermore, Chen et al. [3] recently showed that a running time of $2^{(1/\epsilon)^{1-\delta}}+\text{poly}(n)$ for any $\delta>0$ would imply that the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails. A long sequence of algorithms have been developed that try to obtain low dependencies on $1/\epsilon$, the better of which achieves a running time of $2^{\tilde{O}(1/\epsilon^2)}+O(n\log n)$ [11]. In this paper we obtain an algorithm with a running time of $2^{\tilde{O}(1/\epsilon)}+O(n\log n)$, which is tight under ETH up to logarithmic factors on the exponent.
Our main technical contribution is a new structural result on the configuration-IP. More precisely, we show the existence of a highly symmetric and sparse optimal solution, in which all but a constant number of machines are assigned a configuration with small support. This structure can then be exploited by integer programming techniques and enumeration. We believe that our structural result is of independent interest and should find applications to other settings. In particular, we show how the structure can be applied to the minimum makespan problem on related machines and to a larger class of objective functions on parallel machines. For all these cases we obtain an efficient PTAS with running time $2^{\tilde{O}(1/\epsilon)} + \text{poly}(n)$.
We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents with budget-additive valuation functions. Budget-additive valuations represent an important class of …
We present the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing the Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents with budget-additive valuation functions. Budget-additive valuations represent an important class of submodular functions. They have attracted a lot of research interest in recent years due to many interesting applications. For every $\varepsilon > 0$, our algorithm obtains a $(2.404 + \varepsilon)$-approximation in time polynomial in the input size and $1/\varepsilon$.
Our algorithm relies on rounding an approximate equilibrium in a linear Fisher market where sellers have earning limits (upper bounds on the amount of money they want to earn) and buyers have utility limits (upper bounds on the amount of utility they want to achieve). In contrast to markets with either earning or utility limits, these markets have not been studied before. They turn out to have fundamentally different properties.
Although the existence of equilibria is not guaranteed, we show that the market instances arising from the Nash social welfare problem always have an equilibrium. Further, we show that the set of equilibria is not convex, answering a question of [Cole et al, EC 2017]. We design an FPTAS to compute an approximate equilibrium, a result that may be of independent interest.
We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allocation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS) fairness. We consider three previously studied …
We initiate the work on fair and strategyproof allocation of indivisible chores. The fairness concept we consider in this paper is maxmin share (MMS) fairness. We consider three previously studied models of information elicited from the agents: the ordinal model, the cardinal model, and the public ranking model in which the ordinal preferences are publicly known. We present both positive and negative results on the level of MMS approximation that can be guaranteed if we require the algorithm to be strategyproof. Our results uncover some interesting contrasts between the approximation ratios achieved for chores versus goods.
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were …
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procaccia and Wang (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. In contrast to what real-world experiments suggest, they show that a maxmin guarantee (1-MMS allocation) is not always possible even when the number of agents is limited to 3. While the existence of an approximation solution (e.g. a $1/2$-MMS allocation) is quite straightforward, improving the guarantee becomes subtler for larger constants. Procaccia provide a proof for existence of a $2/3$-MMS allocation and leave the question open for better guarantees. Our main contribution is an answer to the above question. We improve the result of [Procaccia and Wang] to a $3/4$ factor in the additive setting. The main idea for our $3/4$-MMS allocation method is clustering the agents. To this end, we introduce three notions and techniques, namely reducibility, matching allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness, and prove the approximation guarantee of our algorithm via non-trivial applications of these techniques. Our analysis involves coloring and double counting arguments that might be of independent interest. One major shortcoming of the current studies on fair allocation is the additivity assumption on the valuations. We alleviate this by extending our results to the case of submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give constant approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS agents, and a logarithmic approximation for the case of subadditive agents. Furthermore, we complement our results by providing close upper bounds for each class of valuation functions. Finally, we present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in polynomial time.
A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all …
A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others.
If all items are goods and utility functions are homothetic, concave (and monotone), the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes maximizes the Nash product of utilities: hence it is welfarist (determined utility-wise by the feasible set of profiles), single-valued and easy to compute.
We generalize the Gale-Eisenberg Theorem to a mixed manna. The Competitive division is still welfarist and related to the product of utilities or disutilities. If the zero utility profile (before any manna) is Pareto dominated, the competitive profile is unique and still maximizes the product of utilities. If the zero profile is unfeasible, the competitive profiles are the critical points of the product of disutilities on the efficiency frontier, and multiplicity is pervasive. In particular the task of dividing a mixed manna is either good news for everyone, or bad news for everyone.
We refine our results in the practically important case of linear preferences, where the axiomatic comparison between the division of goods and that of bads is especially sharp. When we divide goods and the manna improves, everyone weakly benefits under the competitive rule; but no reasonable rule to divide bads can be similarly Resource Monotonic. Also, the much larger set of Non Envious and Efficient divisions of bads can be disconnected so that it will admit no continuous selection.
We initiate the study of indivisible chore allocation for agents with asymmetric shares. The fairness concept we focus on is the weighted natural generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fairness and …
We initiate the study of indivisible chore allocation for agents with asymmetric shares. The fairness concept we focus on is the weighted natural generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fairness and OWMMS fairness. We first highlight the fact that commonly used algorithms that work well for the allocation of goods to asymmetric agents, and even for chores to symmetric agents do not provide good approximations for allocation of chores to asymmetric agents under WMMS. As a consequence, we present a novel polynomial-time constant-approximation algorithm, via linear program, for OWMMS. For two special cases: the binary valuation case and the 2-agent case, we provide exact or better constant-approximation algorithms.
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if …
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any other agent up to the removal of one good. In addition, an allocation is deemed efficient if it satisfies Pareto efficiency. While each of these well-studied properties is easy to achieve separately, achieving them together is far from obvious. Recently, Caragiannis et al. (2016) established the surprising result that when agents have additive valuations for the goods, there always exists an allocation that simultaneously satisfies these two seemingly incompatible properties. Specifically, they showed that an allocation that maximizes the Nash social welfare objective is both EF1 and Pareto efficient. However, the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare is NP-hard. As a result, this approach does not provide an efficient algorithm for finding a fair and efficient allocation. In this paper, we bypass this barrier, and develop a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for finding allocations that are EF1 and Pareto efficient; in particular, when the valuations are bounded, our algorithm finds such an allocation in polynomial time. Furthermore, we establish a stronger existence result compared to Caragiannis et al. (2016): For additive valuations, there always exists an allocation that is EF1 and fractionally Pareto efficient. Another key contribution of our work is to show that our algorithm provides a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation to the Nash social welfare objective. This improves upon the best known approximation ratio for this problem (namely, the 2-approximation algorithm of Cole et al., 2017), and also matches the lower bound on the integrality gap of the convex program of Cole et al. (2017). Unlike many of the existing approaches, our algorithm is completely combinatorial, and relies on constructing integral Fisher markets wherein specific equilibria are not only efficient, but also fair.
A set of objects, some goods and some bads, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so …
A set of objects, some goods and some bads, is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that each of them must be entirely allocated to a single agent, then fair division may not exist. What is the smallest number of objects that must be shared between two or more agents in order to attain a fair division?
We focus on Pareto-optimal, envy-free and/or proportional allocations. We show that, for a generic instance of the problem --- all instances except of a zero-measure set of degenerate problems --- a fair and Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found in polynomial time, assuming that the number of agents is fixed. The problem becomes computationally hard for degenerate instances, where the agents' valuations are aligned for many objects.
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an …
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a welfare-achieving allocation, we embed such an oracle into a flexible algorithm called the Constrained Round Robin (CRR) algorithm, that achieves the required welfare level. Our algorithm also allows the system designer to lower the welfare requirements in order to achieve a higher degree of fairness. If the welfare requirement is lowered enough, a strengthening of envy-freeness up to one item is guaranteed. Hence, our algorithm can be viewed as a computationally efficient way to interpolate between welfare and approximate envy-freeness in allocation problems.
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits, and buyers have utility limits. Beyond applications in economics, they arise in the context of maximizing …
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits, and buyers have utility limits. Beyond applications in economics, they arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when allocating indivisible items to agents. In contrast to markets with either earning or utility limits, markets with both limits have not been studied before. They turn out to have fundamentally different properties. In general, the existence of competitive equilibria is not guaranteed. We identify a natural property of markets (termed money clearing) that implies existence. We show that the set of equilibria is not always convex, answering a question posed in the literature. We design an FPTAS to compute an approximate equilibrium and prove that the problem of computing an exact equilibrium lies in the complexity class continuous local search ([Formula: see text]; i.e., the intersection of polynomial local search ([Formula: see text]) and polynomial parity arguments on directed graphs ([Formula: see text])). For a constant number of buyers or goods, we give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an exact equilibrium. We show how (approximate) equilibria can be rounded and provide the first constant-factor approximation algorithm (with a factor of 2.404) for maximizing Nash social welfare when agents have capped linear (also known as budget-additive) valuations. Finally, we significantly improve the approximation hardness for additive valuations to [Formula: see text]. Funding: J. Garg was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant CCF-1942321 (CAREER)]. M. Hoefer was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grants Ho 3831/5-1, Ho 3831/6-1, and Ho 3831/7-1].
Many convex problems in machine learning and computer science share the same form: \begin{align*} \min_{x} \sum_{i} f_i( A_i x + b_i), \end{align*} where $f_i$ are convex functions on $\mathbb{R}^{n_i}$ with …
Many convex problems in machine learning and computer science share the same form: \begin{align*} \min_{x} \sum_{i} f_i( A_i x + b_i), \end{align*} where $f_i$ are convex functions on $\mathbb{R}^{n_i}$ with constant $n_i$, $A_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i \times d}$, $b_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}$ and $\sum_i n_i = n$. This problem generalizes linear programming and includes many problems in empirical risk minimization. In this paper, we give an algorithm that runs in time \begin{align*} O^* ( ( n^{\omega} + n^{2.5 - \alpha/2} + n^{2+ 1/6} ) \log (n / \delta) ) \end{align*} where $\omega$ is the exponent of matrix multiplication, $\alpha$ is the dual exponent of matrix multiplication, and $\delta$ is the relative accuracy. Note that the runtime has only a log dependence on the condition numbers or other data dependent parameters and these are captured in $\delta$. For the current bound $\omega \sim 2.38$ [Vassilevska Williams'12, Le Gall'14] and $\alpha \sim 0.31$ [Le Gall, Urrutia'18], our runtime $O^* ( n^{\omega} \log (n / \delta))$ matches the current best for solving a dense least squares regression problem, a special case of the problem we consider. Very recently, [Alman'18] proved that all the current known techniques can not give a better $\omega$ below $2.168$ which is larger than our $2+1/6$. Our result generalizes the very recent result of solving linear programs in the current matrix multiplication time [Cohen, Lee, Song'19] to a more broad class of problems. Our algorithm proposes two concepts which are different from [Cohen, Lee, Song'19] :
$\bullet$ We give a robust deterministic central path method, whereas the previous one is a stochastic central path which updates weights by a random sparse vector.
$\bullet$ We propose an efficient data-structure to maintain the central path of interior point methods even when the weights update vector is dense.
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and quantify the loss of fairness when we impose a constraint that each agent must receive a connected …
We study the allocation of indivisible goods that form an undirected graph and quantify the loss of fairness when we impose a constraint that each agent must receive a connected subgraph. Our focus is on well-studied fairness notions including envy-freeness and maximin share fairness. We introduce the price of connectivity to capture the largest multiplicative gap between the graph-specific and the unconstrained maximin share and derive bounds on this quantity which are tight for large classes of graphs in the case of two agents and for paths and stars in the general case. For instance, with two agents we show that for biconnected graphs it is possible to obtain at least 3/4 of the maximin share with connected allocations, while for the remaining graphs the guarantee is at most 1/2. In addition, we determine the optimal relaxation of envy-freeness that can be obtained with each graph for two agents and characterize the set of trees and complete bipartite graphs that always admit an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) for three agents. Our work demonstrates several applications of graph-theoretic tools and concepts to fair division problems.
We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any …
We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by many researchers for several years, the existence of EFX allocations has not been settled beyond the simple case of two agents. In this paper, we show constructively that an EFX allocation always exists for three agents. Furthermore, we falsify the conjecture by Caragiannis et al. by showing an instance with three agents for which there is a partial EFX allocation (some items are not allocated) with higher Nash welfare than that of any complete EFX allocation.
We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, …
We consider a fair division setting where indivisible items are allocated to agents. Each agent in the setting has strictly negative, zero or strictly positive utility for each item. We, thus, make a distinction between items that are good for some agents and bad for other agents (i.e. mixed), good for everyone (i.e. goods) or bad for everyone (i.e. bads). For this model, we study axiomatic concepts of allocations such as jealousy-freeness up to one item, envy-freeness up to one item and Pareto-optimality. We obtain many new possibility and impossibility results in regard to combinations of these properties. We also investigate new computational tasks related to such combinations. Thus, we advance the state-of-the-art in fair division of mixed manna.
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among $n$ agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods. We first consider the Nash social welfare …
We develop polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among $n$ agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods. We first consider the Nash social welfare as our objective and design a polynomial-time algorithm that, in the value oracle model, finds an $8n$-approximation to the Nash optimal allocation. Subadditive valuations include XOS (fractionally subadditive) and submodular valuations as special cases. Our result, even for the special case of submodular valuations, improves upon the previously best known $O(n \log n)$-approximation ratio of Garg et al. (2020).
More generally, we study maximization of $p$-mean welfare. The $p$-mean welfare is parameterized by an exponent term $p \in (-\infty, 1]$ and encompasses a range of welfare functions, such as social welfare ($p = 1$), Nash social welfare ($p \to 0$), and egalitarian welfare ($p \to -\infty$). We give an algorithm that, for subadditive valuations and any given $p \in (-\infty, 1]$, computes (in the value oracle model and in polynomial time) an allocation with $p$-mean welfare at least $\frac{1}{8n}$ times the optimal.
Further, we show that our approximation guarantees are essentially tight for XOS and, hence, subadditive valuations. We adapt a result of Dobzinski et al. (2010) to show that, under XOS valuations, an $O \left(n^{1-\varepsilon} \right)$ approximation for the $p$-mean welfare for any $p \in (-\infty,1]$ (including the Nash social welfare) requires exponentially many value queries; here, $\varepsilon>0$ is any fixed constant.
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and …
We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX$_0$, EFX$^3$ and EF1$^3$ - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1$^3$ allocation. With $-\alpha/0/\alpha$ utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX$^3$ and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With $-\alpha/0/\beta$ utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.
A set of T indivisible goods has to be allocated to a set of n agents with additive utilities, in a way that is fair and efficient. A standard fairness …
A set of T indivisible goods has to be allocated to a set of n agents with additive utilities, in a way that is fair and efficient. A standard fairness concept is envy-freeness, which requires that each agent prefers her own allocation over the allocation of any other agent. Even though envy is clearly unavoidable in this context - consider the case of a single indivisible good and two agents - providing approximately envy-free solutions is possible [3, 6]. Specifically, an allocation is envy-free up to one item (EF1) if for every pair of agents i and j, any envy i has for j can be eliminated by removing at most one good from j's bundle. Recently, Caragiannis et al. [3] show that the allocation that maximizes the product of the agents' utilities (with ties broken based on the number of agents with positive utility) is EF1 and Pareto efficient. The majority of the literature to date has focused on the case where the items are available to the algorithm upfront. In many situations of interest, however, items arrive online. A paradigmatic example is that of food banks [1, 5]. Food banks across the world receive food donations they must allocate; these donations are often perishable, and thus allocation decisions must be made quickly, and donations are typically leftovers, leading to uncertainty about items that will arrive in the future. Benadè et al. [2] study this problem, but focus only on fairness. They show that there exists a deterministic algorithm with vanishing envy, that is, the maximum pairwise envy (after all T items have been allocated) is sublinear in T , when the value vit of agent i for the t-th item is normalized to be in [0, 1]. Specifically, the envy is guaranteed to be at most O(√p T logT /n), and this guarantee is tight up to polylogarithmic factors. The same guarantee can also be achieved by the simple randomized algorithm that allocates each item to a uniformly random agent. These results hold even against an adaptive adversary that selects the value vit after seeing the allocation of the first t - 1 items. On the other hand, if we focus only on efficiency, our task is much easier. For example, we could simply allocate each item to the agent with the highest value. But, and this brings us to our interest here, the question remains: How should we make allocation decisions online in a way that is fair to the donation recipients, but also as efficient as possible?